Chinese Counterterrorism Diplomacy in Afghanistan: Cooperation or Coercion?
How Beijing uses investment, recognition, and security demands to shape Taliban behavior after the U.S. withdrawal.
Party leadership has delicately, yet assertively, crafted Chinese policy toward post-withdrawal Afghanistan. President Xi Jinping views Afghanistan as a critical link of his government’s Belt and Road Initiative connecting China to the Middle East. As such, China has maintained three core interests in Afghanistan: connectivity, access to resources, and security. China has long faced criticism from the West for its lack of engagement in security, especially in the Global War on Terrorism. However, today, China has gradually increased its involvement in security operations in and around Afghanistan. This article explores how China engages diplomatically with Afghan authorities, particularly the Taliban, to advance Chinese counterterrorism goals, and whether these actions reflect genuine cooperation or subtle coercion.
Regarding security on their western borders, Chinese leadership is most concerned with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a Uyghur jihadist movement that advocates for Xinjiang’s independence. The ETIM has long been active in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which borders Afghanistan. During its founding, the ETIM received material support from the Taliban and had links with the Pakistani Taliban. As a result, China has urged Afghanistan and Pakistan to take action against ETIM to prevent spillover effects that could affect Xinjiang’s and overall Chinese border security.
Beijing has not formally recognized the Taliban government, although they have taken steps in that direction. For example, Chinese leadership has received the Taliban ambassador and has allowed them to control the Afghan Embassy in Beijing. However, China remains insistent that it is “pragmatically and cautiously accepting the Taliban’s dominance in Afghan affairs.”
At a Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference, the Taliban Foreign Minister gave a public assurance stating that, “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will not allow any of its own members, or any other individual or group, including al-Qaida, to pose a threat to the security of others from the soil of Afghanistan.” However, Beijing and others remain skeptical. These doubts are corroborated by Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda, who lived in downtown Kabul until his assassination by an American drone strike.
The relationship between Chinese leadership and the Taliban raises the question of whether it is grounded more in cooperation or coercion. On the surface, both actors appear to have overlapping interests; meanwhile, there is evidence that China has employed pressure tactics to guarantee that Chinese security concerns are prioritized.
The Taliban’s quest for economic legitimacy provides a sign of mutual interest, as since regaining power, they have faced international isolation and financial strain. China offers a path for recognition and investment that the Taliban could be eager to pursue. On the other side, Afghanistan and China also share a broader opposition to Western influence, which provides an extra incentive for engagement.
However, Chinese actions also reveal a degree of coercion. Beijing has consistently demanded guarantees regarding Uyghur militant groups such as the ETIM. As previously stated, China has pressured Pakistan to suppress these groups in the past, and, as such, similar expectations have been placed on the Taliban. For example, Chinese telecom firm Huawei has reportedly assisted the Taliban in developing mass surveillance infrastructure. Additional reports on surveillance and intelligence operations in Afghanistan also show that China is willing to act on its own in order to secure its interests.
China’s engagement with the Taliban reflects a combination of cooperation and coercion. While both sides benefit from economic and political ties, China’s security agenda often shapes the relationship in ways that limit the Taliban’s autonomy.
As Afghanistan is continuously isolated from the West, China’s role will likely increase. This engagement could either help stabilize the region or, if perceived as intrusive, deepen tensions. However, this trend extends beyond Afghanistan as China increasingly positions itself as a security actor in Central Asia and other parts of the Global South.
Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.
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