The Emerging Franco-German Consensus on China

Two of Europe's major powers are increasingly coming together regarding the People's Republic.

On February 26, 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited China with the ostensible aim of improving relations with Beijing. Merz’s visit took place amid trade tensions between the European Union (EU) and the United States.

However, beneath the positive headlines and press releases, Germany’s policy toward China has shifted considerably closer to France’s. With a converging Franco-German position, it becomes much easier for the EU to pursue policies that de-risk against China, namely by pushing to lessen Europe’s dependence on Chinese technology and advocating for a deeper India-Europe relationship.

France Seeks Pushback

France and Germany, being the most influential powers in the EU, have significant sway over the bloc’s trade, monetary, industrial, and foreign policy, known as the Franco-German engine. However, Paris and Berlin have diverged numerous times, and one of the issues was how to engage with Beijing.

Within the EU, France initiated the discussion to treat China as a geopolitical competitor. In 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the era of European naiveté toward China is “over.” In 2020, after Macron voiced support for the Hong Kong protests, the Chinese embassy in France vehemently pushed back against his claims, calling it “hypocritical.” More broadly, the heart of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy since 2018 has been to assert strategic autonomy vis-à-vis Washington and Beijing. In line with this approach, France has bolstered security partnerships with key regional powers, including India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

One of the key reasons France has been more vocal in challenging China is that it is a regional power in the Indo-Pacific whose interests are directly affected by China’s growing geopolitical clout.

Germany Wanted Engagement

By contrast, Germany has taken a more accommodative approach vis-à-vis China. Under former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany prioritized engagement with China. Notably, her lack of criticism during the Hong Kong protests prompted criticism from other German politicians in her own party, the Christian Democratic Union. Unlike France’s security-centric approach in the Indo-Pacific, Germany’s is centered on trade. Germany is China’s largest trading partner in the EU, whereas France and China do not share a very deep economic relationship. Notably, in 2021, China accounted for only 9% of France’s imports and 1.4% of French exports. Even though France also has a trade deficit with China, it is less dependent on China than Germany is.

Given the amount of economic interdependence, Berlin has been very reluctant to pursue a policy of de-risking from China. In fact, in November 2022, a group of German business executives argued that de-risking from China would be bad for their businesses and that the Chinese market is essential to their industry. Likewise, in 2024, Germany opposed an EU measure to impose tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, while France supported it. At the time, then Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that imposing tariffs would be “protectionist.”

With diverging Franco-German interests, it was difficult for the EU to fully adopt a de-risking strategy toward China.

Shift in Germany’s Stance

However, over the past three years, Germany’s stance toward China has grown more hawkish. Two key reasons for that are concerns over China’s economic competition with the German automobile industry and its support for Russia’s War in Ukraine.

For decades, the German automobile industry has long been a symbol of the country’s overall economic health. In particular, brands such as Volkswagen were highly dependent on the Chinese market, and in some years, their market share was 50%. However, in recent years, the German automotive industry has suffered significantly from competition from Chinese electric vehicles, and its sales to China have fallen by two-thirds since 2022. According to Andrew Small, a research fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Germany is at the heart of the second China shock.” In fact, one of the reasons for Chancellor Merz’s visit to China in February 2026 was to address the widening trade deficit Germany has with China, calling it unhealthy.

In tandem, Berlin has been increasingly concerned with Beijing’s support for Moscow in the Russia-Ukraine War. In December 2024, former German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock accused China of acting against European interests by backing Russia’s war. In addition, one of the issues Chancellor Merz raised during his China visit concerned Beijing’s support for Moscow.

With these two factors, the German position vis-à-vis China has shifted much closer to France’s.

Impact of Franco-German Consensus on China

With a converging view between Paris and Berlin on China as a threat, it becomes easier for the EU to pursue policies to de-risk its exposure to China.

One area of policy alignment is reducing European reliance on Chinese technology. During a digital summit in November 2025, both Macron and Merz supported efforts to reduce the reliance on Chinese (and American) technology. During the summit, Macron argued that Europe does not want to be a client of American or Chinese technology. Merz echoed his sentiment, insisting that Europe cannot leave AI to the Chinese or Americans. Notably, France and Germany announced a public-private partnership between Mistral AI (a French firm) and SAP SE (a German firm) to develop Europe’s sovereign technology sector. They affirmed support for the EU’s digital sovereignty plan.

Another policy area is strengthening relationships with other Indo-Pacific powers, namely India. As noted by Garima Mohan in her report for the German Marshall Fund, much of Europe, aside from France, prioritized its relationship with China over its relationship with India. However, amid Berlin’s desire to reduce its dependency on China, it has turned to India, given its sheer market size and its crucial role in challenging Chinese power in the Indo-Pacific region. With the two largest EU powers favoring a deeper relationship with India, it has played a key role in shaping EU policy outcomes, such as the India-EU free trade agreement.

At a moment when Europe is navigating multiple geopolitical crises, a Franco-German alignment on China allows the EU to advance a credible strategy of de-risking and assert its strategic autonomy.

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Editorial contributions by Kathryn Kremp

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.