Türkiye’s Entry in the Indo-Pacific: Invoking Islamic Solidarity & Strategic Autonomy
Ankara looks east through faith, defense, and middle-power diplomacy.
The upcoming NATO summit in Türkiye in July highlights the crucial role the country plays in the transatlantic alliance and European security. However, what is equally important is the report that Türkiye is seeking to join the military pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Ankara’s reported interest in joining the Saudi-Pakistani military pact points to another dimension of Turkish foreign policy: its growing role in the Indo-Pacific.
When examining Türkiye’s growing relations with the Indo-Pacific, Ankara has relied on two strategies. The first is invoking the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity, especially in its relations with Muslim-majority countries in the region, such as Pakistan and Indonesia. The second is how Ankara has exerted its influence in the region by positioning itself as an alternative partner vis-à-vis the United States and China to the middle powers of the region.
The Evolution of Türkiye’s Indo-Pacific Policy
For much of the Cold War, Türkiye’s foreign policy establishment was closely aligned with the West. Some of these examples included Türkiye’s 1952 NATO membership, its participation in the Korean War, and its membership in pro-American regional organizations such as CENTO. With the end of the Cold War, Ankara, especially under the AKP government, sought to diversify its foreign policy beyond the West by developing relationships with other regions, such as the Indo-Pacific.
In the 2010s, Türkiye opened embassies in various Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, Laos, and Myanmar. In 2013, Ankara became a dialogue partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and in 2017, became an ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partner. Importantly, in 2019, Türkiye launched its Asia Anew policy with four key priorities: improving interstate relations, expanding trade, strengthening academic cooperation, and developing people-to-people ties.
Invoking the Ottoman Past
When examining Türkiye’s relations with the Indo-Pacific, one strategy that the Turks have employed is the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity. In particular, Turkish officials have invoked Ottoman history — a hallmark of the neo-Ottoman current in Turkish foreign policy.
In its relations with Pakistan, Türkiye has been one of the primary supporters of the Pakistani view on Kashmir. For example, during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 2020, he compared the Kashmiri cause with the Ottoman Empire’s campaign in Gallipoli in 1915. During Erdoğan’s visit to the Pakistani parliament in February 2020, then speaker of the parliament, Asad Qaiser, remarked how “our forefathers“ supported Türkiye during the Khilafat movement. Notably, the Turkish television show “Diriliş: Ertuğrul” became immensely popular in Pakistan. In fact, former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan ordered the country’s television broadcaster to air it in Urdu.
In April 2025, during Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to Türkiye, the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Numan Kurtulmuş, remarked that relations between the two date back to the 16th century and claimed that the Ottoman Empire and Indonesians, as Muslims, jointly resisted the “imperial West.” Likewise, Subianto remarked that Türkiye is the “greatest Muslim civilization for Indonesians” and expressed his personal admiration for Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II. An article published by the Jakarta Post in April 2025 remarked how “cultural relations … serve as a strong foundation and reminder between the two countries that share similar aspirations to provide prosperity to their peoples.”
Turkish Offer of Alternative Partnerships
The second strategy Ankara has relied on is positioning itself as an alternative partner, as middle powers in the region seek to diversify their partners amid rising great-power competition between the U.S. and China. One primary way Türkiye has done this is by deepening defense industrial cooperation, which has only accelerated as the Russo-Ukrainian War expanded Ankara’s defense industrial base.
One example includes growing defense relations between Türkiye and Indonesia. Since its independence, Jakarta has pursued a foreign policy known as “bebas atkif,” an Indonesian phrase meaning “free and active,” emphasizing that the country does not take sides in great-power politics. Amid the growing competition between the United States and China, the Indonesians have been eager to remain neutral and explore other partnerships, such as with Türkiye. With a desire to diversify its partnerships, Turkish-Indonesian defense cooperation has increased in recent years. Some examples of growing security ties include the two countries’ agreement to jointly produce unmanned aerial vehicles during Erdoğan’s visit to Indonesia in February 2025.
Likewise, during South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s visit to Türkiye in November 2025, the two countries agreed to advance defense industrial cooperation. Similarly, the foreign minister of South Korea reiterated that desire in January 2026 and mentioned how the two countries are working together on projects such as the Altay main battle tank. Despite South Korea’s defense alliance with the U.S., it is eager to exercise greater middle-power agency. In addition to Indonesia and South Korea, Türkiye has expanded defense ties with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Pakistan.
Türkiye’s offer of alternative partnerships to countries in the Indo-Pacific is not unique. Other powers, such as France, the European Union, and India, have each positioned themselves as alternative partners beyond the U.S. and China. However, as the tensions between Ankara and New Delhi illustrate, there are multiple visions of “alternative partnerships” as each country seeks to assert its interest vis-à-vis Beijing and Washington. As a result, one middle power’s interests may not always align with the other middle powers of the region.
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.