The Changing Dynamic of Russo-DPRK Relations
A strategic marriage of convenience with global implications.
On July 13, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in the eastern coastal city of Wonsan, the second visit by a senior Russian government official to North Korea in as many months. These meetings are the latest sign of expanding cooperation between the two nations, following the signing of a mutual defense treaty in 2024.
Underpinning the deepening bilateral relationship is the DPRK’s military support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Pyongyang on June 4, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un affirmed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would “unconditionally support” Moscow on Ukraine, a position he reaffirmed in his latest meeting with Lavrov.
Since the beginning of the conflict in February 2022, North Korea has increasingly become an indispensable part of Russia’s military strategy. In return, Russia has provided Pyongyang with a new injection of military and non-military aid needed to further improve the regime’s resilience in the face of sanctions and near-universal isolation from the international community.
Munitions Trade: A Growing Dependence
Since late 2022, North Korea has provided Russia with the munitions needed to continue its invasion of Ukraine. An analysis by the Open Source Center (OSC) and Reuters identified at least 64 arms shipments — totalling between 4.2 and 5.8 million munitions — between August 2023 and March 2025. A more recent analysis by South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the intelligence arm of the Defense Ministry, projected that North Korea has shipped about 12 million munitions since the beginning of the war in February 2022. Newer, more advanced weapons systems have also been sent to Russia from North Korea, including Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles and short-range surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. In exchange for its arms sales, North Korea has earned an estimated $20 billion in economic benefits, including an estimated $630 million from technology transfers, according to the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).
With Russia’s expenditure of artillery rounds averaging around 10,000 a day, these munitions shipments enable Russia’s sustained artillery fire in Ukraine, a critical element of its current military strategy. Ukrainian intelligence analysts estimate that around 40 percent of shells fired by the Russian army were provided by North Korea. As Russia continues to exhaust its domestic weapons stockpile, this trend is set to continue as Kim has ordered the DPRK’s arms industry to operate at full capacity for 24 hours a day.
There are two primary reasons behind Russia’s growing dependence on North Korean arms. First, the two countries share a land border, allowing for easier and more secure logistical transport compared to other suppliers. Second, alternative suppliers such as Iran have faced increasing challenges due to sanctions and domestic constraints. Although Moscow is unlikely to rely exclusively on Pyongyang in the long term, North Korea’s current position allows it to negotiate with greater leverage — even under international sanctions.
North Korea Deploys Troops
In recent months, North Korea has begun funneling both military and civilian manpower to support Russia’s invasion. According to Ukrainian officials, North Korea is preparing to send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers to fight on behalf of Russia, adding to the 11,000 it sent in November 2024.
For North Korea, sending troops to fight in the Russian invasion of Ukraine provides the Korean People’s Army (KPA) with actual experience conducting combat operations in a technologically advanced battlefield environment. This could give them an edge in a hypothetical conflict with their neighbors to the South, who regularly engage in training exercises, but not actual combat.
For Russia, the arrival of North Korean troops is a welcome reprieve. Although Russia had seen its traditional spring conscription reach 160,000 recruits — the largest call-up in 14 years — its attempts to develop alternative sources to increase its troop count without ordering a politically unpopular second mobilization have been more modest. On July 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners to serve in the Russian army during draft periods. While the exact number of foreign nationals fighting on behalf of Russia is unclear, estimates range from around 1,500 to 15,000 volunteers, preventing Moscow from relying too heavily on foreign fighters. Therefore, it is unclear whether this decree will improve foreign recruitment numbers, making Pyongyang’s less-than-voluntary injection of troops even more valuable.
Non-Military Support Means Moderate Gains for Pyongyang
Russia’s war in Ukraine has opened a rare window for North Korea to circumvent sanctions and improve its economic and technological capacity. Under the 2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategy Partnership, Pyongyang receives critical foreign currency, energy supplies, and people-to-people contacts.
One notable example is the Khasan-Rajin logistics project that would establish a rail network linking North Korea’s northeastern city of Rajin with the eastern Russian border town of Khasan. During his visit to Pyongyang in June 2024, President Putin highlighted positive developments on the project, which is expected to be completed by 2026.
These projects have deepened ties between North Korean officials and Russian politicians representing eastern provinces such as Primorsky Krai, which had been dormant since the late 1990s. These ties are likely to form the basis for lasting cooperation between the two countries independent of the conflict in Ukraine.
Beyond tangible gains, the prestige of aligning with a global power like Russia enhances North Korea’s international standing — especially in negotiations with China. Recent trends show Pyongyang expanding engagement with Beijing, particularly in tourism, which could shift China’s perception of North Korea from strategic liability to useful buffer if U.S.-China tensions continue to rise.
Strategic Relationship: Concerns and Limits
Since signing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese officials have expressed concerns that Kim could seek major technology transfers from Russia in return, which would potentially enhance the threat posed by his military nuclear program. These concerns should be taken seriously, as there is little evidence of a resolution of the conflict in the near term. While Russia’s cooperation currently is relatively low-cost, its dependence on North Korea’s munitions could trigger more substantial concessions.
However, it is important to recognize the limits to this relationship. While Russia and North Korea’s bilateral relations continue to deepen, Russia is still predominantly a Western-focused power and does not have the capacity to effectively provide robust deterrence capabilities for both itself and the DPRK. Further, attempts to improve the DPRK’s naval force by the two countries have seen limited success.
Additionally, sending weapons to Russia could reduce the DPRK’s internal deterrence capabilities in the event of a crisis. As previously mentioned, North Korean factories have been at full capacity as early as February 2024, and it is unclear whether Pyongyang is able to realistically scale up production in the short term.
Rethinking U.S.-DPRK Negotiation Strategies
At its core, North Korea’s strategy is about regime survival. Deepening ties with Moscow not only deliver tangible benefits but also reflect a more flexible, long-term strategic calculus than previously assumed.
Rather than reacting with alarm, the United States and its allies should explore what conditions or incentives might persuade Pyongyang to scale back its arms transfers and troop deployments. A reactive approach may harden the alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang, while a more measured strategy could open diplomatic pathways. With the Trump administration currently reviewing its North Korea policy, a reassessment of negotiating assumptions is urgently needed. Pyongyang’s leverage has grown, and the U.S. must now consider what it is willing to offer in response.
Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.
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