Unraveling Public Sentiment on Taiwan Unification

Decoding the Complexity of Mainland China's Stance on Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Unification Strategies

Eastern Empirics

Welcome to the first edition of Eastern Empirics, a specialized section of The Asia Cable that aims to demystify the intricacies of academic research pertaining to Asia by presenting scholarly findings in a comprehensible and captivating manner. Our main objective is to shed light on the multifaceted socio-political and economic dynamics of Asia, fostering a deeper understanding of the region among the general public.

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Today, we'll be reviewing an insightful article titled "Assessing Public Support for (Non-)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China," which offers a new perspective on this topic.

The authors of this article are two distinguished scholars in the field. The first author, Adam Y. Liu, is currently an Assistant Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. Prior to this, he served as a Lecturer and Postdoc Associate at Yale University's McMillan Center/Political Science. With a PhD in Political Science from Stanford University, his expertise and contributions to the field are well-recognized.

The second author, Xiaojun Li, is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. He also holds a PhD in Political Science from Stanford University. His research interests and publications span a wide range of topics, including Foreign Policy, Political Economy, and Public Opinion.

Together, they bring a wealth of knowledge and experience to the table, making this piece a must-read for anyone interested in the latest in cross-strait relations. In this post, we'll break down the key points of the article and provide an analysis to help you digest and understand its implications.

Summary of the Article

The article delves into the complex issue of the Chinese public’s perception of various policy tools that Beijing could potentially leverage against Taiwan. The authors utilize data from a nationwide survey conducted in China to gauge public sentiment toward this issue. The study explores various factors that might influence public opinion, such as economic conditions, political beliefs, and national identity.

Purpose of the Article

The purpose of the article is to provide empirical evidence on the level of public support in China for unification with Taiwan, whether peaceful or otherwise. The research question it seeks to answer is: "What is the level of public support in China for the (non-)peaceful unification with Taiwan, and what factors influence this support?"

By answering this question, the authors aim to contribute to the understanding of public opinion in China and its potential impact on cross-strait relations. This study is particularly relevant given the ongoing discussions and tensions surrounding the issue of Taiwan's status.

Article's Methodology

The authors propose five potential policy choices that Beijing could adopt, ranging from the most to the least aggressive. These options include launching a full-scale war, initiating limited military campaigns, imposing economic sanctions, maintaining the status quo, and accepting separate political systems.

The survey presented respondents with these five policy options in a random order to avoid recency bias. Instead of asking respondents to pick their most preferred option, the authors asked them to evaluate each policy. This approach was designed to mitigate political and social desirability bias and to map out a more diverse range of preferences. The survey restricted the time period to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen's second term (2020-2024) to ensure the findings' immediate policy relevance. However, the authors note that the findings might still be relevant beyond 2024.

Following the main questions, the survey included a series of questions designed to explore respondents' thinking when weighing the different policy choices. These questions assessed the likelihood of US intervention in the event of cross-strait military conflict, the potential costs of a unification war, respondents' direct experiences with Taiwan, their estimates of whether ordinary Taiwanese would fight back, and their beliefs about the role of the Kuomintang (KMT) government in promoting peace.

The survey also included standard and China-specific demographic questions to measure respondent age, gender, education, Communist Party of China membership (CPC), geographic location, rural residence, income, and knowledge about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) development. Additionally, it included five standard questions to construct an index of the respondents' degree of nationalism.

Key Findings

1. Public Opinion on Policy Options: The survey found that only a slim majority (55%) of the Chinese public expressed explicit approval of a full-scale war during Tsai’s second term. A third of the respondents were unequivocally opposed to using force, with the rest being ‘unsure’. The other policy options were all viewed as ‘acceptable’ by a slim majority (55–58%) of the respondents.

2. Individual-Level Characteristics: The respondents largely fell into three categories based on their answers: 'pacifist', 'bellicose', and 'ambivalent'. Only 19 out of 1,824 respondents (or about one percent of the sample) rejected all but the most extreme option of armed unification.

3. Impact of Individual Respondent Attributes on Policy Preferences: In the study, the authors developed a scale using Item Response Theory (IRT) to gauge the level of aggressiveness in policy preferences for individual respondents. The scale assigned a score between zero and one to each respondent, with a higher score indicating a greater degree of aggressiveness in policy preferences and a lower score indicating a lesser degree of aggressiveness.

   

   Figure 2 | Latent Measure of Taiwan Policy Preferences. This histogram of latent measure of Taiwan policy preferences is derived from a two-parameter IRT model rescaled to range from zero to one | Source: Liu, A.Y., & Li, X. (2023). 'Assessing Public Support for (Non-)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China.' Journal of Contemporary China

4. Demographic Features and Policy Preferences: Many respondents’ demographic features are correlated with their policy preferences in expected directions. For example, men are more likely to opt for aggressive policy choices than women. Respondents with better knowledge about PLA development are more likely to prefer the more aggressive policy options. Those who believed that a KMT government could better facilitate the peaceful resolution of a cross-strait crisis in the future were more ambivalent.

5. Nationalism and Peer Pressure: Nationalism has the largest positive effect on aggressive policy preferences. Peer pressure is a close second, suggesting that the observed level of support among the Chinese public for using force might be a higher-bound estimate.

6. Potential Costs of Non-Peaceful Means: Respondents do take into account the potential costs of non-peaceful means to achieve unification when weighing the different policy options. In particular, all three cost measures and the likelihood of US intervention reduce the appeal of aggressive policy options, including a full-scale war.

   

Interpretations and Implications

1. Public Support for Armed Unification is Not as High as Perceived: Contrary to popular belief, the study found that only a slim majority of respondents explicitly supported the idea of waging a unification war. This finding suggests that the general perception of high public support for using force to resolve the Taiwan Question may be overstated.

2. Support for Non-Violent Measures: Interestingly, the study also found similar levels of support for less aggressive policy options. These include military coercion short of full-scale war, economic sanctions, and maintaining the status quo. Surprisingly, about one-fifth of the respondents even found it acceptable for the two sides to go their separate ways, which essentially equates to de facto independence for Taiwan.

3. Policy Implications: The findings of the study suggest that Beijing may have more flexibility on Taiwan than is commonly perceived. The fact that armed unification in the near future garners no more support than a wide range of less aggressive policy options indicates that shifting away from using force may not necessarily generate a domestic backlash that would undermine the regime’s legitimacy.

4. Impact of Nationalism and Peer Pressure: The study found that nationalism and peer pressure could create an amplifying effect, pushing up the overall aggressive stance of the public. However, concerns about the human, economic, and reputational costs of a unification war and possible US intervention can deter even the most nationalistic respondents from endorsing more aggressive policies.

5. Contradicting Existing Research: The study found that respondents with college degrees and above tend to endorse the more aggressive policy options, which contradicts existing research showing no relationship between education and support for using military force.

Critical Analysis

Strengths:

1. Broad Scope: The study's strength lies in its comprehensive approach. It doesn't just focus on the concept of armed unification but explores a wide range of policy options. This approach provides a more nuanced understanding of public preferences.

2. Relevance: The study is timely, offering insights into public support for peaceful and non-peaceful means of unification with Taiwan during a period of heightened US—China rivalry.

Weaknesses:

1. Sample Limitations: The study's primary weakness is its reliance on an online sample, which tends to be more educated and urban. This could limit the generalizability of the findings.

2. Potential Bias: The study could be subject to social desirability bias. Respondents might be inclined to express support for more aggressive policy options due to nationalism and peer pressure.

Limitations and Future Research:

1. Time Frame: The study's findings are limited to Tsai's second term, which restricts their long-term applicability. Future research could explore public preferences beyond this time frame.

2. Exploration of Non-Aggressive Options: The study found surprising support for the option of allowing the two sides to go their separate ways. This finding warrants further exploration in future research.

3. Additional Influencing Factors: Future research could examine other factors that might influence public preferences, such as media influence and the role of propaganda.

Conclusion

This piece of research provides a fresh and nuanced perspective on the public sentiment in mainland China toward unification with Taiwan. It challenges the prevailing notion that there is overwhelming support for armed unification, thereby adding a new dimension to our understanding of this complex issue.

Despite its significant contributions, the study is not without limitations. The reliance on an online sample, which tends to be more educated and urban, may limit the generalizability of the findings. Additionally, the potential for social desirability bias cannot be overlooked, as respondents might have been influenced to express support for more aggressive policy options due to nationalism and peer pressure.

On a personal note, I found the article to be a thought-provoking read. It encourages readers to look beyond the dominant narrative and consider the multifaceted nature of public opinion on the Taiwan Question.

In light of the insights gained and the depth of the research, I would highly recommend readers explore the original article. It is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in understanding the dynamics of the Taiwan Question. Reading the article will not only allow you to appreciate the complexity of the issue but also enable you to form your own opinions based on the evidence presented.