China
Xi Jinping on visit to Xinjiang calls for every effort to achieve social stability. President Xi Jinping urged intensified efforts to maintain stability and promote the Sinicisation of religions during his visit marking the 70th anniversary of the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. He emphasized grass-roots work, national unity, economic development tailored to Xinjiang’s strengths, and further integration into the Silk Road Economic Belt. William Zheng, South China Morning Post, September 24
Chinese premier urges joint actions with EU to advance bilateral cooperation. Premier Li Qiang called for strengthened China-EU cooperation during a meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, urging implementation of previously agreed goals and joint efforts to uphold open markets, fair competition, and global stability. He emphasized mutual trust and rule-based dialogue, while von der Leyen affirmed shared interests in climate, trade, and sustainable development. Global Times, September 24
Japan
Trump poised to add Japan stop to upcoming Asia trip. U.S. and Japanese officials are coordinating a potential visit by President Donald Trump to Tokyo next month, ahead of his scheduled attendance at the APEC summit in South Korea. The visit would be Trump’s first meeting with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s successor and part of ongoing efforts to finalize a bilateral tariff deal. Trevor Hunnicutt and Yukiko Toyoda, Reuters, September 24
Japan makes historic fighter jet deployment to Europe for defense exchanges. Two Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-15s arrived at Laage Air Base in Germany following a stop in Britain, marking Japan’s first fighter jet deployment to Europe. The visit, part of the Atlantic Eagles program, aims to strengthen unit-level ties with NATO allies amid growing security concerns over Russia and China. Kyodo News, September 24
South Korea
South Korea’s ex-first lady faces bribery trial as Dior bag scandal widens. Kim Keon Hee, wife of ousted former president Yoon Suk Yeol, appeared in court for her corruption trial on charges including bribery, stock manipulation, and illegal political fundraising. Prosecutors allege she received luxury gifts from the Unification Church in exchange for favors. Her lawyers denied the charges and requested a judge trial. Heejin Kim, Reuters, September 24
Nat’l Assembly set to vote on gov’t reorganization bill. South Korea’s National Assembly will vote Thursday on a sweeping reorganization bill that would dissolve the prosecution service and redistribute its powers between two new agencies. The plan also restructures key ministries, including removing budget planning from the finance ministry and transferring energy oversight to a renamed environment ministry. The PPP plans a filibuster. Chae Yun-hwan, Yonhap News Agency, September 25
Live broadcast allowed for ex-President Yoon’s new hearing over martial law. A Seoul court approved the live broadcast of former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s upcoming hearing on charges related to his failed martial law declaration in December. The broadcast, requested by the special prosecutor citing public interest, applies only to the new trial’s first hearing. A separate request to televise his bail hearing was denied. Oh Seok-min, Yonhap News Agency, September 25
South Korea’s Lee and Bessent discuss conditions for U.S. tariff deal. President Lee Jae Myung told U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent that any agreement to implement a $350 billion South Korean investment package must be commercially rational and consider South Korea’s economic stability. Seoul is pushing for a foreign exchange swap with an unlimited credit line, warning that large capital outflows could weaken the won and deplete reserves. Jack Kim, Hyunjoo Jin, Cynthia Kim and Jihoon Lee, Reuters, September 24
North Korea
N. Korea presumed to possess up to 2,000 kg of highly enriched uranium, unification minister says. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young stated North Korea likely holds up to 2,000 kg of uranium enriched to 90% or more, enough for up to 200 nuclear bombs. He said sanctions alone can no longer halt the weapons program and urged renewed U.S.–North Korea dialogue. Talks could also help restore inter-Korean relations. Park Boram, Yonhap News Agency, September 25
Thailand
Thai PM says he will dissolve parliament by end-January. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced plans to dissolve Thailand’s parliament by January’s end, aiming for elections in March or April. He rose to power in September with support from the opposition People’s Party, which demanded early elections. Fitch downgraded Thailand’s outlook to “negative” amid political uncertainty, high debt, and weak consumption. Panarat Thepgumpanat and Orathai Sriring, Reuters, September 24
Senate panel unveils charter reform model. Thailand’s Senate committee on political development proposed a “Two Prongs, Two Steps” model to reform the constitution while complying with recent court rulings. The plan suggests electing 200 provincial and appointing 200 expert members to a 400-person drafting body. The model aims to balance direct public input with parliamentary oversight and will undergo further debate. Bangkok Post, September 24
Vietnam
Vietnam, Tuvalu establish diplomatic ties. Acting Foreign Minister Le Hoai Trung and Tuvaluan Foreign Minister Paulson Panapa signed a joint communiqué in New York establishing diplomatic relations, making Viet Nam one of the few nations with ties to all 193 UN member states. Both sides pledged future cooperation in tourism, education, and the blue economy, and deeper collaboration at multilateral forums. Vietnam News, September 25
Myanmar
Myanmar junta boss heads to Moscow for nuclear forum at Putin’s invitation. Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing traveled to Moscow for World Atomic Week, his fourth visit to Russia in seven months, to deepen nuclear cooperation with President Vladimir Putin’s government. The delegation includes key ministers tied to Myanmar’s nuclear ambitions, including a planned small modular reactor with Rosatom, raising concerns about possible military intentions. Maung Kavi, The Irrawaddy, September 24
Myanmar junta’s proxy party floods election with candidates, dwarfing rivals. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party has fielded over 1,000 candidates for the December–January election, surpassing all other parties and making up more than one-fifth of total registered contenders. Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing ordered top generals and ministers to run under its banner in polls widely criticized as illegitimate. Phoe Tar, The Irrawaddy, September 24
Laos
Laos, Russia move closer to signing MoU on judicial cooperation. Laos and Russia are preparing to sign a Memorandum of Understanding to enhance judicial cooperation, with a focus on court administration, judge training, and civil procedure. The initiative was discussed at the XIII International Legal Forum of Asia-Pacificia, coinciding with the 65th anniversary of diplomatic ties and 60th anniversary of their friendship associations. Vientiane Times, September 25
Cambodia
Cambodia voices strong concern over Thai reports on border issues. Cambodia’s Foreign Ministry objected to Thai military reports labeling Cambodians as “invaders” at 17 sites near Pursat and Koh Kong provinces, citing ongoing demarcation efforts and decades of shared land use. Phnom Penh urged de-escalation, reaffirmed its commitment to peaceful resolution via the Joint Border Committee, and criticized inflammatory statements by Thai naval sources. Khmer Times, September 25
Philippines
Duterte participation in drug killings cited. The International Criminal Court charged former president Rodrigo Duterte with crimes against humanity, alleging he orchestrated a system of extrajudicial killings from his time as Davao mayor through his presidency. Prosecutors say he implemented a “common plan” involving police death squads and civilian gunmen, with documented operations spanning from 2011 to 2019. Franco Jose C. Baroña, The Manila Times, September 24
ICC bares order on Duterte interim release. The International Criminal Court released a redacted order revealing it had invited the Netherlands and another state to submit observations by July 2 on hosting Rodrigo Duterte during a possible interim release. The defense had offered assurances, including covering costs and waiving asylum. Prosecutors opposed the request. Franco Jose C. Baroña, Red Mendoza and Kristina Maralit, The Manila Times, September 24
Escudero rejects claims in ex-DPWH undersecretary’s exposé. Senator Francis Escudero dismissed corruption allegations made by former DPWH Undersecretary Roberto Bernardo, calling them a coordinated effort to discredit the Senate. Escudero pointed out that Bernardo admitted they never had direct contact and he vowed to take legal action and defended his clean record in public service. Zacarian Sarao, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 25
Indonesia
ICA-CEPA signed, Indonesia and Canada boost trade relations. President Prabowo Subianto and Prime Minister Mark Carney oversaw the signing of the Indonesia–Canada Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in Ottawa, with both countries pledging to eliminate most tariffs and enhance market access. The agreement is expected to raise Indonesian exports to $11.8 billion by 2030 and includes new cooperation on MSMEs, digital trade, intellectual property, and defense. ANTARA News, September 25
Taiwan
Beijing warns Japan against giving a platform to Taiwan independence with Tsai’s visit. China condemned Japan for allowing former Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen to visit, warning against legitimizing “Taiwan independence” forces. Although Tsai’s trip was personal and lacked official meetings, Beijing criticized Japan’s historical role and urged strict adherence to the one-China principle. The warning comes amid broader tensions over cross-strait relations. Alcott Wei, South China Morning Post, September 24
Taiwan suspends tech export rules after S Africa agrees to talk, MOFA says. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the suspension of new export controls on semiconductors to South Africa after Pretoria agreed to open dialogue over the status of Taiwan’s offices. The dispute began in 2024 when South Africa unilaterally downgraded Taiwan’s diplomatic representation, a move Taipei attributes to Chinese pressure. Normal operations continue in Pretoria. Joseph Yeh, Focus Taiwan, September 25
India
India and China vie for Global South leadership at UN gatherings. China and India held separate events at the UN General Assembly, each courting developing nations to assert influence in the Global South. China pledged WTO reform and new development projects, while India promoted democratic values, diversified trade, and shorter supply chains. Despite diplomatic gestures, both maintain underlying tensions and compete for strategic dominance. Khushboo Razdan, South China Morning Post, September 24
Kazakhstan
Tokayev backs China’s global initiatives as path to fairer world order. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev endorsed China’s Global Development and Global Governance Initiatives during a UN General Assembly sideline event, praising their relevance to modern geopolitical and digital challenges. He emphasized Kazakhstan’s support for equitable digital access, AI governance, and alignment with the Belt and Road Initiative to advance peace and sustainable development. Fatima Kemelova, The Astana Times, September 24
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan on track for WTO membership in 2026. WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala stated Uzbekistan could gain membership by spring 2026 following rapid reforms initiated in 2024. A working group meeting is scheduled for November to finalize negotiations. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s push for market reforms received strong praise, including from Donald Trump, who applauded Uzbekistan’s $105 billion in proposed U.S. purchases. Eurasianet, September 24
East Asia
Unpacking China’s New Headline Climate Targets. China announced a 7–10 percent emissions cut from “peak levels” by 2035, expansion of wind and solar capacity to 3,600 gigawatts, non-fossil energy above 30 percent of consumption, and mainstream adoption of new energy vehicles, while signaling broader carbon market coverage and climate adaptation goals. The pledge covers all greenhouse gases yet omits gas-specific targets and gives no clear coal pathway. Benchmarking against IPCC-aligned trajectories indicates ambition below what is consistent with 1.5–2°C limits. Beijing frames delivery over aspiration and will formalize the NDC before COP30, with details expected via the 15th and 16th Five-Year Plans and potential carbon budgets. Kate Logan and Li Shuo, Asia Society, September 24
How America Can Win in Space to Protect Taiwan and Beyond. China could blind U.S. and allied forces by disabling satellites, so U.S. strategy must secure space superiority. The Space Force’s 2025 doctrine defines the fight, but national policy should add four moves: expand Artemis Accords into a security “Artemis Alliance,” re-empower the National Space Council with directive authority, harness commercial space through structured public-private forums and steady funding, and reestablish a sustained U.S. presence on the Moon to set norms and monitor adversaries. Andrew Hanna and Kathleen Curlee, Council on Foreign Relations, September 24
Japan’s reckoning with the past remains a work in progress. Marking the war’s 80th anniversary on 15 August 2025, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba restored explicit hansei at the national memorial, reversing recent conservative practice. Murayama’s 1995 statement and Koizumi’s 2005 pledge had embedded apology, while Abe removed “remorse” and questioned its intergenerational burden. Nuances of hansei, apology, and regret are often flattened in English, shaping debate inside the LDP. Unresolved legacies persist: visits and offerings to Yasukuni, redress for forced labor and sexual slavery, and the Northern Territories dispute. Emperor Naruhito has voiced “deep remorse,” yet references to Asian victims remain sparse. Leadership must safeguard pacifism and acknowledge harm. Takuya Nishimura and Mindy L Kotler, East Asia Forum, September 24
South Korea’s diplomacy more myopic than pragmatic. Early moves under President Lee Jae-myung signal drift, with mixed messages after Foreign Minister Cho Hyun’s remarks on China and Yoon-era security framing constraining options. Trilateral alignment with the United States and Japan deepened deterrence but narrowed access to Beijing and Moscow as Pyongyang redesignated Seoul an enemy. Trump’s return adds uncertainty through outreach to Kim and a July 2025 trade deal featuring a 15 percent tariff clause, a US$350 billion investment pledge, and shipbuilding commitments. Meanwhile, the 2024 Russia–North Korea treaty and Chinese ambiguity bolster Pyongyang. Recovery requires principled, diversified pragmatism: calibrated engagement with Beijing and Moscow, risk-reducing channels to the North, hedging with Tokyo, and ASEAN-centric multilateralism. Hao Nan, East Asia Forum, September 24
Taiwan’s nuclear phase-out faces public opinion shift. A 23 August 2025 referendum on extending Maanshan’s operation won 74.2 percent of valid ballots yet failed because turnout reached only 29.5 percent, below the one-quarter electorate threshold. The initiative, launched by the Taiwan People’s Party and backed by the Kuomintang through the Legislative Yuan, underscored the Democratic Progressive Party’s minority status. Key milestones frame debate: Article 95’s “nuclear-free by 2025,” its 2018 annulment, and a 2021 vote narrowly rejecting Lungmen’s restart. Survey evidence shows partisan divides and rising support among non-aligned voters, with pro-nuclear sentiment reaching 64.5 percent by 2022 as undecideds shrank. Low participation likely reflected simultaneous recall campaigns. Signals now point to flexibility balancing energy security with stated phase-out goals. Shangpo Hsieh, East Asia Forum, September 25
Talking Past Each Other: Examining Poland–China Relations Following Wang Yi’s Visit. Wang Yi’s Warsaw stop reopened high-level channels but exposed divergent security and economic narratives. Poland focused on Russia’s aggression, NATO consultations, and airspace incursions, while China offered generic calls for talks and avoided attribution. Border closure with Belarus during Zapad exercises underscored Warsaw’s “security over trade” stance and limited leverage on Eurasian rail, with rerouting via the Middle Corridor mitigating pressure on Beijing. Agricultural “wins,” notably poultry regionalization, carry modest potential amid China’s import substitution and politicized agri-trade. Growing Poland–Taiwan links in semiconductors and technology complicate calculus and prompted reactive Chinese outreach. Net effect: parallel monologues, minimal convergence, and persistent structural frictions. Marcin Jerzewski, China Observers, September 25
Sunburnt: Why China’s solar success became its own worst enemy. China’s state-driven solar boom delivered global dominance but created a 2024–25 bust as overcapacity and a price war crushed margins and utilisation. The country supplies over four-fifths of the solar chain, produces about 97 percent of wafers, and enabled an 80 percent slide in module prices, yet firms carry heavy debts and resist exit due to local protections. Analysts urge a pivot from production subsidies to demand-side support, disciplined competition, and orderly consolidation. Installed solar reached 887 GW by end-2024, but durable stability requires aligning industrial and energy policy, expanding domestic uptake, and cushioning workers during shakeouts. Chen Gang, ThinkChina, September 24
Southeast Asia
The Paradox in Southeast Asia’s Decarbonization Agenda. Clean-energy expansion collides with conservation and community rights across Southeast Asia. Anti-climate protests rose sharply in 2024, often targeting mines, hydro, wind, and solar projects seen as harming biodiversity and livelihoods. Indonesia’s geothermal push illustrates the trade-offs: legal changes opened protected forests to development, triggering organized resistance on Flores, World Bank withdrawal from Wae Sano, and a 2025 provincial moratorium. Durable transition requires free, prior, and informed consent, smaller projects with local benefits, and community ownership to align climate goals with justice and ecosystem protection. Debbra Goh, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 24
What Scarborough nature reserve plan means for South China Sea. China approved a 3,500-hectare nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal with core and experimental zones, presenting conservation aims while intensifying legal and diplomatic friction. Manila protested as an EEZ encroachment; Washington backed the Philippines; other claimants stayed quiet as ASEAN focused on a code of conduct. Outcomes hinge on transparency and cooperation: options include joint scientific surveys and coordinated fisheries rules, but unilateral enforcement could deepen mistrust. Conservation could become a rare confidence-building path if implemented inclusively. Nong Hong, ICAS, September 24
Vietnam’s Quest for Online Positivity Could Breed Negativity. Hanoi is moving from deleting “toxic” posts to saturating feeds with upbeat narratives by formalizing influencer governance, launching a Digital Trust Alliance, and rating creators for compliance, credibility, and “responsible influence.” New rules tighten ad disclosure, product-claim liability, tax compliance, and platform cooperation, yet the core objective is to enlist KOLs as amplifiers of state messaging. This strategy collides with engagement-driven algorithms and risks backfire: token platform compliance, credibility loss for scripted influencers, and information blind spots as criticism moves to private channels. A higher-yield approach would prioritise authentic digital engagement by leaders and tangible improvements in daily life over algorithmic cheerleading. Dien Nguyen An Luong, FULCRUM, September 24
The Newly Appointed Mufti of Malaysia’s Federal Territories Faces Formidable Challenges. Ahmad Fauwaz Fadzil Noor’s May 2025 appointment places him in a politically sensitive post elevated by a pending bill that would expand the office’s stature and authority. His lineage bridges PAS and Amanah, while his training at al-Azhar and Dār al-Iftāʾ and Sufi affiliation signal theological depth and openness to dialogue. Immediate pressures include partisan scrutiny, intra-ulama tensions, and the need to apply maqāṣid al-sharīʿah within diverse urban constituencies across Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya, and Labuan, where jurisprudential traditions differ from the capital. Navigating inter-state dynamics, public expectations, and institutional rivalries will test his ability to issue solutions-oriented fatwas and embody the government’s Madani ethos. Mohd Faizal Musa, FULCRUM, September 24
South Asia
Semiconductor Clusters in the Making: India’s Push for Global Competitiveness. India is compressing ecosystem buildout via the India Semiconductor Mission, layered state incentives, and targeted cluster formation in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and the Chennai–Hyderabad corridor. Approved fabs, OSATs, and packaging hubs are paired with design depth in Bengaluru and national R&D assets in Mohali and Delhi. Advantages include large engineering pools, multinational anchors, and expanding electronics exports. Constraints persist: fab-grade utilities, import dependence for inputs, specialized manufacturing talent gaps, and weak R&D intensity. Lessons from U.S. clusters stress unified incentive stacks, anchor-led supplier pull, integrated university R&D, and shovel-ready infrastructure. Collaboration with the United States can speed scale-up and embed India in trusted supply chains. Sujai Shivakumar and Shruti Sharma, CSIS, September 24