Why Differences Regarding India & Pakistan Will Not Cause a Major Rift Between Russia & China

Despite backing opposing sides in South Asia, Moscow and Beijing remain aligned in their flexible, anti-Western partnership.

In February 2022, Russia and China announced their "no limits” partnership in a joint communiqué. The perception of this relationship in the West has either exaggerated the friendship or dismissed it outright. However, the reality is much more complex, as illustrated by each country’s role in the recent escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan. Although Russia and China maintain diverging regional alignments—Russia’s with India, China’s with Pakistan—their broader strategic partnership remains intact, united by shared opposition to U.S. hegemony and facilitated by a flexible, non-binding relationship structure.

Western Narratives of the Russia-China Relationship

Much of the Western discourse around the Russia–China relationship ranges from two extremes: treating it as an “existential threat” or inflating the historical mistrust that exists between the two countries.

The former view within Western policy circles sees the Russia-China alignment as a fundamental challenge to U.S. interests and the foundations of the postwar international system. However, this interpretation is due to a misinterpretation of the Sino-Russian “no-limits partnership” announced in February 2022. In fact, the original Chinese statement described the bilateral relationship as having “no boundaries to friendship” and “no areas off-limits for cooperation” (两国友好没有止境，合作没有禁区), but not unconditional commitment. The English rendering “no-limits partnership” collapses two separate ideas into a single, rigid-sounding label that never actually appeared in the original communiqué.

The latter perspective rests on how Western skeptics of the Russia-China relationship point to the checkered history between the two countries and portray the relationship as fundamentally unequal. This notion, that Moscow plays second fiddle, has shaped U.S. attempts to achieve a “Reverse Kissinger,” such as how in October 2024, Trump said to Tucker Carlson, “I’m going to have to un-unite them.”

In reality, these two extreme interpretations do not fully capture the nuances in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing. As demonstrated by their differing stances on India and Pakistan, the Russia-China relationship is a carefully managed, non-committal arrangement, designed to accommodate strategic disagreements.

Background of the Pahalgam Terrorist Attack

On April 22, 2025, the Resistance Front claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack that killed 25 Indians and one Nepali in Pahalgam, Kashmir. According to survivors of the attack, the terrorists intentionally killed Hindu tourists, and many officials/analysts now argue that the attack sought to provoke communal tensions in India. In response, the Indian government accused the Pakistani state of being behind it, given Pakistan’s history of not doing enough to crack down on terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba that launch terrorist attacks in India from Pakistani soil.

On May 7, 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor against terrorist sites in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In response, the Pakistanis retaliated by launching Operation Bunyan Marsoo, in which Islamabad claimed to have hit Indian military sites. Eventually, on May 10, President Trump announced an American-brokered ceasefire, ending the military exchanges.

Like other countries, Moscow and Beijing publicly claimed neutrality and urged India and Pakistan to “de-escalate.” However, Russia and China were “far from neutral” when taking into account Russia's historical relationship with India and China’s historical relationship with Pakistan.

Background: Russia’s Relationship With India and Pakistan

Since the Cold War, Russia (the Soviet Union) has been a long-standing strategic partner to India. Moscow has regularly used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block any UN resolutions critical of India on issues related to Kashmir and has been an important arms supplier. From 1955 to 1991, the Soviet Union supplied 66% of India’s arms imports. Many Indians, too, especially the older generation, view with nostalgia the time when the Soviets supported India during the 1971 India-Pakistan War (also known as the Bangladesh Liberation War). By contrast, the United States gave carte blanche to the Pakistanis even as it was well aware that the Pakistani military was committing a genocide against the Bangladeshis.

Following the Cold War, close ties between India and Russia have persisted, as India continues to import the majority of its arms from Russia. India also refuses to openly condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. This refusal has been a source of friction in India’s relations with the United States and the European Union. By contrast, relations between Moscow and Islamabad remained limited. This lack of importance is reflected in Vladimir Putin’s ten visits to India and zero visits to Pakistan. The lack of substantive relations is due in part to the lingering distrust Russia has because of Pakistan’s role in aiding the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Background: China’s Relationship with India and Pakistan

While initially cordial, relations between India and China have been challenging ever since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and it wasn't until 1988 that an Indian leader visited the PRC. Aside from the war, China’s close ties with Pakistan were a significant factor in Sino-Indian tensions. Since the 1960s, Beijing has been one of Islamabad’s most important partners, often referred to as the “all-weather friendship.” During the 1960s and 1970s, “China’s fear of Soviet encirclement dictated its close ties with Pakistan,” and Pakistan used its close ties with the United States to act as an interlocutor between Washington and Beijing.

After the Cold War, despite extensive economic ties, China’s relations with India continue to be marked by tensions, owing to China’s support for Pakistan. Within the past five years, Pakistan has imported about 81% of its weapons from China. Additionally, Beijing’s flagship BRI project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and its diplomatic support to Islamabad in the UN Security Council have only deteriorated ties with New Delhi.

When examining Russia and China’s role in the recent escalation of tensions, the differences between the two are shaped by this history.

Why Russia Backs India and China Backs Pakistan

When examining Russia and China’s role post the Pahalgam terrorist attack, the two have very different positions.

From Russia's perspective, it is in their interests to back India — or at least not to openly criticize New Delhi. As stated previously, India is one of Russia's top buyers of its weapons. With the advent of the Western-led sanctions regime over Ukraine, Russia seeks to mitigate its economic isolation. Consequently, Russia seeks to maintain its cordial relations with India to offset the impact of sanctions rather than risk alienating India, as cash-strapped Pakistan is unable to provide meaningful assistance. More recently, Russian media have spread narratives arguing that the Pakistanis have supplied weapons to the Ukrainians.

From China's perspective, its decision to back Pakistan is to keep India distracted, as it views with great paranoia the growing relationship between the United States and India. By ensuring that New Delhi must continuously address security concerns along its borders, Beijing delays India’s efforts to…consolidate influence in Asia-Pacific affairs.” In fact, one of India’s primary strategic nightmares is the possibility of a two-front war with China and Pakistan simultaneously.

Why These Differences Won’t Harm Cooperation

Despite Sino-Russian differences over India and Pakistan, they will not cause the “Reverse Kissinger” that some in Washington hope for. It is essential to note that during the Cold War, Sino-Soviet differences over India and Pakistan harmed the relationship due to the growing ideological rift and China’s growing perception that the Soviets posed a threat to its interests.

However, this is no longer the case today as ideology no longer shapes the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Moreover, the absence of institutional constraints—such as a NATO-style treaty— allows both countries the freedom to maneuver independently, as seen in South Asia. At the core, Russia and China share the view that the United States is their primary geopolitical adversary.

With this in mind, Russia and China’s differences regarding India and Pakistan don’t significantly challenge that fundamental view. Oddly enough, Russia’s support for India and China’s support for Pakistan are in part shaped by their competition with the United States.

Russia and China’s differences with India and Pakistan are indicative of the limitations found in using a black and white framework to analyze how countries conduct their foreign policy.

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