The 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi demonstrated both the growing importance of the organization and the differences among its members. BRICS now includes countries with very different economic interests, foreign-policy priorities, and relationships with the United States. China and Russia have increasingly used the organization to support a greater redistribution of political and economic power, while India has continued to participate in BRICS alongside its relationships with the United States, Europe, Russia, and the Gulf states. These differences make it difficult for BRICS to act as a unified geopolitical bloc, but they have not prevented cooperation in areas where members have overlapping interests.
The New Development Bank & Financial Diversification
One of the clearest examples of BRICS institutional development is the New Development Bank (NDB). Established in 2015, the bank was created to finance infrastructure and sustainable development in emerging economies and to provide an additional source of development finance outside the established multilateral development banks. Research on the NDB has emphasized that its importance lies in creating a new institution through which developing countries can expand their access to development finance and gain greater influence over the financial architecture. At the same time, the bank remains much smaller than institutions such as the World Bank.
The NDB’s role is particularly relevant to the broader discussion over financial diversification. At the New Delhi summit, BRICS leaders encouraged the bank to expand local-currency financing, diversify its funding sources, and increase its capacity to support infrastructure and economic integration. The New Delhi Declaration explicitly calls for greater use of local currencies in trade and investment, while the NDB’s 2026 investor presentation identifies domestic and local-currency borrowing as part of the bank’s funding strategy.
This is a more gradual development compared to the creation of a common BRICS currency. The organization has prioritized improving cross-border payments and facilitating trade settlements in national currencies. Russia’s position also illustrates the distinction: ahead of the summit, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia was not seeking “de-dollarisation,” but supported expanding the methods available for international payments.
The NDB therefore fits with a broader pattern within BRICS. Members are not necessarily attempting to create an entirely separate financial system, but they are developing institutions that give them additional options within the existing one. Recent research on the NDB similarly describes its contribution as widening policy space, local-currency finance, and alternative development practices within the existing international financial architecture rather than immediately displacing the Bretton Woods institutions.
Ukraine & the Middle East as a Diplomatic Test
The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East also demonstrate the limits of BRICS cooperation in foreign policy. Russia’s position within the organization has made a common approach to Ukraine particularly difficult. The New Delhi Declaration does not mention Ukraine, although it reiterates a general commitment to resolving international disputes through dialogue, consultation, and diplomacy. This is consistent with India’s broader preference for maintaining diplomatic flexibility rather than adopting a unified position on the conflict.
Academic literature also demonstrates why Ukraine has been an important test for BRICS. Kristen Hopewell argues that the war has reinforced political and economic ties among BRICS members, particularly through their continued engagement with Russia. At the same time, BRICS does not share a common position on the war. Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion in March 2022, while India, China, Iran, and South Africa abstained. The organization has continued to accommodate countries that have maintained very different relationships with Moscow and the West.
The Middle East presents a different diplomatic problem. Iran and the United Arab Emirates are both BRICS members despite their different relationships with the United States and their competing regional interests. At the New Delhi summit, both countries supported a joint statement calling for restraint, protection of civilians, and diplomacy. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and UAE Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed also met during the summit, their highest-level engagement since the conflict began.
BRICS did not contribute to resolving existing conflicts, but the summit demonstrated that the organization can provide a diplomatic setting in which states with competing interests continue to engage one another. This is also reflected in the New Delhi Declaration, which emphasizes dialogue and diplomacy while recognizing the different national positions of BRICS members.
India-China Relations
These differences are also important for understanding India-China relations. The improvement in relations between New Delhi and Beijing should not be interpreted as the end of strategic competition. Relations deteriorated substantially after the 2020 border clash, and India has subsequently used both multilateral and minilateral institutions to manage China’s growing power. Ian Hall’s research in International Affairs argues that India has used organizations including BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the Russia-India-China grouping as part of a broader strategy of soft balancing China.
At the same time, India and China have incentives to improve economic and diplomatic relations. Xi Jinping’s visit to India for the 2026 BRICS summit was his first in seven years, and the two governments discussed restoring business and transport links while continuing negotiations over their disputed border. Bilateral trade reached a record $155.6 billion in 2025, although India continues to run a substantial trade deficit with China.
This helps explain India’s approach to BRICS. New Delhi does not need to resolve its strategic competition with China to cooperate with Beijing on trade, development finance, or reform of international institutions. Recent research on India’s simultaneous participation in BRICS and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework similarly describes this as a form of strategic autonomy in which India participates in institutions with competing purposes rather than committing itself to one geopolitical grouping.
This also helps clarify the relationship between India and the United States. India’s participation in BRICS does not require abandoning cooperation with Washington. The two countries can continue to cooperate in defense, technology, and the Indo-Pacific while India maintains relationships with Russia, China, Europe, and the Gulf. For New Delhi, these relationships serve different purposes rather than requiring a single strategic alignment.
BRICS & U.S. Policy
U.S. policy has become another factor in this process. In August 2025, Washington imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian imports because of India’s purchases of Russian oil. The White House described the measure as part of its response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and India’s continued importation of Russian oil.
The additional tariff was removed effective February 7, 2026, after India committed to stop purchasing Russian oil. Reuters reported that the decision followed discussions between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi and represented a change in the U.S. approach to India.
The episode demonstrated how closely trade policy had become connected to broader foreign-policy objectives. It also highlighted the tension between Washington’s use of economic leverage and New Delhi’s interest in maintaining flexibility in its external economic relationships. That tension has continued into September 2026, when President Trump signed legislation increasing economic pressure on Russia and authorizing tariffs affecting countries that continue significant commercial relations with Moscow.
For India, this does not necessarily mean moving toward China or away from the United States. It instead reinforces the logic of maintaining multiple relationships. India can cooperate with Washington on defense and technology while maintaining diplomatic ties with Moscow, participating in BRICS, improving relations with Beijing, and expanding partnerships with Europe and the Gulf.
The Short-Term Implications for BRICS
These different approaches are likely to remain a defining feature of BRICS in the short term. China and Russia have greater incentives to use the organization to promote changes to the existing political and economic order, while India and several other members have stronger incentives to preserve relationships with both BRICS members and Western economies. This will limit the extent to which BRICS can develop a common position on major geopolitical disputes, but it does not prevent cooperation on areas such as development finance, trade, payments, and institutional reform.
The New Development Bank is likely to remain one of the more practical areas of cooperation, particularly as members expand local-currency financing and other forms of financial diversification. BRICS can also provide a diplomatic forum for countries that disagree on individual conflicts, as demonstrated by the discussions over Ukraine and the Middle East. At the same time, the differences among members make a unified BRICS foreign policy difficult. India in particular is likely to continue using BRICS alongside other institutions rather than treating membership as a replacement for its relationships with the United States or other major economies.
BRICS therefore is likely to be used primarily where its members can identify overlapping interests: development finance, trade, payments, economic cooperation, and reform of international institutions. It will be less capable of producing common positions on major security issues where the interests of its members diverge. The organization is becoming an additional component of the international system rather than a replacement for it, while its members gain more options for conducting economic and diplomatic relations. The longer-term significance of BRICS will depend in part on whether these institutions can continue to expand cooperation without requiring its members to resolve the strategic differences that separate them.
The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.