Asia Daily: May 2, 2025
China
China says it is looking at American proposals to scale down tariff war. China’s Ministry of Commerce said it is evaluating U.S. proposals to restart trade negotiations, while reaffirming its demand for the full removal of unilateral tariffs as a precondition. Despite Washington’s outreach, officials warned against coercion disguised as dialogue. Recent U.S. tariffs have led to a sharp drop in Chinese exports and shipping volumes. Ji Siqi, South China Morning Post, May 2
China’s ex-trade negotiator takes lesser role as Trump tariff war heats up. Wang Shouwen, China’s former vice-minister of commerce and chief trade negotiator during the first Trump administration, has been reassigned to a lesser-known role at the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. His removal and replacement by WTO envoy Li Chenggang come amid escalating U.S.-China tariff tensions. Wang’s exit may signal Beijing’s intent to reset trade talks, though officials deny any current negotiations with Washington. Shi Jiangtao, South China Morning Post, May 2
Japan
BOJ halves GDP growth estimate under shadow of Trump’s tariffs. The Bank of Japan halved its 2025 GDP growth forecast to 0.5% and left interest rates unchanged, citing uncertainty over U.S. trade policy. The central bank also lowered growth and inflation projections through 2027 and delayed its 2% price stability target. Governor Kazuo Ueda linked the revision to tariff-driven market disruptions. Kuniaki Nishio and Chihaya Inagaki, The Asahi Shimbun, May 1
Japan, U.S. agree to step up tariff talks with June deal in mind. Japan and the United States agreed to accelerate tariff negotiations, aiming for a possible deal by June as trade tensions persist. Chief negotiator Ryosei Akazawa met U.S. officials including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, emphasizing economic security and mutual benefit. Proposals include increased U.S. agricultural imports and relaxed auto screening rules. Takuya Karube, Kyodo News, May 2
South Korea
Ex-PM Han declares presidential bid. Former South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo officially entered the June 3 presidential race, announcing his candidacy one day after resigning as acting president. Han, who previously served under both liberal and conservative administrations and was ambassador to the U.S., is viewed as a leading conservative contender to face Democratic Party nominee Lee Jae-myung. Lee Haye-ah, Yonhap News Agency, May 2
Finance Minister Choi offers resignation before impeachment motion. South Korean Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok resigned late Thursday, just before the National Assembly filed an impeachment motion led by the Democratic Party. The motion accused Choi, who was set to become acting president at midnight following Han Duck-soo’s resignation, of delaying the appointment of a Constitutional Court justice and other alleged misconduct. His resignation was submitted at 10:28 p.m., averting a constitutional crisis. Kim Han-joo, Yonhap News Agency, May 1
North Korea
S. Korea's military says new N. Korean warship likely requires more time for deployment. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed that North Korea’s new 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class destroyer will need significant time before it becomes operational. Despite its launch, additional development and integration work appears necessary, as satellite imagery showed tugboats moving the ship. Chae Yun-hwan, Yonhap News Agency, May 1
Thailand
People's Party presses premier about alleged tax-dodging notes. The People's Party is intensifying a House inquiry into Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s use of promissory notes in a 4.43-billion-baht share purchase, suspecting the deal was structured to avoid gift tax. PP MPs raised legal and procedural questions with the Revenue Department and Auditor General’s Office, citing concerns over transparency and compliance with Revenue Code Sections 13(7) and 17(7), which address tax rulings and disguised transactions. Aekarach Sattaburuth, Bangkok Post, May 2
EC seeks court ruling to disqualify Senator Keskamol. Thailand’s Election Commission has requested the Supreme Court to disqualify Senator Dr. Keskamol Pleansamai for allegedly misrepresenting her academic credentials during the 2023 senatorial election. Keskamol is accused of falsely claiming a doctorate from “California University,” which Thai authorities do not recognize. The Nation, May 1
Myanmar
Junta forces retreat as escalating clashes with Arakan Army continue across Ayeyarwady Region. Clashes between the Arakan Army and junta forces have intensified across Ayeyarwady’s Lemyethna, Yegyi, and Ngathaingchaung townships, with fighting concentrated along the strategic Gwa–Ngathaingchaung Road. Junta troops have reportedly retreated from several areas, prompting attempts to recruit locals and secure food supplies. Ko Cho, Myanmar Now, May 1
Myanmar junta bombs quake zones as Anwar calls for truce extension. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim urged Myanmar’s military and civilian government to extend a humanitarian ceasefire to aid earthquake-hit areas, but junta airstrikes continued across 13 regions during and after the truce. Despite previous commitments, the regime reportedly violated the ceasefire, killing over 250 civilians since March 28. The Irrawaddy, May 1
Cambodia
Press freedom rated ‘very good’ in 2025, says Information Ministry. Cambodia’s Ministry of Information reported that 81.4% of 467 surveyed journalists rated press freedom in 2025 as “very good,” with high marks also for media ethics, safety, and access to information. Minister Neth Pheaktra said the findings reflect progress in media governance and legal protections under the Law on the Press Regime. The ministry’s study showed rising confidence in journalistic independence and professional conduct compared to 2024. Hang Punreay, Khmer Times, May 2
PM slams opposition based abroad for urging EU sanctions. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet condemned overseas opposition figures for lobbying the European Union to impose sanctions, accusing them of harming national interests amid ongoing trade disputes with the United States. Speaking in Sihanoukville, he criticized the call for sanctions as detrimental to Cambodian workers already affected by tariff pressures and EBA privilege losses. Torn Vibol, Khmer Times, May 2
Philippines
Govt must execute ICC arrest warrants. Human rights lawyer Kristina Conti affirmed the Philippines has the authority and obligation to enforce ICC arrest warrants, following Vice President Sara Duterte’s claim she is on the court’s draft list. The statement comes after former president Rodrigo Duterte was arrested and transferred to The Hague. Conti said more officials may be added to the probe, which already targets Duterte-era police leaders linked to drug war abuses. Franco Jose C. Baroña, The Manila Times, May 2
Palace to Sara Duterte: ‘Level up’ your arguments. The Philippine Palace criticized Vice President Sara Duterte for dismissing government probes as political attacks, urging her to present arguments with reason and data. Communications Undersecretary Claire Castro responded to Duterte’s defense of PrimeWater and past controversies, including alleged misuse of confidential funds and unresolved education expenditures. Zacarian Sarao, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 2
Indonesia
Indonesia parliament set to ratify sea boundary with Vietnam, lawmaker says. Indonesia’s parliament is expected to ratify a 2022 agreement with Vietnam that delineates their exclusive economic zones in the South China Sea after over a decade of negotiations. The move aims to reduce frequent encroachments by Vietnamese fishermen and establish legal certainty for maritime patrols and resource exploration. Ananda Teresia and Stanley Widianto, Reuters, May 1
Malaysia
Kosovo opens embassy in Kuala Lumpur, boosting ties in key sectors. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim welcomed the inauguration of Kosovo’s embassy in Kuala Lumpur, calling it a milestone in bilateral relations. The embassy will support cooperation in trade, education, culture, tourism, and halal product exports. Anwar emphasized leveraging Kosovo’s EU ties for economic benefit and pledged stronger engagement beyond diplomacy. President Vjosa Osmani Sadriu is in Malaysia for a four-day official visit. Malay Mail, May 2
Singapore
PM Wong appeals to voters to give him the best team to take Singapore forward. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong urged Singaporeans to support the People's Action Party in the May 3 election, warning that electing opposition voices would weaken leadership during global uncertainty. Speaking in Punggol and Sengkang, he emphasized character and unity, vouching for Cabinet members and introducing new candidates. Goh Yan Han, The Straits Times, May 2
In final rallies, opposition parties call on Singapore electorate to vote with hope, not fear. Singapore’s opposition parties, including the Workers’ Party, Progress Singapore Party, and Singapore Democratic Party, concluded their campaigns by urging voters to choose hope and conviction over fear. WP chief Pritam Singh rejected PM Lawrence Wong’s warnings about weakening governance, while PSP’s Leong Mun Wai and SDP’s Chee Soon Juan framed the election as a chance to shape Singapore’s future. Renald Loh, Ang Hwee Min and Louisa Tang, Channel NewsAsia, May 2
Uzbekistan
Uzbek foreign minister meets with Japan’s minister of justice. Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov met with Japanese Justice Minister Keisuke Suzuki during an official visit to Tashkent to advance strategic ties. Talks focused on bilateral cooperation in legal reforms, judicial modernization, and governance best practices. Both sides discussed global and regional issues and explored institutional collaboration between their justice systems as part of Uzbekistan’s ongoing reform agenda. Uzbekistan Daily, May 1
Central Asia–GCC summit in Samarkand postponed. The high-level summit between Central Asian nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council, set for May 5 in Samarkand, has been postponed by mutual agreement. Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that discussions are ongoing to reschedule the event. Despite the delay, both sides reiterated their commitment to advancing regional ties through the Central Asia–GCC Strategic Dialogue framework. Kun Uz, May 1
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan breaks ground on first tunnel of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway. Kyrgyzstan has begun construction on a 12-kilometer tunnel in Jalal-Abad, marking the first phase of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project. The 523-kilometer route will boost connectivity between East and West, with over 300 kilometers traversing Kyrgyz territory. Deputy Chairman Bakyt Torobayev said the initiative would drive trade, jobs, and economic integration. The line handle up to 15 million tons of cargo annually. Sergey Kwan, The Times of Central Asia, April 30
Northeast Asia
Japan’s Three D’s: Defense, Disaster Management, and Demographics. Prime Minister Ishiba’s administration has prioritized three policy pillars—defense, disaster management, and demographics—as the foundation for Japan’s strategic industrial revitalization. These “Three D’s” are framed as opportunities for economic dynamism, technological advancement, and public-private collaboration, particularly through increased government procurement and innovation contests. Japan's defense budget is set to double by 2027, offering startups and emerging tech firms new avenues for defense-related innovation. Simultaneously, disaster preparedness, rooted in national trauma and frequent seismic risks, is being transformed into a proactive industrial strategy supported by a proposed Ministry of Disaster Management. Technological solutions such as AI-powered prediction tools, autonomous drones, and portable water systems are being deployed through collaborative public-private frameworks. Demographically, Japan faces a shrinking and aging population, especially in rural regions, spurring demand for automation, eldercare innovations, and regional revitalization. Government contests and pilot projects aim to integrate these solutions with local economic development strategies. Collectively, the Three D’s serve as a cohesive national framework for industrial policy and startup growth, with long-term potential to influence global markets facing similar challenges. Kenji Kushida, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1
Britain’s Deluded Relationship with China. As Prime Minister Keir Starmer plans a diplomatic reset with China, critics argue the UK continues to ignore Beijing’s strategic manipulation and coercive influence. Recent ministerial visits to China yielded minimal tangible gains for Britain, while advancing Chinese economic and political interests. Chinese ownership in key sectors such as British Steel and MG Motors has delivered broken promises and offshoring of production. Meanwhile, widespread use of Chinese surveillance equipment and drones by UK authorities raises national security concerns, with some vehicles believed to have data-collection capabilities near sensitive sites. Chinese investments in nuclear energy, telecommunications, and infrastructure are modest in scale but grant disproportionate influence due to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) entrenched control over all major private enterprises. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, CCP influence over business has intensified, with party cadres embedded in corporate governance. The British public remains largely unaware of China's deep integration into sectors like surveillance technology, higher education, and even critical infrastructure like Heathrow Airport. Despite past cautionary failures such as the Huawei 5G debacle, the current UK government appears poised to repeat missteps, with China reportedly planning a new London embassy potentially situated atop strategic telecom routes. Britain's diplomatic naivety risks compromising national sovereignty and security in favor of illusory economic engagement. Stephen Vines, SOAS China Institute, May 1
Dancing Lions: China’s Influence Campaigns Target Influencers. China is conducting covert influence operations in Central and Eastern Europe by targeting social media influencers and media platforms to shape positive perceptions of its regime. Offers of all-expenses-paid trips to China, like those received by Czech travel influencer Milan Dobrovolný, often come with no requirement to post publicly—suggesting content is created solely for Chinese audiences. These campaigns are orchestrated by opaque entities like “China Seeing” and are part of a wider strategy leveraging cultural symbols and entertainment to obscure political motives. Traditional media has also been co-opted, with radio programs and commercial inserts promoting pro-Beijing narratives, often in partnership with Chinese state outlets like China Radio International. TikTok campaigns in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Greece have used national symbols and local-language influencers to embed subtle state messaging. The Czech campaign evolved into longer “reaction” videos portraying ethnic minorities in China positively, including travel footage from Xinjiang. These soft power initiatives are difficult to detect and exploit influencers’ access to young, trusting audiences. TikTok’s largely unregulated environment makes it a fertile ground for these influence operations, which bypass traditional media scrutiny and raise urgent questions about digital sovereignty and foreign propaganda. Milan Dobrovolný, China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, May 2
Southeast Asia
How the Squad Risks Upending ASEAN Norms. The inclusion of the United States, Philippines, Australia, and Japan in the newly formed “Squad” minilateral has intensified regional military cooperation, notably through the 2025 Balikatan exercises. However, this grouping risks undermining ASEAN norms by focusing on militarized responses to China and prioritizing Taiwan and the South China Sea disputes. Unlike the Quad, which maintained a broader and less confrontational stance, Squad adopts a country-specific security focus that contradicts ASEAN’s principles of non-interference and consensus. By involving non-Asian actors and bypassing ASEAN mechanisms, Squad challenges the bloc’s role as the core of regional architecture. The coalition’s dependence on U.S. military support and lack of institutional safeguards further expose it to volatility, particularly under fluctuating U.S. administrations. While Squad has delivered immediate benefits to the Philippines through military aid and defense upgrades, its assertiveness risks alienating ASEAN members and escalating tensions with China. Without legitimizing itself through partnerships aligned with Indo-Pacific security—not just anti-China posturing—Squad could exacerbate insecurity rather than create stability. Vincent Kyle Parada, Lowy Institute, May 2
Singapore Election: All About the Lived Economy. Singapore’s 3 May general election marks the formal rise of the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) Fourth Generation leadership under Prime Minister Lawrence Wong. While the PAP frames its campaign around external economic threats, particularly U.S. tariffs disrupting global trade, voters are primarily concerned with domestic, day-to-day issues. Despite corruption and adultery scandals involving prominent politicians and an earlier focus on environmental policies, the 2025 electoral discourse is dominated by rising living costs. The PAP faces pressure to maintain its longstanding supermajority and avoid slipping below its historical 60% vote share threshold, with cost-of-living issues such as housing affordability and inflation at the forefront of public concern. The Workers’ Party, led by Pritam Singh, is emerging as a significant opposition force. Yet, the political contest remains structured more by alignment with or against the ruling party than by ideological divides. The PAP’s electoral fate may ultimately hinge on whether voters believe it can effectively manage the “lived economy,” rather than macroeconomic figures or symbolic political transitions. Quah Say Jye, Lowy Institute, May 1
Philippine Politics on Trial as the Dutertes Head to Court. The political alliance between the Marcos and Duterte families has collapsed ahead of the May 2025 midterm elections, triggering legal challenges against the Dutertes and reshaping the national political landscape. Former President Rodrigo Duterte was arrested by the International Criminal Court in March 2025 for crimes against humanity tied to his anti-drug campaign. Meanwhile, Vice President Sara Duterte faces an impeachment trial scheduled for June, following her February impeachment. The dissolution of the Marcos–Duterte pact has facilitated international accountability mechanisms once obstructed by political shielding. Despite the legal turmoil, Sara Duterte’s popularity has grown, with a February 2025 survey showing 59% approval, compared to President Marcos Jr’s declining 25% rating. While Duterte supporters remain mobilized, public sentiment on accountability is divided; 51% believe Rodrigo Duterte should be held responsible for his drug war actions. The upcoming Senate election will be pivotal—conviction in Sara Duterte’s trial requires a two-thirds Senate majority, and Marcos allies are currently positioned to win most of the contested seats. Ultimately, the trials test whether Philippine institutions can deliver justice independent of dynastic influence or if legal proceedings will remain a political weapon cloaked in democratic process. Kerstin Steiner, East Asia Forum, May 2
ASEAN Must Harness AI as a Force for Gender Equality. Artificial intelligence has the potential to deliver nearly US$1 trillion in GDP gains to ASEAN by 2030, yet current digital policies risk reinforcing gender disparities rather than closing them. While ASEAN’s Digital Masterplan 2025 and Digital Integration Framework Action Plan advance digital transformation, they fall short on implementing gender-inclusive strategies. Women, underrepresented in AI development and overrepresented in jobs most susceptible to automation, face a widening digital divide. Despite initial interest, only 12% of girls pursue STEM at higher levels, weakening the future talent pipeline. Additionally, algorithmic biases have already been observed in generative AI, reinforcing gender stereotypes. National and regional efforts—including public–private initiatives, STEM engagement campaigns, and AI skills training—are making strides, but must be scaled to be impactful. The expansion of internet access and early digital education is crucial, as nearly half of women in the Asia Pacific still lack online connectivity. The rise in AI-enabled gender-based violence further shows the need for robust digital safety frameworks. ASEAN’s challenge is to convert broad gender equity goals into actionable, enforceable policies that ensure inclusive AI governance and equitable digital economies. Felicia Feiran Chen and Adam Au, East Asia Forum, May 1
Has China’s Great Relocation Helped Southeast Asia Industrialise? China’s change of manufacturing operations to Southeast Asia—driven by rising domestic costs, geopolitical tensions, and supply chain diversification—has sharply increased investment in ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia. Between 2016 and 2023, Chinese greenfield FDI in manufacturing in the region more than doubled, accounting for one-third of all such investment in 2023. While this has expanded production capacity and boosted exports, the benefits have been uneven. Much of the investment remains low in knowledge intensity, and many economies have not advanced up the value chain. Economic complexity has improved notably in Vietnam and the Philippines but stagnated elsewhere. Although the region has seen a rise in resident patent filings and R&D interest—especially in fields like electric vehicles and semiconductors—most high-value innovation activity remains concentrated in Singapore. A lack of strong institutional frameworks, skilled labor, and incentives for technology transfer limits Southeast Asia’s ability to transition from being a manufacturing base to an innovation hub. To fully leverage Chinese investment, ASEAN must build deeper domestic supply chain linkages, foster SME participation, and improve policy support for technological upgrading and skills development. Maria Monica Wihardja and Midzuki Low, Fulcrum, May 2
South Asia
Kashmir: Why Was India So Quick to Blame Pakistan? The recent attack in Pahalgam, a heavily militarised area of Indian-administered Kashmir, exposed critical failures in India’s security and intelligence systems. Assailants operated with apparent impunity, questioning victims and executing them without interference. Despite the severity of the lapse, the immediate official response was to blame Pakistan, invoking The Resistance Front (TRF) without providing substantive evidence. The TRF denied involvement, and no international intelligence agency has confirmed Pakistani state complicity. The narrative serves political expediency, diverting attention from domestic weaknesses. This pattern echoes the 2019 Pulwama attack, where warnings were also reportedly ignored. The broader concerns are systemic human rights violations in Kashmir, demographic changes through mass settlement of non-locals, and escalating repression under the current Indian government. It warns that perpetuating unverified claims erodes both domestic harmony and regional peace. The call is for a change from externalising blame to confronting internal dysfunction and restoring dignity to Kashmiris. Ishaal Zehra, Lowy Institute, May 2
Can India Cut Off Pakistan’s Indus River Lifeline? Following the April 2025 Pahalgam militant attack, which India linked to Pakistan, Delhi suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), threatening to halt water flows to its neighbor. The IWT, brokered by the World Bank in 1960, allocates the Indus River’s eastern tributaries to India and the western ones—making up 80% of the river’s flow—to Pakistan. While India vows that "not even a drop of water goes to Pakistan," it currently lacks the infrastructure to enforce such a cutoff. The treaty allows only limited storage and "run-of-the-river" hydropower on the western tributaries, and any large-scale diversion projects would take years and face legal and logistical constraints. Meanwhile, Pakistan's reliance on the Indus is profound: over 90% of its agriculture and 20% of its electricity depend on the river, yet its water storage capacity remains alarmingly low. India may exert pressure by suspending data sharing mandated under the IWT, affecting Pakistan’s flood preparedness. However, escalating water tensions risk regional instability and could invite retaliatory actions. Delhi’s move also alarms other neighbors like Bangladesh and Nepal and may prompt China—Asia’s hydro-hegemon with upstream control over key rivers—to mirror such tactics against India. Weaponizing water could thus backfire, undermining India's own long-term strategic interests. David Michel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1
Nuclear Ambiguity in the Indian Ocean. India and Pakistan are deepening their sea-based nuclear deterrents, introducing strategic ambiguity and heightening risks in an already volatile maritime region. India’s second nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arighaat, recently test-launched a K-4 SLBM, while Pakistan launched its second Hangor-class diesel-electric submarine, with analysts suggesting future nuclear armament. India’s deployment of submarines and dual-capable missiles like BrahMos raises concerns over potential counterforce intentions, especially with unclarified official statements. Pakistan, lacking nuclear-powered subs, may resort to arming conventional vessels with nuclear-capable cruise missiles like the Babur-3, further blurring lines between conventional and nuclear capabilities. This ambiguity complicates adversarial threat perception and increases the risk of miscalculation. Escalation risks are particularly high at sea due to unclear weapon loadouts and limited crisis communication. India’s recent assertive moves after the Pahalgam attack, including naval missile tests, signal growing brinkmanship. Both nations lack effective communication mechanisms like a functional naval hotline or an Incidents at Sea agreement. To mitigate risks, experts urge doctrinal clarity, technological separation of nuclear and conventional forces, and centralized command structures. Without such measures, the Indian Ocean may become a theater for inadvertent escalation rather than deterrence stability. Joaquin Matamis, Stimson Center, April 30
Breaking the Dam: How India Can Abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty. India’s recent suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in response to the Kashmir attack has reignited debate over whether it can legally abrogate the 1960 agreement. The treaty lacks an explicit exit clause, requiring any termination to occur through a new mutually ratified pact. However, under customary international law, particularly the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), India could potentially justify withdrawal. Article 56 permits exit from treaties without termination clauses, provided a 12-month notice is given, while Articles 60 and 62 allow for abrogation in cases of material breach or fundamental change in circumstances. India might argue that Pakistan’s broader conduct undermines the treaty’s cooperative spirit or cite drastic hydrological and environmental changes due to climate change. Global precedents, such as Iraq’s exit from the Baghdad Pact and Egypt’s withdrawal from a treaty with the USSR, show that states have previously invoked such doctrines successfully. Strategically, abrogation would free India to unilaterally manage Indus waters but could provoke significant diplomatic fallout and potential military escalation from Pakistan. From a realist perspective, the IWT may now serve more as a constraint than a guarantor of peace, and India has both legal and strategic grounds to consider withdrawal. Dr. Akshat Dwivedi, Geopolitical Monitor, May 2
Oceania
Bursting the Solomon Islands Stability Bubble. The OUR Party government in Solomon Islands has disintegrated just a year after re-election, with ten ministers, including Manasseh Sogavare, resigning to join forces with former opponents. This political upheaval, though not unusual in the country’s volatile parliamentary system, follows an unprecedented period of cohesion. The 2024 elections, framed around promises of Chinese-funded development, ultimately saw half of the party’s ministers lose their seats. Jeremiah Manele replaced Sogavare as prime minister but has struggled to maintain control amid changing allegiances and allegations of corruption within his administration. Deputy Prime Minister Bradley Tovosia faced criticism for unpaid mining royalties, illegal mineral exports, and a controversial road project allegedly used to mask mineral prospecting. Tovosia’s resignation could signal an effort to reconfigure the coalition by reclaiming defectors. The opposition, though now holding a parliamentary majority, lacks unity on a successor, complicating the potential for stable leadership change. Unlike systems that require an alternative nominee in no-confidence motions, Solomon Islands permits ousting without naming a replacement, risking further fragmentation. Additionally, increased financial resources—including Chinese development funds—may influence political loyalties on both sides, introducing new variables into the already unstable environment. Jon Fraenkel, Lowy Institute, May 2