Examining the Saudi-Pakistan Defense Pact

A symbolic move against Washington without genuine mutual defense.

On September 17, 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact. According to the Pakistani readout of the agreement, “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both,” akin to NATO’s Article 5. Examining the agreement’s impacts reveals the broader paradox of Saudi Arabia seeking to diversify its security away from American influence by looking toward actors like Pakistan. However, genuine mutual defense is unlikely, given the KSA’s unwillingness to jeopardize its economic ties with India, and Pakistan’s deep reluctance to provoke Iran.

The History of Pakistani and Saudi Military Relations

It is essential to note that close security ties between Riyadh and Islamabad are nothing new.

In 1947, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to officially recognize Pakistan. During the 1960s, Saudi Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz described Pakistan as Saudi Arabia’s “number one friend in the world.” In 1967, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first defense agreement, which stated that in exchange for Pakistan’s training the Saudi military, the Saudis would help them in their wars against New Delhi. In 1979, the Pakistani army took part in the operation to remove the religious zealots who occupied the grand mosque in Mecca. In 1990-91, Pakistan assisted Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War.

In the context of their history, the recent defense pact is merely emblematic of that close relationship. According to Md. Muddassir Quamar, “This pact is simply the formalisation of a long-standing Saudi-Pakistan understanding that goes back to the 1960s.”

The Saudi Insecurity About American Reliability

What makes this agreement stand out is its timing. On September 9, 2025, the Israelis launched a surprise military attack in Doha to target senior Hamas leaders. Nearly a week later, the Saudi government publicly announced its mutual defense pact with Pakistan. While the attack on Doha was the immediate spark, the structural concerns the Saudis — and by extension many Arab countries — had on the reliability of American security existed for several years.

President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” doctrine was the early spark for Saudi concerns about American reliability. Under this foreign policy vision, the United States needed to reduce its commitments and involvement in the Middle East, as the rise of China and the Indo-Pacific had become a much higher priority. According to Trita Parsi, Iranian-Swedish writer and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, in an interview with the London School of Economics, the Obama administration’s negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, was in part a way to reduce its involvement in Middle East conflicts to focus on Asia.

Under the first Trump administration, even though the United States left the Iran deal, some of its decisions also reinforced Saudi insecurity. For example, in 2019, when the Houthis attacked Saudi oil fields, the Americans decided not to retaliate against the Houthis (and by extension Iran) on the side of the Saudis. During the Biden administration, one of the reasons the KSA re-established diplomatic relations with Iran was due to the perception that the United States was incapable of countering the Iranian threat.

Fast forward to today, Israel’s attacks on Doha were the final straw for the KSA. Even though the second Trump administration designated Riyadh as a major non-NATO ally, there is still no defense agreement like those the United States shares with South Korea or the Philippines. In addition, American officials are concerned that selling Riyadh the F-35s would undermine Israel’s regional military advantage.

The Unlikely Saudi Defense of Pakistan

Despite growing Saudi concerns about the reliability of American security, one key challenge for this agreement to be substantive is Saudi-Pakistani differences over India.

After the signing of the agreement, one of the main worries of New Delhi was the possibility that Saudi Arabia would fight on behalf of Pakistan against India. However, it is highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia will get involved in any future India-Pakistan conflict. While it is true that the Saudis have backed Pakistan in the past in its conflicts against India, it is essential to note that their support has been political, diplomatic, and financial. However, the Saudis have not militarily gotten involved in any conflict between India and Pakistan and are unlikely to do so in the future.

Aside from Saudi unwillingness to get involved in a future India-Pakistan military conflict, Riyadh is unlikely to damage its burgeoning economic relationship with New Delhi. According to The Economic Times, India and Saudi Arabia are seeking to conclude a bilateral investment treaty, which indicates that the two sides remain committed to deepening their economic relationship despite the recent defense pact.

Regarding the future of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), India’s participation in it is unlikely to be impacted by the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact. If anything, it is the ongoing war in Gaza that has put the corridor’s viability into question.

The Unlikely Pakistani Defense of Saudi Arabia

Another factor that would limit genuine mutual defense is Pakistan’s deep reluctance to extend its nuclear deterrence to the Saudis.

For many years, there has been a rumor that the Saudis funded Pakistan’s nuclear program during the 1980s and that the Pakistanis would give their nuclear weapons to the Saudis if asked. Bob Woodward’s book War showed a conversation between MBS and American Senator Lindsay Graham, with MBS saying, “I don’t need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan.” However, this recent defense agreement does not include any mention of Pakistan sharing its nuclear weapons. Importantly, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif told Pakistani media that a nuclear umbrella is not on the radar. The reason for Pakistan’s reluctance is related to Iran.

Just like how the Saudis will be unlikely to fight for India on behalf of Pakistan, “if a crisis erupted between Saudi Arabia and Iran tomorrow, Pakistan would likely evaluate its own national interests…before jumping in.” For example, in 2015, Pakistan refused Saudi Arabia’s request to join its war in Yemen, to remain neutral between the Iranians and Saudis. Most importantly, at a time when Pakistan’s ties with neighboring Afghanistan and India are strained, the last thing Islamabad wants to do is to provoke neighboring Iran.

Ultimately, given the geopolitical constraints of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the defense pact is not a revolutionary paradigm shift. Rather, it is the affirmation of a long-standing Saudi–Pakistani security partnership at a moment of global uncertainty.

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Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.