Of late, the European Union’s (EU) engagement with the Indo-Pacific has intensified. One example includes the uptick in diplomatic engagement between India and the European Union, illustrated by the recent visits of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen (along with other EU officials), and French President Emmanuel Macron.
The EU’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific illustrates two structural changes in the EU’s foreign policy. The first is the EU’s desire to reduce its reliance on the United States, as it increasingly recognizes that Washington is no longer a reliable ally. The second is that the Russia-Ukraine War has transformed the EU into a more security-driven actor, leading many capitals in the Indo-Pacific to view Brussels as a serious geopolitical player on the world stage.
The Transatlantic Alliance is on Life Support
One of the main drivers of Europe’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific is its desire to reduce dependency on the United States.
Europe, a traditional ally of Washington, is reeling from an apparent 180-degree turn in the Trump administration’s approach to the continent. InFebruary 2025, Trump insisted that the EU was formed to “screw” the United States. During JD Vance’s speech in Munich, he alleged that the real threat to the bloc came from within, not from Russia or China. The American national security strategy, released in late November 2025, advocated cultivating resistance in Europe, indirectly laying out plans to support far-right parties such as the AfD in Germany and the Rassemblement National in France. The height of transatlantic tensions occurred over Trump’s threats to invade Greenland and his threat to impose a 10% tariff on France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Finland since they sent troops to Greenland. (Note: Norway and the UK are not part of the EU).
Amid such threats, there is a growing realization across Europe that it must become strategically autonomous and not rely on American security. Many ardent Atlanticist countries, such as Germany, Denmark, Poland, and the Netherlands, are advocating strategic autonomy, something that has usually been limited to France. An Atlancist describes someone who supports the close relationship between the United States and Europe, particularly NATO. Notably, during a speech to the European Defense Agency on January 28, 2026, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, said that Trump has shaken the transatlantic relationship to its foundation and warned that Europe needed to take charge of its own security.
As part of the EU’s desire to become more independent of the United States, it has looked toward the Indo-Pacific, as many in that region have also sought to diversify away from Washington. One example is the uptick in diplomatic engagement between Europe and India, such as the conclusion of a free trade agreement after 2 decades, dubbed the “mother of all deals.” The European Union has also concluded a free trade agreement with Indonesia and is currently negotiating similar agreements with Thailand and Malaysia.
The Rise of a Geopolitical Europe
Another reason driving greater engagement between Brussels and the Indo-Pacific is the transformation of the EU’s foreign policy toward greater security centrality.
The European Union was initially formed as an economic trading bloc, not a security actor. As a result, its foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific focused on expanding trade relations. In fact, this was one of the reasons India did not invest in its relationship with the EU, as it did not perceive the EU as a serious geopolitical actor on the world stage, but rather as a normative trading bloc. By contrast, security cooperation with Indo-Pacific actors, such as India and Vietnam, was primarily limited to France.
However, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it has facilitated the commitment by Brussels to invest more in defense. Some examples include the ReArm Europe and Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiatives. In addition, many European countries, such as Germany, Poland, and Italy, that have traditionally avoided extensive defense spending, have committed to increasing it. Likewise, France has also been at the forefront of pushing for more defense spending beyond its traditional commitments, as French President Emmanuel Macron argued that “to be free in this world, [Europe] must be feared.”
The greater European commitment to investing more in defense has facilitated greater security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Some examples include the EU’s security and defense partnerships with India, Japan, and South Korea. Similarly, in Brussels’ recent agreement with Hanoi to upgrade their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, one of the pillars of cooperation includes security and defense.
While Brussels continues to have differences with India and ASEAN members over the Russian threat, these recent security cooperation initiatives reflect that an increasing number of countries are beginning to view the European Union as a rising geopolitical actor on the world stage.
The American and Russian disruption of the international system has led capitals across Europe and the Indo-Pacific to look to one another. In fact, it may be the start of the very Europe-Asia alliance that French President Emmanuel Macron envisioned during his Shangri-La address.
Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.
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