China
U.S. and China reach deal to roll back most tariffs for 90 days. The United States and China agreed to suspend most recent tariff increases for 90 days, reducing U.S. duties on Chinese goods from 145% to 30%, while China lowered its rate from 125% to 10%. The temporary truce follows two days of talks in Geneva and aims to revive stalled trade. Both sides will continue negotiations, though fundamental disagreements remain unresolved. Jamey Keaten, David McHugh, Elaine Kurtenbach, Ken Moritsugu, Associated Press, May 12
China releases white paper on national security. China’s State Council Information Office issued a white paper outlining the country’s national security doctrine in the “new era,” highlighting its holistic approach as rooted in Xi Jinping Thought. The paper emphasized political stability, territorial integrity, and maritime rights while linking security to development, innovation, and reform. It reaffirmed China's commitment to the Global Security Initiative and multilateralism, advocating a fairer global security governance system. Xinhua, May 12
China’s Xi Jinping urges countries to ‘stand united’ in face of global trade war. President Xi Jinping called for solidarity against protectionism during the China-CELAC forum in Beijing, warning there are “no winners in tariff wars.” Addressing leaders from Latin America and the Caribbean, Xi proposed five new initiatives covering trade, infrastructure, energy, and AI cooperation. He pledged 66 billion yuan in credit, emphasized mutual development under the Belt and Road Initiative, and condemned unilateralism and economic coercion. Dewey Sim and Kawala Xie, South China Morning Post, May 13
Japan
Ishiba seeks agreement with Trump on tariffs in July. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is aiming to reach a tariff agreement with U.S. President Donald Trump by early July, aligning with the launch of Japan’s Upper House election campaign. Originally targeting mid-June, Ishiba delayed talks to observe growing U.S. opposition to high tariffs. He plans to visit the U.S. around July 9, when a 90-day tariff pause ends, hoping to secure a favorable deal for Japanese industry. Kohei Morioka, The Asahi Shimbun, May 12
South Korea
PPP candidate says not considering expulsion of impeached Yoon from party. People Power Party presidential candidate Kim Moon-soo stated he does not plan to expel former President Yoon Suk Yeol from the party despite Yoon’s impeachment and upcoming trials for insurrection. Speaking in Daegu, Kim said Yoon’s future in the party should be his own decision and warned that disavowing Yoon would also implicate the party. He urged unity to move past the martial law controversy. Kim Eun-jung, Yonhap News Agency, May 13
Democratic Party on high alert over terror threats. South Korea’s Democratic Party has heightened security for presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung after multiple terror threats and reports of a possible mole in his security team. Officials suspect standing assassination orders from the December 3 martial law attempt may still be active. The party moved Lee’s campaign launch from Gwanghwamun Plaza to Cheonggye Plaza for safety. Police are investigating seven threats, including alleged smuggling of Russian firearms. Lee Ji-woon, The Dong-A Ilbo, May 12
South Korea's presidential candidates prioritize economic growth as key campaign pledge. As the 22-day campaign period began, leading presidential candidates from all major parties pledged to boost economic growth and national unity. Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung emphasized innovation and AI as drivers of a revitalized economy. People Power Party’s Kim Moon-soo focused on small business relief and job creation through market-friendly reforms. Anna J. Park, The Korea Times, May 12
North Korea
U.N. to host 1st high-level meeting on N. Korea's human rights violations. The United Nations General Assembly will convene its first high-level plenary session on May 20 to address North Korea’s human rights abuses, following a resolution passed in December. This marks the first time such a meeting is hosted directly by the UNGA. South Korea is considering sending a senior official or its U.N. ambassador to participate in the event. Park Boram, Yonhap News Agency, May 12
N. Korean security officials extort money from defectors’ families. Security officers in Hoeryong, North Korea, are coercing relatives of defectors to admit receiving money from abroad and surrender the funds, under threat of forced relocation to remote areas. Some families have paid thousands of yuan to avoid punishment. The crackdown follows increased border surveillance and is part of efforts by Kim Jong Un’s regime to block foreign influence and control unauthorized communication. Lee Chae Eun, Daily NK, May 13
As rules relax, N. Koreans flock to Yalu River cruises near Chinese border. North Koreans are increasingly taking pleasure cruises on the Yalu River in Sinuiju following eased restrictions, with passengers now allowed to wave at Chinese onlookers and take photos. The tours, once tightly controlled, now operate regularly and are open to anyone with a government ID for 20,000 won. The cruise route highlights flood-recovery construction and offers rare views of Dandong, China, sparking public hopes for broader domestic travel freedom. Seon Hwa, Daily NK, May 13
Thailand
Big blow for People’s Party in local polls. Thailand’s People’s Party suffered significant losses in nationwide municipal elections, winning only 13 to 14 out of 94 mayoral races. The party failed to secure any Nakhon municipality seats and performed poorly in Muang and tambon levels. Analysts cited enduring dominance by local political clans and waning momentum since the 2023 general election. Experts urged the party to address its declining popularity and lack of consistent support. Mongkol Bangprapa, Bangkok Post, May 13
Vietnam
Vietnam, Belarus issue joint statement on establishing strategic partnership. Vietnam and Belarus have formalized a Strategic Partnership, pledging closer ties in trade, science, education, defense, and cultural exchange. The agreement followed high-level talks between General Secretary To Lam and President Aleksandr Lukashenko in Minsk. Key documents were signed in areas including scientific research, digital transformation, and athletic training. Vietnam News, May 12
Myanmar
Myanmar resistance briefly captures junta battalion HQ in Bago. Joint forces from the Karen National Liberation Army and the People’s Defense Forces temporarily seized Light Infantry Battalion 598 headquarters in Shwekyin Township, Bago Region. The raid left 30 junta soldiers dead and led to the capture of weapons and six detainees. The junta retook the base after three days using airstrikes and artillery. The Irrawaddy, May 13
Seven resistance members killed by Myanmar junta airstrike in Magway Region. A junta airstrike on May 5 struck a school in Saung Kyan Kone village, Pakokku Township, Magway Region, killing seven resistance fighters sheltering there. The victims included members of local defense groups and the Pauk Township People’s Defence Force under the National Unity Government. Six were killed instantly, and a seventh died from injuries two days later. Four others were wounded. Myanmar Now, May 12
Bangladesh
Ousted Bangladesh PM Hasina’s party barred from election as party registration suspended. Bangladesh’s Election Commission has suspended the Awami League’s registration, barring the party from future elections under a ban imposed by the interim government of Muhammad Yunus. The decision follows months of protests, deadly unrest, and a war crimes probe against party leaders. Hasina, now in exile, was accused of rights violations during her long rule. Ruma Paul, Reuters, May 13
Philippines
Detained in The Hague, Philippines’ Duterte wins hometown mayoral election. Former President Rodrigo Duterte won the Davao City mayoral race by a wide margin despite being detained at the International Criminal Court on murder charges linked to his drug war. With 80% of votes counted, he led his nearest rival by eightfold. His two sons also secured local posts. Duterte’s arrest has intensified support among loyalists, as his daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, faces an impeachment trial. Karen Lema, Mikhail Flores, Reuters, May 12
ICC trial looms for Go, Bato. Senators Bong Go and Ronald “Bato” Dela Rosa are likely to face trial at the International Criminal Court for their roles in the Duterte administration’s deadly anti-drug campaign. Human rights lawyer Kristina Conti said Dela Rosa may receive an arrest warrant by September, while Go is under scrutiny for enabling key decisions. The ICC is expanding its investigation to assess command responsibility among Duterte’s closest allies. Franco Jose C. Baroña, The Manila Times, May 13
Indonesia
Australian PM Albanese to visit Prabowo in first overseas trip since re-election. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will visit Indonesia on May 14–15 for his first official trip since being re-elected, highlighting the strategic depth of bilateral ties. He will meet President Prabowo Subianto to discuss cooperation in food security, energy, and trade. Albanese described Indonesia as vital to Australia’s economic future and emphasized defense, security, and strong personal ties with Prabowo. Grace el Dora, Jakarta Globe, May 13
Taiwan
Taiwan test fires for first time new U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket system. Taiwan conducted its first live-fire test of the U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket system on May 12, launching from Jiupeng base amid growing tensions with China. The mobile system, used effectively by Ukraine, has a range of up to 300 km and could reach targets in China’s Fujian province. Eleven of 29 systems purchased have arrived, with U.S. personnel on-site for support. Ann Wang and Annabelle Chih, Reuters, May 12
Kazakhstan
Agreements worth USD 5 bln signed at Kazakhstan-UAE Business Forum. Kazakhstan and the UAE signed investment deals totaling $5 billion across multiple sectors at the Kazakhstan-UAE Business Forum. Key agreements include a sugar mill project by QazaqArab Sugar LLP, a data processing center backed by Presight and the Digital Development Ministry, and an education cooperation memorandum with Emirates Kazakhstan Education Investment Group. The UAE has invested over $4.3 billion in Kazakhstan, its top regional partner. Zhanna Nurmaganbetova, Kazinform, May 12
Northeast Asia
Fire Sale: Prospects for SOE Privatization in China. China is facing mounting economic and fiscal pressures that could force reconsideration of privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), despite ideological resistance. Although SOEs have grown significantly in market share, accounting for 54% of top-listed firms and 85% of bond issuance, their performance has dragged productivity and fiscal health. Past privatization efforts in the 1990s focused on smaller, non-strategic firms, slashing SOE employment from 24% to 7% of the labor force by 2003. However, since 2012, privatization has stalled under Xi Jinping’s renewed emphasis on Party control and strategic use of SOEs. Now, falling tax revenues, rising debt, and slower growth are reviving internal debates about asset sales. Even modest SOE divestitures could ease local government debt burdens and potentially raise trillions in revenue. A sale of just 10% of SOE assets could yield 15.5–28.5 trillion RMB; selling 50% could generate up to 117 trillion RMB. Politically sensitive sectors like telecoms and energy would likely remain off-limits, while industrial and non-strategic assets could be prioritized. Yet political risks, employment disruption, and unclear asset quality remain serious obstacles. Indicators of a change toward privatization would include local asset registries, mixed-ownership reforms, or IPO activity by SOEs. While a sweeping “fire sale” remains unlikely, fiscal necessity may push Beijing to embrace limited privatization to stabilize its economy. Daniel H. Rosen, Charles Austin Jordan, Laura Gormley and Matthew Mingey, Rhodium Group, May 12
Security with Chinese characteristics: How the Global Security Initiative reflects Beijing’s priorities at home. China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), introduced by Xi Jinping in 2022 and expanded in a 2023 concept paper, outlines six principles prioritizing sovereignty, dialogue-based conflict resolution, and comprehensive security across traditional and non-traditional domains. While promoting multilateralism and cooperation with global institutions and developing nations, the GSI mirrors China’s internal concept of Comprehensive National Security, where virtually all national activities are treated as security concerns. This raises concerns about how China’s global security approach serves its domestic priorities and strategic interests. Despite rhetoric on dialogue and peace, China’s actions, such as support for Russia during the Ukraine war and assertiveness in the South China Sea, reveal a selective application of sovereignty principles favoring Beijing’s interests. The initiative’s focus on development and human security is welcomed in the Global South, yet its implications for global order and traditional security pose challenges, especially when paired with China’s pursuit of global military capabilities. The GSI may function less as a platform for equitable security cooperation and more as a vehicle for extending Beijing’s influence under the guise of mutual security. William Matthews, Lowy Institute, May 12
Why has North Korea finally admitted its troops are dying in Russia’s war on Ukraine? North Korea has officially acknowledged the deaths of its troops in Ukraine, a rare admission marking a change from past secrecy about foreign military engagements. Leader Kim Jong-un praised the deployed forces’ valor and ordered the construction of a monument in Pyongyang, elevating their status to that of soldiers from historic wars. With an estimated 5,000 casualties, the scale and visibility of the deployment have made concealment untenable, especially as images and testimonies from captured soldiers circulate widely online. The state had initially issued vague death certificates and increased military indoctrination to quell unrest. However, growing domestic dissatisfaction and the need to justify further deployments led to public acknowledgment. Economic incentives from Russia have made continued participation in the conflict crucial for Pyongyang. In seeking to manage public sentiment, the regime granted families of the deceased the right to relocate to Pyongyang. While both North Korea and Russia praised the troops' bravery, neither blamed the United States, signaling a strategic communication approach. The acknowledgement also highlights the regime’s recognition of internal limits, as sustaining public support for foreign military losses grows increasingly difficult. Khang Vu, Lowy Institute, May 12
Trump’s China Truce on Tariffs Comes with Cost to U.S. Credibility. The United States and China have agreed to a ninety-day mutual reduction in tariffs following trade talks in Geneva, temporarily lowering U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods to 30 percent and Chinese tariffs on U.S. goods to 10 percent. Despite the short-term market relief, the truce underscores deeper damage to U.S. economic credibility. The tariff pause effectively walks back the Trump administration’s reciprocal tariff strategy, weakening the dollar, discouraging foreign investment, and straining supply chains. China, benefiting from U.S. dependence on its exports, is expected to exploit inventory vulnerabilities and re-route trade through Southeast Asia to avoid tariffs. Meanwhile, U.S. businesses face rising shipping and inflation costs as they rush to replenish inventories. The concession undermines Washington’s leverage while strengthening Beijing’s confidence. Although the administration may portray the deal as a tactical decoupling, it signals a loss of bargaining power. The temporary reprieve is unlikely to result in further tariff cuts, with future negotiations expected to mirror terms favorable to China under the 2020 Phase One deal. Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Council on Foreign Relations, May 12
Quick Take: New Construction at Chongjin Port. Significant construction activity at North Korea’s Chongjin Port suggests a strategic upgrade of the site, potentially linked to military shipbuilding. Satellite imagery from May 2025 shows large-scale improvements to the harbor, including cleared land, new aggregate surfaces, and multiple platforms built on the shipway. Small temporary huts associated with construction brigades appeared in late March, indicating ongoing, intensive labor operations. A new warship, approximately 143 meters in length and consistent with North Korea’s recently launched destroyer at Nampho, was observed near a series of 275-meter construction halls. Kim Jong Un’s recent inspection of the vessel at Chongjin, as part of his broader tour of warship production facilities, shows the port’s growing importance beyond its traditional fishing role. Additional efforts to fortify the quay area from flooding further reflect plans for more permanent or expanded infrastructure. The developments point to Chongjin’s emerging status as a critical node in North Korea’s naval modernization efforts. Martyn Williams and Peter Makowsky, 38 North, May 12
Plucking China’s “Peach Networks.”A recent investigation by China Central Television spotlighted so-called “peach networks”—a term for dating apps allegedly facilitating illicit sexual transactions under the guise of social networking. These apps, such as “Female Companion” and “First Love,” allow men to register without verification while requiring women to submit ID, then lure male users into paying for interactions, often with automated bots. The CCTV exposé cited exorbitant profit margins and deceptive structures that skirt Chinese laws banning prostitution and obscene content. Following the broadcast, some apps were removed from Chinese app stores, though others remained accessible. Media like The Beijing News highlighted how these platforms exploit gender dynamics, turning women into “chat specialists” earning commission from male users’ spending. However, critiques of the report note its alignment with a recurring pattern in Chinese media: surface-level crackdowns on online vice framed as investigative journalism but often serving broader state objectives rather than delivering systemic reform. Historical parallels include the 2014 Momo controversy, where a similar crackdown led to the app’s public listing and eventual evolution into a live-streaming giant. This cyclical media attention demonstrates how campaigns around “peach networks” often serve as colorful, time-bound gestures of state supervision rather than meaningful regulatory enforcement. Dalia Parete, China Media Project, May 13
Southeast Asia
With New Zealand the latest to join, the Philippines is building a network of defence partners amid South China Sea tensions. The Philippines has signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with New Zealand, expanding its roster of defence partnerships amid persistent maritime threats from China and declining confidence in ASEAN solidarity and U.S. reliability. The agreement follows New Zealand’s participation in 2024 maritime exercises and aligns with shared support for freedom of navigation. This adds to similar agreements with Australia, Japan, and the United States, collectively forming the “Squad,” and anticipated deals with Canada and France. Manila is increasingly turning to bilateral defence arrangements due to ASEAN’s ineffectiveness, including its failure to respond decisively to the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff and the 2016 arbitration ruling rejecting China’s maritime claims. China’s harassment tactics, including recent flag-raising on Sandy Cay, reinforce the urgency for the Philippines to bolster deterrence through diversified security ties. While Beijing condemns these coalitions as ideological blocs, such criticism has only solidified regional alignment against its assertiveness. Concerns over U.S. commitment under a second Trump administration, including transactional diplomacy and reduced prioritization of South China Sea tensions, further drive Manila’s pursuit of capable and willing partners. Andrea Chloe Wong, Lowy Institute, May 13
Indonesia’s South China Sea policy needs more than legalism. Indonesia’s traditional reliance on legal frameworks and regional diplomacy in its South China Sea strategy is proving insufficient as China intensifies its assertive maritime activities, particularly in the Natuna Sea. Despite adherence to UNCLOS and participation in ASEAN negotiations, Indonesia’s current approach lacks the naval capacity and operational readiness to deter incursions effectively. China’s 2021 Coast Guard Law and growing patrol presence challenge Jakarta’s maritime sovereignty, while regional counterparts like the Philippines and Vietnam have adopted more assertive postures. A strategy of “partial multi-alignment” is recommended, balancing economic ties with China against security partnerships with the U.S. and others, while reinforcing ASEAN’s centrality. Indonesia must move toward more proactive naval diplomacy and credible maritime enforcement. Improvements should include increased joint patrols, a move away from plans for a costly aircraft carrier toward acquiring versatile patrol vessels and UAVs, and a substantial investment in its under-resourced coast guard. Expanding maritime domain awareness through international satellite surveillance partnerships is also essential. Institutionalizing this strategic posture would enable Indonesia to transform from a passive actor into ASEAN’s maritime stabilizer amid intensifying regional tensions. Probo Darono Yakti and Alfin Febrian Basundoro, East Asia Forum, May 13
Vietnam faces the fallout of US trade volatility. Vietnam’s export-driven economy has been disrupted by the Trump administration’s erratic trade policies, including a sudden imposition and reversal of tariffs on Chinese goods and a temporary 90-day tariff rollback for most partners. These disruptions triggered financial market instability in Vietnam, depreciated the dong, and hurt sectors such as electronics and apparel. Although the reversal provided brief relief, it reinforced concerns over the unpredictability of U.S. trade actions. Accusations that Vietnam facilitates Chinese transshipment have led to increased inspections and anti-dumping measures, but data shows most of Vietnam’s manufacturing growth stems from genuine value-added activity. The volatility shows the need for structural adaptation. Vietnam is advancing a dual strategy: strengthening economic ties with the U.S. while deepening engagement with China and regional partners. ASEAN’s unified call for rule-based trade contrasts with varied national approaches, with Vietnam pushing for broader integration into global supply chains. To mitigate future risks, Vietnam must improve trade diversification, increase its value chain participation through high-tech sectors, and deepen involvement in multilateral trade agreements like CPTPP and RCEP. Strengthening regional coalitions and diplomatic ties is also critical to reduce reliance on bilateral arrangements. These are essential not just for Vietnam’s resilience but as a model for regional adaptation. Vu Lam, East Asia Forum, May 12
Anwar Ibrahim’s Balancing Act as a Muslim Leader for All. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim continues to navigate Malaysia’s deeply polarized religious and political landscape, facing criticism from both Islamist and liberal factions. A recent controversy surrounding the relocation of a Hindu temple in Kuala Lumpur reignited tensions. The temple, located on land purchased by the Jakel Group for a mosque endowment, was eventually offered a nearby plot after government mediation. Despite a peaceful resolution, segments of the Malay Muslim public viewed the arrangement as unjust. Anwar’s decision to officiate the Madani Mosque’s groundbreaking during Ramadan, alongside assurances about the temple’s preservation, sparked mixed reactions. His attempt to reconcile Islamic principles with multicultural governance defines his “post-Islamist” identity, rooted in justice and compassion as outlined in the Quran. However, he has been labeled both too Islamist, when expanding roles for religious agencies, and too liberal, when acting decisively against anti-Hindu speech. This dual scrutiny reflects a broader societal rift. Anwar’s vision, encapsulated in his Madani framework, seeks to institutionalize inclusive Islamic values, but his leadership remains challenged by Malaysia’s entrenched communal politics. Sustaining this balance may prove pivotal to unifying the nation across its complex religious and ethnic divides. Syaza Shukri, FULCRUM, May 13