Moving Beyond Ceasefires: Barriers to Peace in Myanmar
Despite temporary halts in fighting, deep-rooted ethnic tensions, fragmented resistance, and weak international pressure continue to obstruct any path to lasting peace in Myanmar.
The history of Myanmar’s civil war is rooted in ethnic tensions and the country’s colonial history. Myanmar (then Burma) was colonized by the British in 1824. British rule fostered ethnic divisions in the country through the favoritism shown to certain ethnic groups for administrative roles. Following the end of World War II and Myanmar’s independence, many ethnic groups sought autonomy but were unsuccessful in achieving it.
During the period of authoritarianism following the 1962 coup, ethnic suppression was rampant. The promotion of Bamar—Myanmar’s majority ethnic group—culture increased tensions, leading to the creation of many ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) seeking to gain autonomy. Although the brief period of democracy from 2011 to 2020 would see many EAOs agreeing to ceasefires and a cessation of conflict, the 2021 coup reignited these conflicts and plunged the country into civil war. None of the current agreements has addressed the rebel groups’ desire for autonomy.
The civil war has been under a temporary ceasefire since April, following an earthquake on March 28th. This ceasefire, which was initially set to expire at the end of May, has been extended to the end of June. However, like many before it, this ceasefire is unlikely to bring any long-term resolution to Myanmar’s civil war. The three main reasons for this continued conflict are that the ceasefire agreements have failed to look at and address the root causes of the conflict and Myanmar’s history of ethnic tensions, disunity among the major opposition forces in the civil war—namely the People’s Defense Force (PDF) and various EAOs—in combatting the military junta (Myanmar’s armed forces), and a lack of international coordination on sanctions.
While both the PDF and EAOs are fighting against Myanmar’s military, their respective purposes in doing so are different and hinder the ability of the resistance to combat the junta effectively. The PDF, led by the National Unity Government (NUG), is seeking to topple the military junta and establish a democratic government, arguing for its legitimacy. However, the PDF cannot achieve this goal on its own and has been fighting alongside various EAOs to combat the junta across Myanmar. While the EAOs are working together, many are not fighting for the same goal as the NUG, and they are consolidating their efforts in the states where they are located.
The goal of many of these EAOs in fighting the junta is to secure autonomy for their region (or state), with the intention of forming semi-independent statelets, rather than removing the junta from the entirety of Myanmar. While such a goal would seem otherwise unobtainable, the civil war has given ethnic groups in Myanmar the ability to consolidate power in their respective regions, setting up their administrative models and structures of governance in their ethnic homelands.
Given the history of ethnic conflict in Myanmar and the increasing capacity of various EAOs, addressing the desires of the country’s different ethnic groups, especially those with military presence, is becoming a point of necessary consideration for a conflict-free Myanmar. The NUG has stated that the creation of a federalist system of government is possible, but given the history of ethnic suppression in Myanmar, skepticism would be unsurprising.
Although the junta holds just under a quarter of the total territory of Myanmar, this small segment contains approximately 60% of the country’s urban areas, which enables it to maintain a firm grip on Myanmar’s infrastructure and revenue sources. By holding these key areas, the military junta can sustain the conflict despite its significant loss in forces. The junta is also able to maintain itself with the support it receives from global and regional powers, such as India and Russia. Greater collaboration and a unified effort by the PDF and EAOs could be highly beneficial in combating the junta.
The international response to the civil war in Myanmar has been minimal. The United States and the United Kingdom have both levied sanctions against the junta and made efforts to inhibit the ability of high-ranking military members to access funds, but these sanctions remain piecemeal and inconsistent. International and regional organizations, namely the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have avoided imposing sanctions and have legitimized the junta by engaging with its leadership. A key regional power, China, has played a very complex role in this conflict, having been both a supporter of the military junta, through the provision of arms and funding, while also being a proponent for peace by playing an important role in brokering some of the previous ceasefire agreements that have been in place throughout the conflict.
Although the current ceasefire has been extended, it is unlikely to last or bring peace to Myanmar, as many before it have failed to do. The military has announced an election, set to take place at either the end of this year or the beginning of 2026. However, analysts are concerned that the military will not be taking this opportunity to hold a fair and just election, but instead will be used to legitimize their rule with violence in the preceding months.
Even if this is a fair election, the junta’s control of most of Myanmar’s urban areas and the existing state of emergency make the prospects for peace uncertain. While the prospects for long-lasting peace in Myanmar are uncertain, ceasefires provide only a temporary reprieve and cannot be relied on as a permanent solution. For prolonged peace to come to Myanmar, the country must address its history of ethnic conflict and suppression.
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