President Donald Trump is expected to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, on Thursday (Nov. 19). A meeting between the three leaders would be historic, with some analyses referring to it as a “Yalta 2.0”. Indeed, with discussions potentially spanning issues from global conflicts and AI to broader questions about the future order, such a meeting would be timely and could offer a fresh glimpse into how each leader approaches these issues at the highest diplomatic level. While all three leaders have their own incentives for partaking, there are also incentives for their respective countries to capitalize on. Yet, despite the optics of bringing together three great powers, tangible deliverables from the meeting are expected to be limited, given the divergence in objectives fundamental to each country’s national interests.
What Would Leaders Gain from a Trilateral?
U.S. to Reassert Trump’s Global Relevance
Coming off a significant Republican defeat in the U.S. midterm elections and facing increasing bipartisan political pressure and public scrutiny, the Trump administration is battling to both shape and preserve its legacy while holding off an impending ideological rift within the Republican Party. With approval ratings now sitting in the low 30s and stuck in a quagmire over Iran, President Trump could view his first trip abroad since the midterm elections as an opportunity to reaffirm his international relevance and counter perceptions of a lame duck presidency.
Although the White House has so far said that the trilateral agenda will include discussions of nuclear non-proliferation and Iran, President Trump’s tendency toward episodic engagement with foreign policy and his propensity to shift attention between competing priorities indicate he is likely to raise the issue of Ukraine, particularly after his repeated but unsuccessful attempts to settle the conflict over the past two years.
The occasion would give Trump a rare opportunity to raise Ukraine directly with both leaders at the same time, especially China, which has played a consequential role in sustaining Russia through logistical aid, transfers of dual-use technologies, and trade since the outbreak of the war. President Trump is also likely to mention the recent fallout involving former NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, although he may approach the issue cautiously to avoid directly challenging Chinese officials, mindful of the risk of derailing an already fragile bilateral relationship.
More importantly, the meeting would allow the President to pulse check the U.S.-China relationship at the leader-level, assess whether further pressure on Beijing could address Washington’s long-standing grievances over China’s failure to honor previous policy commitments on agricultural purchases and rare earths, secure new deals that could be presented as wins back home, and potentially extend the trade-truce.
China to Project Global Leadership
For China, the timing of the trilateral meeting presents Xi with an opportunity to project China’s stature as a powerful host, particularly in the wake of the recent Fifth Plenum. The political sequencing of the two major events carries its own significance: The plenum’s emphasis on Party discipline, anti-corruption and self-governance — highlighted by the confirmation of further expulsions of senior Party members — reflects Beijing’s continued efforts to consolidate internal political discipline ahead of the 21st Party Congress in 2027. In this regard, the transition from domestic political consolidation to high-level summitry echoes the Confucian principle of 修身齐家治国平天下 (self-cultivation and ordering of one’s immediate sphere before state governance and, ultimately, the establishment of peace and order in the wider world), with internal stability serving as the bedrock for projecting global influence.
The choice of Shenzhen as the host city for the APEC summit and the trilateral meeting is also significant. As China’s technological hub, often likened to Silicon Valley and home to many of the country’s cutting-edge tech firms, Shenzhen offers a platform to showcase China’s technological prowess and demonstrate its vision of techno-industrial governance with Chinese characteristics, particularly amid intensifying competition with the U.S.
The meeting will also be useful for Xi to gauge the extent of Trump’s influence within the Republican Party following the midterms loss, and whether internal GOP divisions and factions could give way to more hawkish voices on China policy within the administration. Chinese officials are likely to pay particular attention to the composition of the delegation accompanying Trump in Shenzhen. Reports have indicated that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has consistently advocated a tougher approach toward China, as well as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, will be in attendance. The three officials have differed over the administration’s approach to China, particularly on tech-related export controls.
Beyond policy signaling, including whether Washington intends to expand tech restrictions and whether Trump will make any public or private references to Taiwan’s security or reiterate U.S. opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing will be closely scrutinizing the delegation for indications of whose voices carry greater weight with Trump. This includes studying which U.S. officials are afforded greater latitude to negotiate independently on specific policy issues, as well as assessing the near- to medium-term implications of White House statements, policy readouts, and official positions following APEC. With Congress likely to intensify pressure and scrutiny over China policy in the wake of the midterm elections and NVIDIA controversy, Beijing will be looking to the executive branch to determine whether Trump has both the political capital and the political will to preserve the current truce, particularly as competing interests within the administration could further constrain his room to maneuver.
While Beijing may be careful not to give the trilateral meeting excessive preeminence at the expense of APEC’s broader agenda, hosting a gathering exclusively with the heads of the U.S. and Russia would cement China’s image as an equal, peer-level and, in many respects, superior counterpart to the other two countries, while further bolstering its claim to a leading role in shaping the Asia-Pacific region.
Russia to Reassert Its Diplomatic Leverage
The Kremlin was reportedly the first to propose a trilateral summit involving the three leaders, and it is understandable why.
Russia has so far been relatively effective at lobbying the Trump administration against major sanctions and more hardline policies traditionally aligned with previous U.S. administration toward Moscow. In September, Trump signed a House bill that would give him broad authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on major purchasers of Russian oil and gas, while also allowing further sanctions against Putin, senior Kremlin officials, and key financial institutions. Barely a month after signing this bill, however, Trump lifted U.S. sanctions on Russian diesel with an executive order to allow Russian diesel supply to reach U.S. and global markets ahead of the November midterm elections. Looking holistically at U.S. policy over the last two years, Russia has received substantially more carrots than sticks, while Ukraine has proven repeatedly to be the principal casualty of Washington’s shifting diplomatic stances and priorities. These have ranged from repeated halts to intelligence sharing and delays in providing air defense capabilities to diplomatic pressure on Kyiv to curb strikes against Russian energy infrastructure and concede territory, even as Russian bombardments continue.
When Putin was received by Trump at the Alaska summit in 2025, it signaled that Putin had succeeded in reopening high-level diplomatic dialogue with Washington despite Russia’s continued global isolation. The trilateral in Shenzhen offers Putin another opportunity to project strength as the leader of a major nuclear power and re-exert his influence over Trump’s thinking on Ukraine, this time with Chinese President Xi standing alongside him.
Narrow Scope for Meaningful Outcomes
The meeting itself is going to capture a global media frenzy, even as it takes place on the sidelines of APEC and with limited bandwidth to delve into substantive issues. Regardless, what is likely to be one of the few opportunities for the three leaders to convene together would give each of them a chance to portray some form of diplomatic wins for their respective domestic audiences, while creating space for strategic maneuvering only available at the highest leadership level. It is also worth considering that, for the Chinese and Russian leaders, few moments may present such an opportunity to entertain ideas and proposals that would otherwise be considered too unorthodox, particularly with an unconventional and transactional U.S. President at the table.
The fact that all three leaders have incentives to participate does not necessarily mean that they share an incentive to cooperate. The very motivations that make the summit appealing to each leader may also constrain its ability to produce meaningful outcomes. While it is best to keep expectations modest for any major policy shifts emerging from this trilateral meeting, there may still be avenues worth exploring so as not to waste this gathering.
Following the expiration of the New START treaty between Washington and Moscow in February, the U.S. has been pushing for a three-way nuclear arms reduction initiative to include Beijing. It is unrealistic to expect China to agree outright to any reduction framework, given its longstanding position that its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than those of the U.S. and Russia during an ongoing nuclear modernization effort. However, it is not unreasonable to envision a joint communiqué between the three countries reaffirming language similar to that of the 2022 P5 Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War, signed by the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, and France, which affirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
Additionally, building on the momentum around nuclear arms discussions, the three leaders could, and should, pursue a separate agreement on the responsible application of AI. Such an agreement could establish communication channels for AI-related military incidents, reaffirming the importance of human oversight over critical AI-driven decisions, such as those involving nuclear command and control, and commit to maintaining dialogue on AI safety and standard-setting. This would build on the September discussions between the U.S. and China on establishing a communication mechanism for AI-related incidents, while bringing Russia into the framework.
For the three powers, using this meeting to set the right tone on issues of global consequence could provide a pathway to translate areas of shared concern into concrete policies, while instilling some stability in an increasingly polarized geopolitical environment. The three countries do not need to agree on how AI should be governed globally to agree on certain minimum safeguards against catastrophic escalation.
Other, more nuanced discussions, including potentially facilitating exit strategies for the Iran war, could also feature on the agenda, although reaching a consensus on these issues would be challenging. Ultimately, the trilateral summit is unlikely to produce many tangible breakthroughs, given the divergence of the strategic objectives of the three countries and a geopolitical climate that has long fostered mistrust more than cooperation. Nevertheless, a rare gathering of the three leaders would underscore the continued significance of great-power diplomacy. In an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment, the ability to establish even limited common ground on issues such as nuclear arms control and the risks associated with the militarization of AI should not be discounted.
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.





