China
As China’s population falls, 300,000-strong robot army keeps factories humming. China installed 295,000 industrial robots in 2024, accounting for over half of global deployments and offsetting labor shortages from a third consecutive year of population decline. With over 2 million active robots, the country is leading global automation while advancing toward large-scale humanoid deployment. Mandy Zuo, South China Morning Post, October 6
U.S. FCC to vote to tighten restrictions on Chinese telecom equipment. The Federal Communications Commission will vote on October 28 to expand restrictions on Chinese telecom firms by banning devices with parts from companies on the national security “Covered List.” The move targets firms like Huawei and ZTE amid concerns over unauthorized market activity. David Shepardson, Reuters, October 6
Japan
Ex-LDP No.2 Motegi may serve as foreign minister in new Cabinet: source. Former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi is likely to be appointed Japan’s next foreign minister under incoming Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, according to a source close to the matter. Takaichi is also expected to name key rivals from the leadership race to Cabinet or party roles. Kyodo News, October 6
68% have high hopes for Takaichi after election as LDP president: poll. A nationwide survey showed 68.4% of respondents expressed high expectations for Sanae Takaichi following her election as Liberal Democratic Party president, while 77.5% opposed appointing scandal-linked lawmakers to key roles. Over half anticipated worsening China ties, and 86.5% supported Japan having its first female prime minister. Kyodo News, October 6
Sanseito leader rejects idea of partnering with Takaichi’s LDP. Sanseito leader Sohei Kamiya ruled out forming a coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party after Sanae Takaichi’s election as party president, saying such a move would betray the party’s founding purpose. While he expressed preference for Takaichi over Shinjiro Koizumi, Kamiya reaffirmed that Sanseito was created in response to LDP failures. Shinkai Kawabe, The Asahi Shimbun, October 6
South Korea
New S. Korean envoy vows to solidify alliance with U.S. South Korea’s new ambassador to the U.S., Kang Kyung-wha, pledged to reinforce bilateral ties, calling the alliance the foundation of the Lee Jae Myung administration’s pragmatic diplomacy. She emphasized cooperation in security, economy, and technology, and vowed full embassy engagement to address trade and diplomatic issues. Song Sang-ho, Yonhap News Agency, October 6
North Korea
North Korean leader Kim tells Russia’s Putin that alliance will grow. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sent a birthday letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin affirming continued alliance and praising Putin’s leadership. Kim voiced support for Russia’s defense of its sovereignty — an apparent reference to the Ukraine conflict — and pledged to uphold their bilateral treaty signed last year. Jihoon Lee, Reuters, October 6
N. Korea’s Kim calls for bolstering naval power to ‘thoroughly’ punish enemy. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the 5,000-ton Choe Hyon destroyer and called for expanding naval combat capabilities to deter and counter provocations. He emphasized developing a future-oriented navy equipped with cruise and ballistic missiles. Kim Soo-yeon, Yonhap News Agency, October 6
Thailand
Pardon vetoed for former Thai PM Thaksin. Thailand’s Justice Minister Rutthapon Naowarat upheld a recommendation to deny former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s royal pardon request. Thaksin must continue serving his one-year prison sentence under a Supreme Court ruling. A committee reviewed the petition, and the minister submitted the findings and his opinion to the Cabinet Secretariat for further action. Bangkok Post, October 6
People’s Party calls on government to drop planned referendum on ending MOUs 43–44. People’s Party leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut urged the government to cancel its planned referendum on terminating border MOUs 43 and 44 with Cambodia, citing public confusion over the issues. He said the government should take responsibility for the decision and warned the additional ballot would complicate the general election. The Nation, October 6
Vietnam
First working day of 13th Party Central Committee’s 13th plenum. The 13th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam opened its 13th plenum in Hanoi, addressing key personnel decisions and internal discipline. Four new members joined the Inspection Commission, and Do Trong Hung was dismissed from all Party positions. Delegates also reviewed draft reports and nominations for the 14th National Party Congress. Vietnam News, October 6
Myanmar
Myanmar junta crushes election criticism with wave of arrests. Myanmar’s military regime has prosecuted 64 people under the new Election Protection Law, which imposes penalties of up to death for opposing the upcoming poll. The law, enacted in July, has been used to detain activists and silence dissent. Elections are scheduled for December 28 in regime-held areas. Myo Pyae, The Irrawaddy, October 6
Philippines
Philippine annual inflation at 1.7% in September. The Philippines recorded a 1.7% annual inflation rate in September, rising from 1.5% in August but falling short of the 2.0% forecast by economists in a Reuters poll. The statistics agency released the data on Tuesday amid continued monitoring of price trends and economic stability. Mikhail Flores and Karen Lema, Reuters, October 7
Ping Lacson resigns as Senate blue ribbon chairman. Senate President Pro Tempore Panfilo Lacson formally resigned as chairman of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee amid criticism from colleagues over his investigation into flood control project anomalies. Lacson rejected claims of bias and said his actions were not politically motivated. He emphasized having no further political ambitions beyond his current term. Bernadette E. Tamayo, The Manila Times, October 6
Taiwan
Deep trouble: Taiwan-made submarine delays raise new doubts over project’s future. Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine has missed its September sea trial deadline, raising concerns over technical setbacks and political implications. Delays linked to structural issues and system integration difficulties may jeopardize the planned November delivery. Lawmakers have frozen funding for future submarines pending successful trials. Lawrence Chung, South China Morning Post, October 6
East Asia
China’s demographic future depends on stronger care systems. China’s population has declined since 2022, driven by high childrearing costs, workplace discrimination, hukou barriers, and changing aspirations, with women bearing disproportionate unpaid care. A birth-friendly slogan cannot substitute for reliable services: childcare remains scarce for under-threes, pilots cluster in wealthier cities, and rural counties face fiscal strain without deeper hukou and county-level investment. Durable recovery requires nationwide childcare subsidies, free preschool, caregiver-neutral leave, and integrated investment that links childcare, health, and ageing support across the life course. Community networks and employer reforms can redistribute care, while policies should connect care provision with ecological wellbeing to rebuild trust and stability across generations. Shiqi Shen, East Asia Forum, October 6
By giving up WTO privileges, China gains more than it loses. Beijing’s decision to stop claiming developing-country special and differential treatment at the WTO sacrifices little in practice while neutralizing a U.S. and EU critique about unfair advantages for exporters. The designation’s benefits mostly involve longer implementation windows and selective exemptions, many of which China has already moved beyond, using the label to align with the Global South. Framed through Mao’s “strategic defensive,” the change resembles a tactical retreat that avoids an unwinnable argument, conserves political capital, and repositions the debate on terms more favorable to China’s long-term objectives. The move disarms a rhetorical weapon in Washington while preserving Beijing’s leadership narrative credibly in the Global South. Dominik Mierzejewski, South China Morning Post, October 7
Chinese officials boast a god’s-eye view of towns from above. Local party offices run digital grids that map residents into units and flag “at-risk” individuals for monthly checks, aligning with Xi Jinping’s directive to resolve issues at the lowest level. Systems log routine complaints and showcase quick fixes, while counties report improbable resolution rates near 99 percent. Cameras and sensors extend oversight in richer cities, but practices can be harsher elsewhere, with daily visits to petitioners in some areas. Implementation strains staff, who juggle multiple apps and passwords, creating “fingertip formalism” that prioritizes data entry over service. Surveillance expands reach, yet bureaucracy blunts efficiency, revealing a control model both intrusive and cumbersome. The Economist, October 6
Xi Jinping’s Global Civilization Initiative: An Individual Tool for Global Power. The Global Civilization Initiative consolidates Beijing’s influence toolkit that targets politicians and civil groups, complementing state-centered efforts such as the Belt and Road. The program advances a Leninist approach of organization and mobilization, with the CCP’s International Department orchestrating party dialogues, training programs, and high-visibility summits. These channels enable coordinated messaging, cultivate rising figures, and offer status incentives that shape elite behavior. Growing application across parts of Europe illustrates how vague slogans mask a structured push that normalizes Beijing-approved norms and discourages dissent. The initiative’s power lies less in ideas and more in networked leverage that conditions access, nudges compliance, and slowly redefines who counts as an elite. Sense Hofstede, China Observers, October 6
China’s Control of Rare-Earth Minerals Weakens Trump’s Hand in Tariff Poker. Beijing’s command over mining, separation, and magnet production gives it a choke point across batteries, wind turbines, and precision-guided weapons, reducing the impact of new U.S. tariffs and raising the cost of escalation. Trump’s poker framing collides with structural dependencies: alternative supplies remain limited, timelines for new projects are long, and price spikes would ripple through manufacturing. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s rhetoric about Beijing “playing with a pair of twos” ignores China’s credible option to curb exports or tighten quotas, which would pressure U.S. firms faster than tariff pain lands in China. Washington must find different leverage or accept narrower goals while supply chains diversify. Graham Allison, Foreign Policy, October 6
Takaichi’s rise symbolizes LDP’s illusory politics and inability to change. Sanae Takaichi’s upset win exposed a breach between party elites and grassroots, offering the image of renewal without programmatic reform. Factional calculations and member frustration, not a concrete agenda, propelled her. A nationalist profile and hardline stances on history, media regulation, and immigration sit beside tactical pivots, raising questions about conviction versus pragmatism. Immediate tests loom: cabinet formation, a supplementary budget to offset inflation, and governing without a stable lower-house majority with Komeito. Foreign policy trials include an early meeting with President Trump and possible trade friction. Her choices will determine whether she converts momentum into authority or reverts to managed ambiguity. Mieko Nakabayashi, Nikkei Asia, October 6
Taiwan’s main threat isn’t military – it’s media speculation. Sensational headlines amplify fear, outpacing nuance and encouraging overreactions that distort public perception and policymaking. A Washington Post report on a pause in $400 million of military aid blurred distinctions between free assistance and booming arms sales, prompting premature conclusions. Similar anonymously sourced items, including claims that Xi Jinping will press Donald Trump on opposing independence, remain speculative and do not imply a strategic collapse. Opaque decision-making in Washington and Beijing widens room for conjecture, which anxious audiences then amplify. The near-term risks of escalation arise less from military moves than from misread narratives; observed facts do not show imminent danger, so restraint and precise framing are the corrective in coverage. Julien Oeuillet, Lowy Institute, October 6
South Korea’s Response to U.S. Demands: Minimize Risk, Maximize Reward. Political turmoil left Seoul late to engage Washington as new tariffs and possible troop reductions reshaped the alliance agenda. Rather than retaliate, the Lee government pursued a deal that cut reciprocal and sectoral tariff rates to 15 percent and pledged a $350 billion U.S. investment package plus $100 billion in energy purchases. Shipbuilding cooperation emerged as a major opportunity, while messaging aligned with U.S. priorities on China and deterrence. Frictions, including an ICE raid on a Korean-led plant, exposed policy incoherence that risks undermining investment goals. Recommended steps include a joint vision document, force-posture changes paired with modernization, cautious contingency planning, tighter interagency coordination, deeper Japan–ROK–U.S. trilateral work, and new cooperative domains. Victor Cha, CSIS, October 6