The Last Holdouts: Resistance in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan
Armed resistance to the Taliban continues, but its impact remains limited.
Following the September 11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan with broad support from the international community. The American-led coalition captured the capital, Kabul, in just over two months. Following that victory, the United States would be in Afghanistan for 20 years. However, the collapse of this mission took only one day. As the Taliban took over Kabul, then-President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, the American embassy was abandoned, and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was re-established. Today, according to a United Nations report, at least 22 groups are working in opposition to Taliban leadership.
Historical Context
Afghanistan is often referred to as “the graveyard of empires” due to its long history of resisting foreign conquest. The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion and the accompanying Mujahideen’s response serve as a strong example of Afghanistan’s legacy of resistance. In Arabic, “mujahideen” is the plural of “mujahid,” which roughly translates to “someone who fights for Islam.” The Mujahideen are not a singular organization but instead a collection of loosely affiliated Afghan resistance fighters.
Ahmad Shah Massoud emerged as a leader of the Afghan resistance and envisioned an “independent, sovereign, and Islamist Afghanistan.” He later turned his native Panjshir Valley into a stronghold that fought against Soviet aggression. For his efforts, Massoud received the nickname “the Lion of Panjshir.” The turning point in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would come in 1986 as the Mujahideen began to receive extensive backing in the form of weapons and technical support via covert programs conducted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and British MI6. After nearly 10 years of invasion, the Mujahideen emerged victorious as the Soviets exited the nation.
Massoud later became Afghanistan’s defense minister and, alongside former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, played a key role in the Northern Alliance, which opposed Taliban rule after they took control of Kabul in 1996. Hence their name, the Northern Alliance is largely made up of non-Pashtuns from the northern and central provinces. On the other hand, Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan primarily fill the ranks of the Taliban. The Northern Alliance later grew to include other non-Pashtun leaders and assisted the American military during the 2001 invasion.
As illustrated, Afghanistan has a long history of resistance. The question then becomes: who opposes the Taliban today, and do they pose a threat to Taliban control?
Key Resistance Groups
The National Resistance Front (NRF) has become the most visible, non-extremist, and armed opposition group to the Taliban. Ahmad Massoud leads the NRF. He is the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud and operates out of Panjshir. His fight is symbolic of his own father’s fight against the Soviets, Taliban, and al-Qaeda. Consisting of many ex-Afghan military, police, and other security officials, the NRF has seen a growth in local support. As such, the group’s operations have expanded and are now present in nearly twenty provinces. By the summer of 2022, the NRF had started to carry out ambushes and limited attacks against Taliban forces in northeastern Afghanistan. Since then, the scope of their attacks has expanded to include eastern Afghanistan and Kabul.
The NRF maintains three main goals: leading efforts among various anti-Taliban groups to align and coordinate their activities, seeking increased engagement from the international community, and expanding the scope and scale of its operations across Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) emerged in 2022 and declared a goal of ending “tyrant rule” through an “inevitable conflict.” Furthermore, the AFF has vowed to restore democracy and women’s rights in Afghanistan. Yasin Zia, who previously served as a former Chief of Staff, Deputy Defense Minister, and Governor of Takhar Province, leads the AFF. Zia also served as head of Afghanistan’s counterterrorism unit in 2011 and as the Deputy Director of the National Directorate of Security from 2011 to 2015. Compared to the NRF, the AFF is less centralized and has focused more on urban-based sabotage operations. In October 2024, the AFF claimed to have attacked Kabul Airport with missiles and a small infantry unit. Last month, the AFF reportedly killed and wounded Taliban fighters in Kunduz and Panjshir. The AFF and NRF are known to collaborate by raising money, weapons, and support for their cause abroad.
Former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) remnants are also resisting the Taliban, although in a much less organized manner. The ANDSF primarily operates with other known groups, such as the NRF and AFF.
Capabilities
Militarily, these resistance groups are quite limited. However, with the start of the NRF’s urban operations, information warfare and guerrilla tactics have become quite valuable for their campaign. Since January 2024, the NRF has had more than 207 successful operations. The NRF has also been able to successfully target military bases and facilities, checkpoints, and high-level officials. Being headquartered in the Panjshir Valley, the NRF’s intelligence capabilities have increased, and, as such, it has been able to infiltrate the Taliban’s intelligence network. More broadly, resistance groups, such as the NRF, have been able to garner some domestic support; however, this has not necessarily translated into external support.
Regional and International Response
Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan, maintains concerns about instability and has engaged with Taliban leadership. More specifically, the Pakistani government remains wary of Afghan refugees entering Pakistan. As such, the “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan” has been introduced. This Plan outlines the proposed return/deportation procedures for non-citizens who reside in Pakistan and do not hold a valid visa in three phases, starting with undocumented Afghan nationals. The United Nations and other humanitarian organizations have strongly criticized this plan.
Tajikistan, like every other government, has refused to recognize the Taliban as the official leaders of Afghanistan. The Taliban have labeled ethnic Tajiks as prone to resistance. In response, President Emomali Rahmon has publicly denounced the Taliban, stating they failed to form an inclusive government or respect ethnic minorities, particularly Tajiks. Tajikistan has also provided refuge to prominent Afghan resistance figures. The country has hosted key NRF figures, such as Ahmad Massoud, granting them protection and enabling them to coordinate resistance efforts from the Tajik capital, Dushanbe. In September 2021, Tajikistan posthumously awarded the nation’s highest honour, the Order of Ismoili Somoni, to Ahmad Shah Massoud and former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani.
Will the Resistance Fade Away?
In the short term, resistance groups such as the NRF will likely remain alive and well. However, due to limited external support, these groups are likely to have only a limited impact on Taliban rule. The most significant risk for resistance is that it further fragments into more radical factions.
In the long term, much depends on whether the Taliban implodes or not. With the organization’s internal network fragile and only continuing to fracture, infighting between the Taliban’s factions is splintering their system.
Another possibility is an economic collapse, which could potentially undermine Taliban authority. Since the takeover by the Taliban in 2021, the Afghan economy has contracted by 27%, unemployment has doubled, and only 40% of the population has access to electricity. Sectors such as finance have “basically collapsed,” and there are no major sources of economic activity, such as exports or public expenditure, which are lacking, leaving small and medium enterprises and farmers as the lifeblood of the faltering economy. Furthermore, 69% of Afghans lack basic resources.
As shown, Afghanistan has a strong legacy of resistance that remains present today. However, these resistance groups are fragmented and under-resourced. Regarding the future, low-level insurgency will undoubtedly continue; however, it will most likely not significantly threaten the Taliban’s rule. The future of this resistance will rest on the support or silence of the Afghan people rather than military strength.
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.