Takaichi’s Clandestine Gamble: Japan’s Intelligence Council Explained
The proposed National Intelligence Council is one of Japan’s most consequential postwar security reforms.
In a major victory for Sanae Takaichi’s government, the Japanese House of Representatives voted on Thursday, April 23rd, to approve the creation of a new, centralized intelligence committee. The proposal, fostered and supported by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), further consolidates Tokyo’s national security apparatus under the Prime Minister’s office and strengthens intelligence gathering capabilities. Although still awaiting approval from the Diet’s upper chamber, the legislation not only presents a major shake-up in state security but also offers crucial insight into Takaichi’s vision for the future of Japan’s intelligence community altogether.
The National Intelligence Council would reshape Japan’s clandestine services in two major ways: it would centralize decision-making under the Prime Minister, and create a chokepoint for all critical security data. Although membership of this council would most likely fluctuate, the proposal outlines the following key members: the Minister of Finance, the Justice Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the Prime Minister.
Intentionally vague, the legislation designates the Council to handle all “important matters concerning important intelligence activities.” The proposal specifically outlines this responsibility for a few tasks, including combating foreign intelligence, conducting analysis, and matters regarding collaboration between agencies. Perhaps the most important tool that the council would wield is its mandate to coordinate information, which would allow it to direct any agency to share national security intelligence as needed.
“In a complex and harsh international environment, the bill’s passage will help the government make informed decisions based on high-quality information,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara told the media after the legislative session. Mr. Kihara, a former Minister of Defense and chairman of the LDP research commission on security, will serve as Deputy-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council if approved by the House of Councillors.
Previously, the five organizations of Japan’s intelligence community worked separately, with little to no overlap. These included the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), the National Police Agency (NPA), the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO), and the Intelligence and Analysis Service with the Foreign Affairs Office (MOFA). The National Police Agency traditionally operates as the primary intelligence-gathering service, in accordance with Japanese law.
Mimicking the UK-style system, wherein a specific task is assigned to each agency with little overlap or partnership, Japan’s intelligence community has long been plagued by well-documented inefficiencies and an inability to command a foreign intelligence-gathering regime effectively. Recognition of these systemic obstacles led to the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 2013, loosely modeled after its U.S. counterpart, led by a core team of four Cabinet Ministers.
The establishment of a National Intelligence Council would not function as a replacement for the NSC, but rather as its counterpart. Essentially, it would serve the same primary role of centralizing the command structure of Japan’s intelligence community as the NSC’s role was envisioned to be for national security policy over a decade ago. Structurally, Takaichi’s National Intelligence Council is clearly inspired by the NSC, which was a cornerstone of Shinzo Abe’s nationalist reforms.
From the beginning, Takaichi made clear that reforming Japan’s somewhat decentralized intelligence community was a top priority for her administration. Only hours into her tenure, Takaichi ordered Secretary Kihara to begin working on a plan to strengthen the command structure for Japan’s clandestine services. While significant at the time as an indicator for Takaichi’s upcoming legislative agenda, it was far from the first step taken towards the collectivization of Japan’s intelligence agencies.
In 2013, in an attempt to encourage information sharing and crack down on leaks to the press, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spearheaded the passage of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated State Secrets. Arguably, the result of U.S. pressure to halt the spread of classified information to regional adversaries, the law proved wildly unpopular in Japan, sparking fears of a return to an imperial-style intelligentsia that would severely damage civil liberties. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Abe, a mentor to Takaichi, defended the legislation as a necessary measure to eliminate the hemorrhaging of sensitive information from within the government.
“If information about our jet fighters or warships were leaked, it would endanger Japan,” Abe said in an address broadcast to the nation. “To protect lives, we must prevent intelligence from reaching terrorists. To secure life and property, we had to enact the secrecy law as quickly as possible.”
Despite her soaring popularity, the proposal still presents the same risks to Takaichi as it ultimately did for Abe. Even before the 2013 State Secrets law, the Japanese electorate had a finicky reputation when it came to national security legislation. In 1985, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s ruling coalition proposed a law that would authorize the death penalty for anyone convicted of state espionage, working under a very loose legal definition, which sparked national outrage.
Perhaps anticipating concerns from civil liberties groups and opposition in parliament, the law includes built-in safeguards intended to placate critics. This includes a stipulation that, under the new framework, the intelligence council cannot collect information on domestic elections, a restriction intended to discourage the ruling party from abusing its national security prerogatives for political gain.
Regardless, some experts warn that the proposal not only represents a monumental expansion of state power but is also mostly unwarranted. “If the parameters of what constitutes a ‘national secret’ expand and threaten the right to know, freedom of expression would be constrained,” Professor Masahiko Shimizu, a scholar on constitutional theory, told Kyodo News back in February when the law was still being debated.
If approved by the upper house of parliament, the National Intelligence Council is arguably the most significant reform to Japan’s intelligence community in the post-war era. Functionally, its centralization of control under the prime minister’s office and cabinet, along with the powers designated for its comprehensive assignment of duties, pushes Japan’s intelligence agencies towards a U.S.-styled structure. Symbolically, it’s another nail in the coffin for Japan’s historic policy of pacifist, decentralized governance.
Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.