Contesting Self-Governance in the South Pacific

New Zealand’s China concerns deepen a Cook Islands sovereignty dispute.

On October 13, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters wrote a letter announcing the suspension of NZ $30 million in aid to the Cook Islands government. Cook Islands’ Prime Minister Mark Brown did not meet the acceptable threshold of consultation with the New Zealand government over a partnership with China on deep-sea mining. Brown explained the Cook Islands does not need to consult New Zealand, citing the ability to conduct its own affairs and assured that there would be no impact on national security. The Cook Islands maintains the free association status in the form of self-governance, founded on the 1964 Cook Islands Constitution Act framework. However, the sovereign relationship between the Cook Islands and New Zealand remains contested over which government system has superseding authority over the foreign affairs of the Cook Islands. Additionally, in 2014, New Zealand established its own Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China focused on counter-terrorism, disaster relief, and maritime security initiatives. New Zealand’s policy toward the Cook Islands, aimed at a strict interpretation of the free association status, is based on skepticism of the Cook Islands’ relationship with China, even though New Zealand has its own strategic partnership with China. The policy double-standard inadvertently complicates the adoption of the New Zealand government’s viewpoint. Prioritizing New Zealand-aligned interests over independent Cook Islands decision-making undermines regional stability. The likelihood of external state actors’ interest in rare earth minerals adds more diplomatic pressure in driving the dispute over the Cook Islands conducting its own foreign affairs with China.

Free Association Status

The complexities of the free association legal status can be contested at times when discussing matters of sovereignty and self-governance. Wellington’s political will to control the decision-making of the Cook Islands’ foreign affairs on deep-sea mining is supported by the voices of great-power competition within and beyond New Zealand. Within the South Pacific, the policy goal is to advance New Zealand’s national security apparatus by exerting authority over the South Pacific. New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon, cites the duty to consult as a superseding authority over the constitutionality of the Cook Islands free association status. Therefore, according to Luxon, the Cook Islands must capitulate to the New Zealand national security apparatus. The precedent claimed by Luxon is based on the 2001 Joint Centenary Declaration, which reverses normalised autonomy into an obligation to align with New Zealand’s national security interests. Wellington seeks reassurance by adopting a strategic trust for a standard of consent for security implications, similar to the Australian foreign policy approach in the South Pacific. Additionally, New Zealand entered a political pact with Niue as Premier Dalton Tagelagi agreed to a celebration of their free association status, while collaborating on climate, economic, and national security issues. New Zealand is countering deteriorating relations with the Cook Islands by strengthening ties with Niue. The declaration includes a limitation on engagement with third-party pacts, which could compromise the established bilateral commitments. The New Zealand government’s foreign affairs strategy reveals a consistency of policy attempting to reorganize the infrastructure of authority in the South Pacific. Furthermore, Peters’ strict policy toward the Cook Islands comes after the Solomon Islands struck a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2023 over national security cooperation. Understanding how the New Zealand government defines its sphere of influence gives insight into the strategic importance of rare earth minerals surrounding the Cook Islands.

Obligation Undermines Sovereignty

Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown stated if the comprehensive agreement between the Cook Islands and China is not a national security threat, then there is no need for New Zealand to react with impunity. Since the agreement does not impact national security, the Cook Islands ought to conduct its foreign affairs without consulting New Zealand. Brown questions whether the New Zealand oversight is legally binding. Furthermore, the gray area between autonomy and expectation undermines independent decision-making. In this case, free association is less than, not equal to, full United Nations membership. Refuting Peters’ stance is an option for conducting their own foreign affairs. If there is an inconsistency in the legality of the free association and if the Cook Islands continues to pursue foreign relations with China on deep-sea mining, New Zealand ought to reshape its diplomatic engagement with the Cook Islands. New Zealand’s attempt to limit the Cook Islands as a perceived buffer state in its sphere of influence could be a form of political admission to a zero-sum strategy by Peters. A strategy that inadvertently promotes a compelling political reason for the Cook Islands to re-align. The policy return on investment does more to break ties with the Cook Islands than a diplomatic solution. New Zealand can improve relations with the Cook Islands rather than jeopardize regional cooperation in the South Pacific. China cannot be both a strategic economic partner to New Zealand while simultaneously a severe national security threat to Wellington by way of cooperation on rare earth minerals with neighboring states.

Rare Earth Minerals

Rare earth minerals continue to be at the forefront of resource extraction. It is, without a doubt, a key factor underscoring the diplomatic exchanges between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. The Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority estimates 6.7 billion metric tons of polymetallic nodules across the surrounding sea. The nodules include minerals such as cobalt, nickel, titanium, and rare earth elements like molybdenum, niobium, vanadium, tungsten, and zirconium. The estimated production is equal to 20 million metric tons of cobalt alone. The New Zealand government perceives the Chinese-Cook Islands partnership on deep-sea mining as undermining the authority of Wellington’s regional national security interests. Even though New Zealand has its own partnership with China, the perception out of Wellington is to maintain the ability to control the foreign affairs of the Cook Islands instead of giving the islands full self-governance. The American response to Beijing’s tightening export controls on rare earth minerals during the tumultuous trade relations was to seek alternative rare earth minerals in areas not dominated by Chinese acquisition. In August, the United States entered a cooperative agreement on deep-sea mining with the Cook Islands. The ongoing focus on rare earths by the United States is consistent, based on existing partnerships with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, and Cambodia within the Asia-Pacific. The administration also signed separate deals with Thailand and Malaysia seeking diversification of critical minerals and supply chain cooperation. Additionally, the administration hosted five Central Asian countries, another region with deep reserves of rare earth minerals. The American prioritization of access to rare earth minerals correlates with China’s economic advancements on rare earth minerals in the South Pacific.

Wellington’s buy-in on great-power competition repositions New Zealand’s policy at the expense of the Cook Islands’ independence. However, even if adopting a framework consistent with great-power rivalry, it is far from reflecting China’s legitimate investment in the Cook Islands. The Chinese government holds 5 ISA contracts in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with the Cook Islands being its furthest progressed deep-sea mining effort. China controls 70 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals and 90 percent of global rare earth processing. Therefore, Chinese cooperation with the Cook Islands might be due to access to rare earth minerals. China is the second largest donor to the Cook Islands after New Zealand, and since 1997, Beijing has financed infrastructure projects across the Cook Islands. Vice-Minister of Natural Resources Sun Shuxian explained the South Pacific voyage of a 4,000-ton advanced marine research vessel, the Da Yang Hao, for deep-sea research following an agreement with the Cook Islands. As the director of China’s State Oceanic Administration, Sun positioned China to continue supporting marine research on deep-sea mapping and marine life observation northeast of Rarotonga. China is a regional actor in the Asia-Pacific. Adopting a zero-sum stance trivializes complex bilateral relationships and trends, especially due to the serious economic fallout that would be nearly irreversible if further alienation continued toward China, not just against the Cook Islands. The actions taken by the government of New Zealand signal an intent to securitize part of Oceania’s resources, a trend identified in U.S.-aligned states adopting the American framework across the Asia-Pacific region in an effort to reduce overdependence on China.

---

Editorial contributions by Kathryn Kremp

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.