China
China’s fourth plenum poised for highest Central Committee turnover in 8 years. At least nine members of China’s Central Committee are set to be replaced during the upcoming fourth plenum due to corruption investigations or deaths, marking the highest turnover since 2017. The meeting, expected October 20–23, will also outline the next five-year plan amid sweeping personnel reshuffles across political and military ranks. William Zheng, South China Morning Post, October 7
China accelerates oil reserve site build amid stockpiling drive. China is rapidly expanding its oil reserve infrastructure, planning 169 million barrels of new storage across 11 sites in 2025 and 2026. The stockpiling effort, spurred by global instability and cheap oil prices, blends strategic and commercial reserves. Beijing aims to cover up to six months of imports, reflecting heightened energy security priorities. Reuters, October 7
China angered at EU ‘challenging’ UN resolution that led to Taiwan leaving global body. China accused the European Union of distorting the meaning of UN Resolution 2758, which transferred China’s UN seat from Taipei to Beijing in 1971. Beijing warned the EU not to undermine the One China principle after the bloc stated the resolution did not mention Taiwan. Ryan Woo, Ben Blanchard and Philip Blenkinsop, Reuters, October 7
Japan
Coalition at risk as discontented Komeito pushes back on Takaichi. Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito warned the coalition with the LDP could collapse over Sanae Takaichi’s stances on money scandals, immigration, and war memorial visits. Takaichi’s dismissal of concerns and planned appointments of scandal-linked lawmakers have sparked backlash from Komeito and its Soka Gakkai base, threatening the long-standing alliance. Tetsuya Kasai, The Asahi Shimbun, October 7
New LDP head Takaichi picks veterans as party execs, focusing on steadiness. Liberal Democratic Party leader Sanae Takaichi appointed seasoned lawmakers to top party posts ahead of her expected confirmation as prime minister. Former finance minister Shunichi Suzuki was named secretary general, with Taro Aso as vice president. Kyodo News, October 7
North Korea
South Korea hopes North Korea-China relations contribute to denuclearisation. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said he hopes deepening ties between North Korea and China will support denuclearisation and peace on the Korean Peninsula. In a phone call with Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, Cho stressed continued bilateral communication on regional security and affirmed Seoul’s diplomatic engagement amid evolving North Korea-China dynamics. Jihoon Lee, Reuters, October 7
Premier Li Qiang to visit North Korea, most senior Chinese official to do so since 2019. Chinese Premier Li Qiang will visit Pyongyang for three days starting Thursday to attend events marking the 80th anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party, becoming the most senior Chinese official to do so since 2019. His visit highlights warming ties and ongoing high-level exchanges between Beijing and Pyongyang. Zhao Ziwen, South China Morning Post, October 7
Thailand
No hidden agenda in reshuffle: PM. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul defended the recent reshuffle of senior Finance Ministry officials, denying any political motive behind the transfer of Pinsai Suraswadi, son of a prominent Pheu Thai figure. Anutin said the appointments were proposed by Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas and aimed at filling vacancies, with several other high-level reassignments also approved. Wichit Chantanusornsiri, Bangkok Post, October 8
Pheu Thai rules out Shinawatra candidate for next prime minister. Pheu Thai Party leader Paetongtarn Shinawatra announced that no members of the Shinawatra family will be nominated as prime ministerial candidates in the upcoming election, marking a strategic shift to counter internal challenges and MP defections. The party has selected three unnamed candidates and aims to rebuild confidence through reform and core policy focus. The Nation, October 7
Vietnam
Second working day of 13th Party Central Committee’s 13th plenum. The Communist Party of Vietnam’s Central Committee continued its 13th plenum in Hanoi by reviewing draft documents for the 14th National Party Congress and discussing socio-economic plans and state budgets through 2030. Sessions were chaired by senior leaders including Tran Cam Tu and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. Vietnam News, October 7
Cambodia
Cambodia and Thailand at impasse as villagers hold their ground while the eviction deadline passes. Tensions escalated along the Cambodia–Thailand border as Cambodian villagers in Banteay Meanchey province refused to leave territory claimed by Thailand. Thai forces threatened eviction while reinforcing their presence. Cambodia rejected preconditions for talks and reaffirmed peaceful resolution through the Joint Boundary Commission. Ben Sokhean, Khmer Times, October 8
China-built warship for Cambodia almost complete. China has nearly completed one of two frigates being supplied to Cambodia under a military assistance program. Former Defense Minister Tea Banh confirmed the first ship has undergone testing, while the second is halfway through assembly. The warships are intended to enhance Cambodia’s maritime security, defense capacity, and humanitarian operations. Hang Punreay, Khmer Times, October 8
Philippines
‘Move first or lose territory’: Defense chief Teodoro warns against West Philippine Sea inaction. Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro urged lawmakers to support increased defense funding, warning the Philippines risks losing territory without proactive efforts to assert sovereignty in the West Philippine Sea and Benham Rise. He emphasized the need for mobility, expanded basing, and modernized equipment to address mounting regional threats. Franco Jose C. Baroña, The Manila Times, October 7
PH Navy eyes acquiring only 3 of 6 Japanese warships. The Philippine Navy is considering acquiring three of six decommissioned Abukuma-class destroyers offered by Japan, citing weapon system removals and constitutional limitations on arms transfers. The ships, designed for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare, are over 30 years old and will be retired by 2027. Vietnam and Indonesia are also possible recipients. John Eric Mendoza, Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 8
Singapore
U.S. Senate confirms Dr Anjani Sinha as new ambassador to Singapore. The U.S. Senate confirmed Dr Anjani Sinha as ambassador to Singapore, filling a post vacant since 2021. Dr Sinha, a career diplomat with over 25 years of experience, pledged to strengthen economic, defense, and technological cooperation with Singapore. He previously served in posts across Asia and held senior roles at the State Department. Channel News Asia, October 8
Taiwan
If Trump convinces China to abandon force against Taiwan he deserves Nobel prize, Taiwan president says. Taiwan President Lai Ching-te said Donald Trump deserves the Nobel Peace Prize if he persuades Xi Jinping to renounce force against Taiwan. Speaking on a U.S. conservative radio show, Lai warned of China’s growing military threats and urged continued American support for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. Ben Blanchard, Reuters, October 7
Pentagon nominee backs Trump call on 10% Taiwan defense spending. John Noh, nominated as the Pentagon’s top Indo-Pacific official, endorsed Donald Trump’s proposal that Taiwan allocate up to 10% of its GDP to defense. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Noh praised Taipei’s recent spending increases as promising, citing the existential threat posed by China’s military buildup. David Brunnstrom, Reuters, October 7
Taiwan-made constellation satellite ‘Chi Po-lin’ heads for high-stakes US launch. Taiwan is preparing to launch its first domestically built satellite in a new eight-part constellation from California, marking a major leap in its space ambitions. The Chi Po-lin satellite, part of the Formosat-8 program, will enhance Taiwan’s surveillance, disaster response, and national security with high-resolution remote sensing capabilities. Lawrence Chung, South China Morning Post, October 7
India
World Bank warns US tariffs on Indian exports to partly slow South Asia growth next year. The World Bank projected South Asia’s growth to decline to 5.8% in 2026, citing U.S. tariffs on Indian goods as a key factor. The 50% tariff impacts $50 billion in exports, mainly affecting labor-intensive sectors. Despite this, India’s current fiscal growth was revised up to 6.5% due to strong domestic spending. Nikunj Ohri, Reuters, October 7
Bangladesh
Bangladesh approves US wheat imports, hoping to ease trade tensions. Bangladesh approved the purchase of 220,000 metric tons of US wheat under a government-to-government deal aimed at improving trade relations with Washington. The deal follows a broader agreement for annual imports and reduced tariffs on Bangladeshi exports. Additional imports of rice, soybeans, cotton, and Boeing aircraft were also approved. Ruma Paul, Reuters, October 7
East Asia
China: Under Xi, PLA Adopts More Civilian Tech. China’s military-civil fusion is operational at scale, with PLA AI contracts increasingly awarded to private firms and universities rather than legacy state conglomerates. Nearly three-quarters of roughly 350 identified suppliers report no state ownership, and two-thirds were founded after 2010, showing a younger, competitive ecosystem. Winners include iFlytek affiliates for language and decision tools, PIESAT for combat simulation and automatic target recognition, and Tengden for drones active near Japan and Taiwan. This diversification blunts narrow sanctions, complicates export controls, and heightens risks from academic collaboration. U.S. policy responses urged: granular risk assessment, best-practice sharing with universities and industry, and allied coordination. Structural frictions persist inside China, yet fusion momentum is clear. Cole McFaul and Sam Bresnick, Foreign Policy, October 7
The U.S. Should Minimize Nuclear War Risk With China. Beijing’s leadership fears U.S. decapitation strikes in a crisis, heightening escalation danger and potential nuclear first use if PLA actions misread U.S. intent. Chinese doctrine and leadership speeches emphasize capital defense and anticipate high-intensity air raids, while deployments around Beijing reflect prioritization of elite protection. U.S. behavior toward adversary leaders historically feeds these perceptions. Risk-reduction steps include avoiding strikes near Beijing, limiting procurement of systems that appear tailored for leadership targeting, maintaining alternative target sets and trajectories, excluding leadership-protection assets from attack plans, curbing peacetime training that signals decapitation practice, and communicating that any mainland strikes would aim solely to stop an invasion of Taiwan. Strategic empathy and force-structure choices can lower miscalculation odds. Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Foreign Policy, October 7
Japan’s university enrolment fees price out opportunity. Japan’s admissions structure requires non-refundable enrolment deposits of 200,000–300,000 yen at many private universities, separate from tuition, leading one in four students to pay multiple fees and some to forego higher education. Roughly 75 percent of students attend private institutions, where student payments provide 75–80 percent of revenue, constraining reform as demographics shrink and campuses miss intake targets. A 2006 Supreme Court decision upheld enrolment fees as consideration for the right to enroll. In June 2025, MEXT urged refunds, instalments, or reductions; a few universities responded, but the no-refund norm persists. Scholarships start after matriculation, excluding those unable to pay deposits. Real relief requires guaranteed refunds, lower charges, and greater public financing to protect opportunity and sector viability. Ryo Konishi, East Asia Forum, October 7
Japanese politics enters its heavy-metal phase. Takaichi Sanae’s victory as LDP leader positions her to become Japan’s first modern female prime minister, blending nationalist instincts with Thatcherite credentials. She proposes a harder-edged Abe agenda while confronting inflation above target, a strained budget, and a vulnerable yen if stimulus continues without reforms. Diplomatic flashpoints include Yasukuni visits and the need to preserve the Seoul thaw, manage China ties, and navigate a coercive $550bn U.S. tariff-investment deal without alienating the security guarantor. At home she opposes separate spousal surnames and courts conservatives, yet coalition arithmetic and geopolitical pressures should temper extremes. Self-made and policy-focused, she could stabilize or polarize depending on execution. The Economist, October 7
Southeast Asia
Can Indonesia stay green while becoming the ‘Saudi Arabia of nickel’? Indonesia pursues EV-supply-chain dominance and coal exit while confronting heavy ecological and social costs. Nickel mining and smelting, largely controlled by Chinese firms, drive deforestation, sedimentation, and community disruption from Sulawesi to biodiversity-rich Raja Ampat, embedding supply chains that deepen external dependence. Solar and geothermal expansion introduces new land conflicts, notably at Rempang, and increases exposure to China’s manufacturing and finance. A just path requires strict environmental enforcement, transparent supply chains, decentralised generation, and diversified partnerships to restore technological sovereignty. Social license must be mandatory, with affected communities shaping project terms. Without recalibration Indonesia risks trading one dependency for another and eroding autonomy. Ronny P Sasmita, ThinkChina, October 7
Malaysia’s high-stakes ASEAN chairmanship amid global turmoil. Malaysia steers ASEAN through wars, tariff shocks, and South China Sea tensions while pushing an inclusive, sustainable agenda that delivered the ASEAN 2045 roadmap, an ASEAN–GCC–China Summit, and a new Geoeconomic Task Force to monitor risks and coordinate responses. Kuala Lumpur advances Timor-Leste’s accession, energy links via the ASEAN Power Grid, and a regional digital economy framework. Engagement with Myanmar’s military and the NUG yields little concrete progress, and chairmanship provides limited leverage on a South China Sea Code of Conduct. Malaysia mediates a sudden Thai–Cambodian border clash, organizing ceasefire monitoring with US–China support. October’s summits cap the term, likely with Premier Li Qiang, not Xi, and uncertain Trump or Putin attendance, yet a 20th Anniversary EAS declaration remains achievable. Ngeow Chow Bing, ThinkChina, October 7
Bersatu’s Lack of Discipline Has Given PAS More Control. Bersatu’s public factionalism has eroded its authority within Perikatan Nasional, elevating PAS as the coalition’s de facto leader. After September’s stormy AGM, President Muhyiddin Yassin and Deputy President Hamzah Zainudin papered over a rift, but renewed infighting followed as senior figures traded accusations over alleged statutory declarations to oust Muhyiddin and revived a past scandal involving Azmin Ali. Grassroots calls to discipline Wan Saiful Wan Jan grew, signaling organizational drift and voter fatigue. PAS, larger and more cohesive, appears to favor Hamzah and is pressing ambitions for up to 80 seats and a potential prime ministerial candidate, positioning itself to dominate the opposition or play kingmaker in a hung parliament while Bersatu weighs succession. Syaza Shukri and Norshahril Saat, FULCRUM, October 7
Myanmar Junta Wooed by U.S., India, and China. Myanmar’s military is clawing back territory, aided by Chinese pressure on ethnic armed groups, new aid pledges, and drone supplies, while diplomatic isolation fades as Min Aung Hlaing meets Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un, and Narendra Modi. India signals public warmth, framing Myanmar as central to regional policy and cooperation on energy, security, and rare earths, while reports suggest the United States is weighing engagement tied to critical minerals via friendly intermediaries. ASEAN’s isolation strategy frays, with Thailand balancing refugee support and economic ties. Piracy, disasters in the Philippines, and changing regional alignments form the backdrop to Myanmar’s partial resurgence and contested 2025 elections, which outside observers deem a sham, complicating peace prospects. Joseph Rachman, Foreign Policy, October 7
South Asia
Multipolar Dreams, Bipolar Realities: India’s Great Power Future. India is stronger than in prior decades yet still far behind China in aggregate power through mid-century, making an Asian order shaped by asymmetrical U.S.–China bipolarity more plausible than true multipolarity. New Delhi prizes strategic autonomy and “multi-alignment,” but this stance, coupled with domestic illiberal drift, undermines the scale of cooperation needed to balance Beijing. Sustained 6% growth elevates India to great-power status, but without deep manufacturing, trade integration, and human-capital gains it will not close the gap with China. The highest-yield course is soft bandwagoning with Washington, including concrete defense coordination and technology ties, while avoiding steps that dilute U.S. support. Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 6
An India–US trade deal’s agricultural Gordian Knot. Modi and Trump launched talks in February 2025 for a bilateral trade agreement aimed at reducing barriers and expanding market access by fall 2025, after the United States flagged India’s average applied tariff of 17 percent and a 2024 merchandise deficit of US$45.7 billion. India pre-emptively cut duties on items such as Harley-Davidson motorcycles and Bourbon and opened space for passenger cars in a UK pact, yet Washington prioritizes agriculture, citing high food tariffs; domestic politics and farm lobbies amplify the push. India resists due to livelihoods tied to smallholder farming. Leaders signal continued engagement, but the sticking point endures and an extended timeline appears prudent to manage sensitivities while preserving broader strategic gains. Biswajit Dhar, East Asia Forum, October 7