Takaichi’s Realpolitik

Japan's Prime Minister has set out an ambitious foreign policy approach, but at what cost to the regional status quo?

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi set out to advance her vision for a robust defense policy focusing on deterrence. Takaichi’s security framework perceives China as a regional power diametrically opposed to Japanese autonomy. Takaichi intends to expand Japan’s Defense Industrial Base as she expects private sector expansion to improve a long-stagnant economy. Her rhetorical willingness to use hard power in regional affairs links the security of Japan to a “peace through strength” strategy. Takaichi signals the continuation of former late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s normalization of bolstering defense, a shift from Article 9, which preserves the founding pacifist principles of the constitution. Takaichi is forming the necessary foundations to amend the constitution to increase defensive capabilities. Japanese voices critical of Takaichi denounced her statements as dangerous by linking Taiwan’s sovereignty to Japan’s national security.

Takaichi’s modernization initiatives include constitutional reforms loosening the restrictions on weapon exports, restructuring Japan’s intelligence agency, incorporating UAVs into and expanding upon the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) security role. Takaichi’s defense spending increase coincides with pressure from the United States to pursue a larger burden-sharing role to meet a new 5% defense spending threshold. Furthermore, the modernization initiatives do more to promote strategic convergence between the United States and Japan by building upon the U.S. as a historic security guarantor for Japan. If Takaichi continues to repudiate pacifism in favor of power projection against China, then Japan, along with its Indo-Pacific allies, could shatter regional security.

Trajectory for Reform

Takaichi is able to leverage greater political support in the legislature for her agenda, which focuses on expanding defense policy for economic growth. Takaichi views herself as the ideological successor to Shinzo Abe. Over the past decade, Shinzo Abe promoted policies focused on increasing defense spending, relaxing defense industry regulations, and amending Article Nine of the Constitution. In February 2026, Takaichi implied during a press conference that she wanted to create an environment for a constitutional referendum as soon as possible. The government could formally propose revisions after the Upper House election in 2028, but challenges in the Upper House could undermine its plan. Revisions to the national charter would require the LDP to increase its seats in the National Diet’s Upper House to a two-thirds majority. If domestic support further increases, her policy goals become more feasible.

Also, Takaichi plans to revise three national security strategy documents aimed at expanding Japan’s Defense Industrial Base. Takaichi seeks to restructure and centralize the National Intelligence Bureau for intelligence collection and analysis by July 2026. This plan revises the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office by turning it into a command center, therefore expanding the scope of intelligence. A national intelligence council would act as the intelligence bureau’s secretariat. Takaichi envisions her intelligence agency to be modeled after the CIA and MI6 agencies. Establishing an intelligence apparatus could assist Japan in decision-making congruent with the goal of applying the JSDF to regional defense.

Weapons Exports

The constitutional revisions would primarily deregulate weapons export controls. Takaichi pursues a defense strategy hinged on domestic production from Japan’s Defense Industrial Base, implementing advanced technology and boosting arms sales. The prime minister heads the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser retains a strong leadership role within the institution, which reviews weapons exports. The weapons exports are limited to countries with pre-existing transfer deals and partnerships with Japan. The deregulation would lift a ban on making items exclusively for rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. Additionally, revisions would enable transfers of jointly developed weapons and systems to third countries. By design, this link between the Defense Industrial Base and the Japanese government seeks to maximize arms sales. The differences between offensive and defensive weapons remain blurred, as long-standing distinctions are undermined by distorted intentions.

Modernization Efforts

Takaichi seeks to increase the role of the JSDF for regional security in East Asia as seen with previous deployments with the Philippines in the South China Sea. In 2022, Japan invested heavily in passive defense, munitions stockpiles, and readiness for the JSDF. It is unclear how the JSDF would cooperate with the U.S. military presence in Japan if the JSDF were to take on comprehensive defense responsibilities. One way the Japanese government could increase the role of the JSDF would be to create a system for declaring a state of emergency. Takaichi views China as a powerful, erroneous force diminishing regional security. Her call for urgency subverts diplomatic engagement with China. Modernization efforts are in full swing. Domestic development on Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles, with a range of 620 miles, was recently deployed to Kumamoto prefecture.

Also, Australia selected Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to upgrade the Mogami-class frigate to replace 11 ANZAC-class ships as Japan allocated nearly $64 million to support the Defense Industrial Base and arms sales. In 2026, Japan is preparing to spend $1 billion on the joint development of a sixth-generation Mitsubishi F-X fighter jet with the UK and Italy by 2035. Takaichi’s most recent visit to Washington concluded with a second round of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Investment Initiative announcement totaling $73 billion. Also, establishing a sovereign cloud-based platform for Japan’s government data system, as well as missile co-production, were discussed. Takachi views the growth of the Defense Industrial Base as a necessary step for strengthening Japanese national security.

Drone Manufacturing

Implementing UAVs offers a variety of pragmatic applications while posing new challenges. Takaichi aims to adapt to new fighting styles, starting with the adoption of UAVs, with an allocated $640 million. UAVs allow for coastal security, space-based capabilities, including satellites, tracking, military communications with a mass deployment of low-cost surface, sub-surface, land and aerial drones by 2028. Given Japan’s challenges with an aging population and an understaffed military, the turn to drones is seen as a pragmatic application of technology within the SHIELD program. Additionally, research and development for artificial intelligence-operated drones is a possibility. Takaichi plans a demonstration to extract rare earth minerals around Minami-Torishima Island this summer.

Currently, UAVs are imported from other countries, including China. Chinese drone manufacturers account for more than 90% of the drone supply in Japan. Japan intends to reduce its overdependence on China’s drone manufacturing by subsidizing up to 50% of the cost for research and development programs and capital investments. Ideally, by 2030, she wants to manufacture and use 80,000 drones for firefighting, infrastructure, and agricultural projects. Japan’s goal is to manufacture drone batteries and motors as well. The Economy, Trade, and Industry Ministry will start publicly inviting Japanese companies interested in participating in the framework, citing the need for standardizing drone parts and raising price competitiveness for supply chains.

Spending Pressures

The 2022 national security policy lifted the current GDP-defense spending to a 2% benchmark. Starting April 2026, Japan will enter its fourth year of a five-year program to double annual arms spending to 2% of gross domestic product, which is a 9.4% increase from 2025. Further increases in defense spending could become a divisive issue if inflation continues to demoralize the country. Japan’s economy suffers from anxiety based on a shrinking workforce, rapidly aging population, and the highest debt-to-GDP ratio, sitting near 240%of GDP. While gross domestic product is not a tell-all for how an economy is measured, fiscal constraints pose a greater threat, rather than legitimate political opposition, for Takaichi’s security agenda. Recently, the United States has sought a 5% increase in burden-sharing costs from its Indo-Pacific allies by 2035. The request allocates 3.5% dedicated to core security interests and 1.5% for infrastructure investments.

Tokyo currently spends $1.4 billion annually on American military utilities, facility maintenance, and wages for Japanese staff at U.S. military bases. This pre-existing fiscal commitment is part of the special measures agreement (SMA), up for renewal in 2027. U.S. Ambassador George Edward Glass stated that he would press Japan to contribute more to the burden-sharing costs. During President Trump’s first term, he suggested that unless Japan increases its defense spending to $8 billion, Japan would risk a withdrawal of roughly 54,000 U.S. troops. Even though hardline diplomatic engagement adds more pressure on Japan, a withdrawal scenario is unlikely due to homogeneity in defense posturing, but not impossible.

Buck-Passing

Takaichi’s “Japan First” agenda aims to connect defense modernization and economic reform. Japan adheres to a buck-passing strategy for its defense, with the U.S. acting as its security guarantor. The security interdependence allows Japan to be attached to Washington’s hegemonic ambitions. Takaichi realizes the dual-use of the U.S. military presence strategically positioned across Japan. Also, the American presence offers a veil of extended deterrence for Japan. The U.S. nuclear umbrella allows Takaichi to condemn China over issues such as Taiwan with ease. Additionally, if Takaichi views her defense reform project as strategic convergence within the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, then any previous hesitation to capitulate to outside fiscal pressure may be turned into diplomatic leverage to appease Washington. Takaichi’s willingness to amplify Japanese defense policy is not entirely a shift away from buck-passing, but somewhat of a pivot in how Japan strategically balances its defense priorities with Washington’s demands. Even though Takaichi echoes Washington’s China threat inflation, increasing defense can paradoxically jeopardize Japan’s national security in a volatile, multipolar world.

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Editorial contributions by Kathryn Kremp

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.