State Polls a Must-win for Anwar to Maintain Government Stability
A surprisingly stable coalition government in Malaysia will need to find some electoral fortune to at the state level if the country is to avoid its fifth change of government in as many years.
Six months into his term as Malaysian Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim’s “unity government” has proven surprisingly stable. Despite being forced into a coalition with their erstwhile rivals Barisan Nasional (BN), the infighting that characterized Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) previous term in parliament has so far been absent. As of 26 June, Merdeka Center found that Anwar’s approval rating remains above 50% while the government enjoyed approximately 60% approval.
Yet, the endurance of this alliance depends heavily on the results of the upcoming state elections on Aug. 12, 2023. Six states will hold elections for their respective state legislatures – Penang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Terengganu, Kelantan, and Kedah. The former three states are more diverse, wealthy, and urbanized, making them natural sources of PH support. Terengganu and Kedah are rural states with a largely Malay population, making them traditional strongholds for the opposition Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition. Kedah – currently run by PN – has historically been a swing state, with PH, PN, and BN all having formed the state government.
The alliance between PH and BN appears at first glance to be an alliance of convenience. With the former coalition originating out of the opposition to the once-hegemonic BN, the two parties have been at loggerheads for much of Malaysia’s history. It was only the unprecedented circumstance of Malaysia’s first hung parliament since independence in 2022 that forced the two old foes to join hands to gain a parliamentary majority, with Malaysia’s King playing a significant role in brokering this unlikely alliance.
At the core of the alliance is a quid pro quo that advances the material political objectives of both coalitions. By counting on the support of BN MPs, PH gains another opportunity to form the government of Malaysia following its premature ouster in 2020, fulfilling Anwar’s longtime dream to assume the premiership. Conversely, it allows BN – which saw itself relegated to only the third-largest coalition in parliament – to remain in government, albeit as a junior coalition partner.
Yet, the pragmatic basis for this coalition risks being undermined by a poor showing at the state elections, which have been framed as a referendum on the coalition’s record over the last eight months. A poor showing would signal that PH cannot reliably assure BN access to the government. BN may therefore be tempted to revert to an arrangement reminiscent of its previous Muafakat Nasional coalition with the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) if it perceives PN as having greater electoral appeal than PH.
Some have argued, however, that the basis of a PH-BN coalition runs deeper than mere pragmatism. It has been claimed that close ties between Anwar and the current BN president, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, have helped smooth over potential tensions between the two coalitions. With the two having been close allies during Anwar’s previous tenure in BN, a leaked phone call between both men prior to the previous general elections suggests that the groundwork for a potential PH-BN coalition had been laid long before Malaysians went to the polls.
Zahid’s position in BN, however, is precarious in the wake of his Faustian bargain with PH. Many members of his Malay Nationalist component party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), are unhappy with his decision to work with PH given the presence of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a multi-racial PH component party. The latter is perceived by these UMNO members to be a Chinese party with an anti-Malay agenda due to its Chinese-majority leadership and voter base, resulting in a “No Anwar, No DAP” commitment during the 2022 polls.
Weak performance in the State elections could therefore energize anti-Zahid forces within BN, which could see members re-consider BN’s support for collaboration with PH. Such an outcome is more likely given that UMNO is currently polarized between pro- and anti-Zahid factions. Resistance against Zahid could heighten infighting within BN, potentially shifting its policy in a direction that favors disengagement from its PH coalition partner.
A good result for the unity government would be retaining or building on its strong grip over the Penang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan state assemblies. Wresting Kedah from PN would represent a strong vote of confidence in the government from rural Malay voters. Federal government stability will also depend on how many seats BN is able to win out of those allocated to them. If BN underperforms, its leaders may be tempted to leave the “unity government” even if the coalition performs well overall.
That said, questions may be raised about whether BN can remain relevant as a coalition if it were to leave PH. Projections from Ong Kian Ming, a former PH minister and current Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, indicate that PH-BN will maintain its dominant position over Penang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan while making limited gains in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu. This seems to indicate the presence of an urban-rural divide, with PH representing more liberal urban voters and PN representing more conservative rural voters.
In this context, BN finds itself squeezed between these two broad demographics. On the one hand, it is too nationalist and conservative to appeal to urban and minority voters on its own. Yet ironically, it is also seen as insufficiently conservative and religious for rural folk amid a “green wave” of conservative Islamism in the countryside. PN also has the edge in winning over less religious Malay voters through its Malay nationalist Bersatu component party, given that this party lacks the baggage of the 1MDB corruption scandal tainting BN’s reputation.
On balance, it is via PH that BN can best remain relevant in a fast-changing Malaysian political landscape. Should it go with PN, its Malay nationalist branding would be quickly diluted by Bersatu and PAS, weakening its influence within the resulting coalition. With PH, it can bring value-add by mobilizing rural Malay support – something that PH has struggled to do – thereby giving it greater influence over its larger PH allies. It was partly for this reason that BN chose to form a counter-intuitive alliance with PH rather than support PN following the 2022 elections.
While significant portions of BN may resent having to form a coalition with PH and even see this inconvenient alliance as a raw deal electorally, BN’s long-term political survival ultimately relies on working with its traditional foes. Yet, given the extent to which Malay nationalism forms part of BN’s political identity, the extent to which BN can adapt its ideology to match its unlikely bedfellows, in the long run, is debatable. Yet, with shifting alliances and ideological flexibility becoming increasingly important features of contemporary Malaysian politics, nothing is off the table.
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The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.