For years, the Thai government’s narrative — “จีนไทยใช่อื่นไกล พี่น้องกัน,” “China and Thailand are not strangers, but brothers and sisters” — has been the guiding principle behind its relations with its larger neighbor. Even more recently, officials on both sides have repeatedly invoked the idea that “Thailand and China are one family.” This idea has raised eyebrows among some in Thailand, which survived colonization.
Such language was politically useful for years. China became one of Thailand’s largest economic partners, with Chinese tourists creating enormous revenue for Thailand’s all-important tourism industry. Chinese factories and technology companies invested in the Thai economy when Thailand feared losing industrial competitiveness to Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. Bangkok, meanwhile, maintained its traditional foreign-policy instinct: stay friendly with every major power and depend on none.
However, even on the streets of Bangkok, something is changing. A collection of controversies involving Chinese-linked businesses, transnational crime, political pressure, and questionable investment practices — just to name a few — has begun to collide with another perception that the Thai state is sometimes more eager to accommodate Beijing than to confront it.
From “One Family” to a Toxic Relationship?
Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s government has continued to deepen Thailand’s relationship with Beijing. During his official visit to China from 16 to 20 July, Anutin met President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang and other senior Chinese figures. His itinerary also included meetings with major Chinese companies including Huawei, Alibaba, and AgiBot.
The Thai government described China as a crucial partner in infrastructure, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, digital technology, tourism, trade, investment and regional security. The visit produced 15 MOUs (memorandums of understanding), with the Thai government subsequently ordering agencies to turn the agreements into implementation plans. None of this is inherently unusual. The political problem here derives from the tone surrounding the relationship.
When Xi met Anutin in Shanghai in July, the Thai government again highlighted the language of “Thailand–China as One Family.” It might be safe to assume that, to forge closer relations, this is harmless diplomatic warmth. But in the eyes of the Thai public, the imagery increasingly clashes with events inside Thailand itself: a family relationship implies trust, and to many Thai people, the relationship with China is certainly not based on trust and, for that matter, certainly not on “family.”
The Rise of “Grey Chinese Capital”
Perhaps no term better illustrates Thailand’s changing mood than ทุนจีนสีเทา or “grey Chinese capital.” The phrase has recently become widespread among the Thai people to describe the networks accused of operating through Thai “nominees.” A nominee is a term used to describe illicit business operations that exploit regulatory weaknesses or connect legitimate-looking businesses to activities such as illegal gambling, cybercrime, money laundering, fraudulent companies, etc. The term is so ubiquitous that it has become part of Gen-Z’s slang in Thailand and is used to describe something as being illicit, fishy, or a scam. Its use further humiliates China in the eyes of the Thai public.
In a country as obsessed with public image as Thailand, such bad publicity inevitably creates public dialogue. Now, that discussion has expanded beyond explicitly criminal operations. In Bangkok’s Huai Khwang district, where Chinese restaurants, businesses, and residents are increasingly visible, a viral controversy from June 2026 concerning a restaurant — allegedly accepting Chinese renminbi rather than normal Thai electronic payments — triggered another debate about closed-loop Chinese business ecosystems, nominee ownership, and whether parts of Bangkok were becoming economically detached from the local economy.
The concern is not that Chinese capital exists, but that Thailand may lack the institutional strength to control capital entering Thailand on Thailand’s terms. Thai People’s Party MP Sahasawat Khumkhong made this argument during the 2026 debate over grey Chinese capital: the fundamental problem, he argued, was not foreigners themselves, but weaknesses within the Thai state that allow illegal or improper activity to flourish. If foreign companies circumvent Thai law, but Thai officials enable them, tolerate them, or fail to enforce regulations, then the controversy ceases to be simply a China problem. It has become a Thai governance problem, especially in the eyes of the Thai people.
The State Audit Office Collapse Changed Perceptions
Then came an event that dramatically intensified scrutiny of Chinese-linked construction. On March 28, 2025, an earthquake centered in Myanmar shook Bangkok. As skyscrapers across Bangkok swayed but remained safe, the unfinished 30-story State Audit Office building collapsed.
A joint venture involving Italian-Thai Development and China Railway Number 10 (Thailand) built the project. Investigators subsequently examined construction practices and building materials, while concerns emerged that the project’s problems had been flagged before the collapse. Although it is wrong to indict Chinese companies as a whole, politically, especially when added to the growing mistrust of China in Thailand, the symbolism matters.
This was not an obscure warehouse. It was a skyscraper for the State Audit Office, the institution whose job is to scrutinize government spending. The optics were devastating: a government accountability building becoming the subject of questions about contracting, oversight, and construction quality.
A 2026 analysis by the Thai fact-checking organization Cofact examined online conversations and found that the collapse helped consolidate broader narratives surrounding ทุนจีน (Chinese capital) and จีนเทา (Grey Chinese). Even before the collapse, researchers found significant negative sentiment in posts discussing China-related issues, particularly around scam networks and visa policies. This matters because political perceptions rarely emerge from a single scandal; they accumulate. The collapse served as a tipping point, turning earlier rumblings into public outcry in the form of protests against China and its dealings within Thailand.
“This is Thailand”
That outcry carried a blunt, recurring message: “This is Thailand,” a slogan that many anti-China protestors chanted, emphasizing that Thailand was not Beijing and demanding that China respect Thai sovereignty. Thai people are extremely nationalistic, stemming from Thailand’s history of being the only country in Southeast Asia to have never been formally colonized. The unease with increasing Chinese influence is therefore more about jurisdiction. Who sets the limits of acceptable political expression inside Thailand? Is it the Thai institutions? Or can the sensitivities of a much larger neighboring power indirectly shape what Thai citizens, journalists, galleries, and politicians are permitted to say?
Criticism of Beijing’s policies and illicit capital has already begun spilling into broader anti-Chinese prejudice. This marks a sharp and troubling turn for Thailand as it has one of Southeast Asia’s deepest histories of Chinese migration and assimilation — millions of Thai families have Chinese ancestry — and Thai-Chinese business communities are integral to the country’s economy. The picture of China and its people in Thailand is, as of late, a criminal network.
In the 2024 survey by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, regional opinion leaders found that 47.7% of Thai respondents expressed little or no confidence that China would “do the right thing” in contributing to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. Only 33.8% expressed confidence or strong confidence. Another striking finding was that concerns about Chinese interference in domestic affairs were especially strong among Thai respondents. On social media, similar discontent is emerging, and online anger can signal that a political narrative is spreading.
So maybe, just maybe, Thailand might have to tell its powerful friend:
“We value this relationship. But this is Thailand, and here, Thailand’s interests come first.”
Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.