Asia Daily: March 21, 2025
China
China unveils rule to counter ‘discriminatory’ measures in international IP disputes. China introduced new regulations allowing countermeasures against foreign governments that restrict its companies in intellectual property disputes. Effective May 1, the rule aims to protect Chinese entities from perceived external suppression, particularly from the U.S. and EU. It strengthens state oversight of IP cases and encourages domestic firms to expand legal expertise overseas. William Zheng, South China Morning Post, March 19
Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez to meet Xi in China next month. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez will visit China in April for talks with President Xi Jinping. The visit follows his September trip aimed at easing EU-China trade tensions over electric vehicle tariffs. Sanchez will also visit Vietnam as part of his Asian tour. Harshita Meenaktshi and Charlie Devereux, Reuters, March 20
China seeks foreign capital old and new to bolster changing economy. China is courting foreign investment, welcoming firms like Brazilian miner Vale while encouraging new ventures in services, healthcare, and biotech. A "special action plan" aims to boost consumption and open the economy further. President Xi Jinping highlighted domestic competition as foreign brands like Starbucks face pressure from Chinese rivals. Xiuhao Chen and Ryan Woo, Reuters, March 20
Japan
Japan opposition lawmakers seek end to China's seafood import ban. A Japanese opposition delegation urged Beijing to lift its ban on Japanese seafood imports, imposed over Fukushima wastewater concerns. During talks in Beijing, Chinese officials emphasized fostering stable bilateral ties. The visit follows an agreement for gradual import resumption pending China’s participation in monitoring efforts. The trip coincides with an upcoming Japan-China-South Korea ministerial meeting in Tokyo. Kyodo News, March 21
Japan says no shift in U.S. alliance despite Trump budget cut plans. Japan reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening its alliance with the U.S., despite reports that Washington may halt military expansion in Japan due to budget cuts. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani insisted bilateral plans remain unchanged. Concerns persist over potential U.S. demands for Japan to shoulder more defense costs, especially amid regional threats from China and North Korea. Kyodo News, Kyodo News, March 21
South Korea
Main opposition party to propose impeachment motion against acting President Choi. South Korea’s Democratic Party plans to introduce an impeachment motion against acting President Choi Sang-mok over his refusal to appoint an opposition-backed justice to the Constitutional Court. The move follows a court ruling deeming Choi’s actions unconstitutional. The impeachment bid coincides with an upcoming ruling on Prime Minister Han Duck-soo’s impeachment, which could impact Choi’s political future. Yi Wonju, Yonhap News Agency, March 21
South Korea, U.S. wrap up annual military drills, stage joint river-crossing. South Korea and the U.S. concluded their 11-day Freedom Shield exercises, featuring a large-scale river-crossing drill near the North Korean border. Around 600 troops and 100 armored vehicles participated, reinforcing military interoperability. Pyongyang condemned the drills as provocative, launching ballistic missiles in response. Tensions persist as Seoul navigates political turmoil following President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment. Daewoung Kim and Hyunsu Yim, Reuters, March 20
South Korea Constitutional Court to rule on PM Han's impeachment on March 24. South Korea’s Constitutional Court will decide on March 24 whether to remove or reinstate impeached Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, who was suspended as acting president last year. The ruling precedes a separate decision on President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment, following his brief declaration of martial law. Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok currently serves as acting president amid the country’s deepening political crisis. Joyce Lee, Jack Kim, Reuters, March 20
North Korea
North Korea's Kim oversees test-fire of anti-aircraft missile system. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un supervised the test-firing of a new anti-aircraft missile system, which state media described as highly reliable with advantageous combat capabilities. The test followed U.S.-South Korea military drills that Pyongyang condemned as a war rehearsal. North Korea warned it is considering all options, including the use of its most destructive military means. Hyunsu Yim, Reuters, March 20
Russia's top security official arrives in N. Korea for meeting with Kim Jong-un: report. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Pyongyang for talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and other officials. The visit follows increased military cooperation, with North Korea reportedly sending troops to support Russia in Ukraine. Shoigu’s trip comes amid discussions on high-level political contacts and speculation over a future Kim visit to Moscow. Park Boram, Yonhap News Agency, March 21
Thailand
Paetongtarn rebuts 'trading deals with the country' allegation. Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra dismissed opposition claims that she engaged in secret political deals benefiting her family, calling the accusations baseless. The opposition's "Trading Deals with the Country" campaign alleges backroom agreements facilitated her father Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile. Paetongtarn labeled the claims a distraction ahead of next week’s no-confidence debate, where the opposition will have 28 hours to present its case. The Nation, March 20
EC backs DSI probe into vote rigging. Thailand’s Election Commission (EC) is cooperating with the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) to investigate alleged collusion in last year’s Senate election. Of 577 complaints received, 220 involve vote-rigging, with nine cases already sent to the Supreme Court. Critics accuse the EC of stalling investigations and lacking transparency. Former Senate candidates have called for broader agency involvement to ensure a fair probe. Mongkol Bangprapa, Bangkok Post, March 20
Vietnam
BRICS, planes and beef in spotlight as Brazil's Lula visits Vietnam, sources say. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will visit Vietnam from March 27-29, leading a business delegation that includes executives from Embraer and JBS. Talks will focus on Vietnam’s potential entry into BRICS, defense cooperation, and economic agreements. Brazil is pushing for Hanoi to approve beef imports, which could pave the way for JBS to invest in a meat-processing plant. Embraer is also negotiating aircraft sales. Francesco Guarascio, Reuters, March 20
NA chairman hopes for deeper, more substantive partnership with US. Vietnam’s National Assembly Chairman Tran Thanh Man reaffirmed the country’s commitment to strengthening ties with the U.S. during a meeting with Senator Steven Daines in Hanoi. Marking 30 years of diplomatic relations, Man emphasized increased collaboration in trade, energy, and war legacy remediation. Daines, the first U.S. senator to visit Vietnam in 2025, pledged to advance bilateral cooperation, including partnerships between Montana and Vietnamese localities. Vietnam News, March 21
Myanmar
Myanmar relief camps receive last World Food Programme aid as cuts begin. The World Food Programme (WFP) has halted assistance to Myanmar’s relief camps due to funding shortages, worsened by U.S. budget cuts under President Donald Trump. The decision affects a million people displaced by ongoing conflict. Residents expressed despair over losing the $50 monthly stipend used for basic survival. WFP officials warn of worsening humanitarian conditions as international aid dwindles. Myanmar Now, March 20
Myanmar junta arming grassroots militias to control urban centers. Myanmar’s military regime is expanding its control over cities by arming community-based militias, known as "People’s Security and Anti-Terrorism" teams. These groups, composed mainly of older, low-income workers, now carry firearms and conduct joint patrols with junta troops. Critics warn the move strengthens military rule while using civilians as proxy forces. The militias have been deployed in Mandalay, Yangon, and other high-tension areas. Hein Htoo Zan, The Irrawaddy, March 20.
Laos
NA approves ministry mergers, amendments to constitution, laws, investment incentives. Laos’ National Assembly approved a government restructuring plan, merging four ministries to streamline administration and reduce the total from 17 to 13. Amendments to the Constitution grant more power to local administrations and enhance anti-corruption measures. Lawmakers also passed incentives for the Amata Smart & Eco City project, including tax breaks. The ministry mergers must be completed by May. Vientiane Times, March 21
Laos included in United States travel ban draft list. The U.S. has placed Laos in the “orange” tier of a draft travel ban list, potentially imposing strict visa requirements and interview mandates. The policy, part of President Donald Trump’s immigration measures, cites concerns over deportee acceptance. Laos has 60 days to address U.S. concerns to avoid harsher restrictions. Advocacy groups are preparing legal challenges against the proposed ban. Beatrice Siviero, The Laotian Times, March 20
Philippines
Philippines eyes transforming islands of former U.S. base into military reservation. The Philippines is considering converting Grande and Chiquita islands in Subic Bay into a military reservation to enhance security and naval capabilities near the South China Sea. The move follows growing tensions with China and increased U.S.-Philippines military cooperation. The announcement came after authorities arrested several foreign nationals on Grande Island for alleged cybercrime and espionage. Mikhail Flores, Reuters, March 20
Imee Marcos blasts Duterte arrest; administration execs push back. Senator Imee Marcos criticized the arrest of former President Rodrigo Duterte, questioning its legality and the government's cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Justice Secretary Jesus Crispin Remulla defended the move, citing the Philippines' obligations under Interpol and national law. Vice President Sara Duterte called the arrest politically motivated, while administration officials insisted it followed due process. Dempsey Reyes and Melvin Gascon, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 21
Indonesia
Indonesia parliament passes contentious amendments to military law. Indonesia’s legislature approved revisions expanding military officers’ eligibility for civilian roles, sparking protests over fears of democratic backsliding. Rights groups warn the changes echo Suharto-era militarization, while officials argue they align with democratic principles. The law also extends retirement ages for officers, potentially limiting career advancement. Protesters decried military overreach, with Amnesty International warning of authoritarian regression. Stefanno Sulaiman and Ananda Teresia, Reuters, March 20
Singapore
Opposition Progress Singapore Party elects new leadership, six new faces in top decision-making body. Singapore’s opposition Progress Singapore Party (PSP) elected a new central executive committee, with six new members joining its top ranks. Non-Constituency MPs Leong Mun Wai and Hazel Poa retained their positions, while key leadership roles, including the secretary-general post, will be decided later. Observers expect Leong and Poa to be frontrunners for the position. The PSP is preparing for the upcoming general election. Ng Wei Kai, The Straits Times, March 20
Taiwan
Taiwan’s president says the defense budget will exceed 3% of GDP in military overhaul. President William Lai Ching-te announced that Taiwan will raise defense spending above 3% of GDP, aiming to strengthen its military amid growing threats from China. The budget increase will fund extended compulsory service, higher pay for troops, and U.S. arms purchases. Lai reaffirmed Taiwan’s commitment to regional stability and closer security ties with the U.S. AP News, March 20
Taiwan pledges to buy more produce, natural gas from US. Taiwan committed to increasing imports of U.S. agricultural products and liquefied natural gas to address trade imbalances and strengthen economic ties. CPC Corp signed an agreement with Alaska Gasline Development Corp to purchase LNG, with further negotiations planned. President William Lai emphasized Taiwan’s role as an essential U.S. partner in high-tech industries, highlighting Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.’s major investments in the U.S. Taipei Times, March 21
Kazakhstan
Assembly of People of Kazakhstan to convene in April, celebrating 30th anniversary. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced that the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan will hold its 34th session on April 23-24, marking three decades since its founding. The assembly, a key institution promoting national unity among Kazakhstan’s 100 ethnic groups, has played an active role in social welfare, including recent flood relief efforts. Tokayev highlighted its role in addressing social challenges such as drug addiction and family violence. Dana Omirgazy, The Astana Times, March 20
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan: seeking Elon Musk-like figures to lead the government. Kyrgyzstan’s parliament is considering a bill to remove experience requirements for cabinet positions, allowing private-sector leaders to enter government. Supporters argue the change would attract global talent, while critics warn it could worsen corruption. The bill, dubbed the “Kyrgyz Musk Act,” reflects broader political shifts in the country, which has seen frequent government turnover. Eurasianet, March 21
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan reach border agreement after years of negotiations. After nearly two decades of talks, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan finalized the junction point of their shared borders. The agreement, concluded in March 2025, ensures Kyrgyzstan retains a key road and approximately 100 hectares of land. The deal follows a separate Kyrgyz-Tajik border agreement aimed at resolving long-standing tensions. Border checkpoints that had been closed for years have now reopened. Sadokat Jalolova, The Times of Central Asia, March 20
Northeast Asia
Is the Pivot to Asia Finally Happening? The Trump administration has initiated actions suggesting a potential change in U.S. foreign policy focus toward Asia, including efforts to end conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza and reduce military presence in Syria. This aligns with longstanding calls to prioritize Asia, where China is viewed as the primary strategic competitor. The ideological contest within Trump’s foreign policy team pits libertarians advocating global disengagement against Asianists pushing for concentrated efforts to counter China. Three key Asianists now lead the Deputies Committee, placing them in prime positions to shape national security decisions. While Trump himself remains noncommittal and unpredictable, early signs of a pivot include increased bilateral security engagements with regional allies like Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, as well as a de-emphasis on multilateralism. However, economic coercion and demands for reciprocity continue to characterize U.S. trade relations in Asia. A successful pivot would depend on sustained reductions in European and Middle Eastern commitments and deeper alignment with Indo-Pacific allies, though the administration’s volatility leaves future policy directions uncertain. Drew Thompson, RSIS, March 18
Taiwan’s democratic uncertainty in the face of recall elections. Taiwan is experiencing a surge in recall initiatives amid political gridlock following the 2024 elections, exposing both the strengths and vulnerabilities of its recall mechanism. Designed to ensure vertical accountability between voters and district legislators, the process enables targeted oversight outside of general elections. However, Taiwan’s mixed-member majoritarian system exempts at-large legislators—such as those from the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP)—from recall, creating an imbalance in accountability. In the current parliamentary configuration, the TPP’s eight at-large seats have allowed it to play a pivotal legislative role without facing recall risk, even as it contributes to policy deadlock. The recall mechanism, while democratizing in intent, is increasingly being used as a political weapon, especially after reforms in 2016 lowered thresholds for initiating recall petitions. Civil society engagement in the recall movement has grown, with both ruling and opposition parties weaponizing the process amid contentious legislative standoffs. The Central Election Commission’s approval of 19 recall proposals targeting KMT legislators in early 2025 reflects the expanding reach of this tool. While the mechanism promotes accountability, its current application risks undermining long-term governance in favor of populist or reactionary politics. Rather than reversing reforms, further refinement is necessary to balance accessibility with safeguards against misuse, ensuring democratic resilience and voter literacy. Shangpo Hsieh, East Asia Forum, March 20
Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans. Amid rising tensions over Taiwan, China is increasingly focused on a joint blockade strategy to coerce Taipei without immediate invasion. This approach would combine military presence with cyber and space domain operations to disrupt U.S. response capabilities. To counter such a strategy, the United States must prioritize resilience in its cyber and space assets. Key recommendations include improving satellite network redundancy, securing undersea cables, and investing in offensive cyber capabilities to preempt or neutralize Chinese digital warfare efforts. Military exercises and intelligence suggest that information dominance is central to China’s coercive plans. The U.S. can disrupt these efforts by integrating space and cyber operations into joint command structures and improving public-private coordination on critical infrastructure. Additionally, building coalitions with allies to create collective cyber deterrence and interoperable space capabilities would complicate Beijing’s planning. Proactive measures across these domains are essential for safeguarding Taiwan and maintaining regional stability. Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis, CSIS, March 20
China’s Germanium and Gallium Export Restrictions: Consequences for the United States. China’s 2023 restrictions on germanium and gallium exports, critical minerals essential for semiconductors and defense technologies, aimed to pressure the United States amid strategic competition. However, discrepancies in trade data reveal that these materials continue reaching the U.S. via third countries, undermining the ban’s effectiveness. While the U.S. government has imposed measures to bolster domestic supply chains, including funding and strategic stockpiling, its dependence on indirect imports from Southeast Asia and Europe persists. This reexport loophole weakens China’s leverage but leaves the U.S. vulnerable to future supply disruptions. Analysts suggest that Washington should improve transparency in mineral sourcing, diversify procurement networks, and strengthen diplomatic engagement with intermediary trade partners. If China chooses to enforce stricter reexport controls, the U.S. could face acute supply chain challenges, especially in high-tech and defense sectors.
Sarah Godek, Stimson Center, March 19
Southeast Asia
Indonesia’s path to scaling nutrition responsibly. Indonesia’s Free Nutritious Meal program (MBG), inspired by India’s PM POSHAN school feeding initiative, aims to address child malnutrition and improve educational outcomes but requires careful, phased implementation to avoid inefficiencies and governance failures. India’s model demonstrates the value of legal mandates, gradual national expansion, community oversight, and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in sustaining large-scale programs. By contrast, MBG remains centrally managed, increasing risks of bureaucratic delays and inconsistent service delivery. To ensure success, Indonesia should begin with pilot projects in high-need areas like Eastern Indonesia and Kalimantan, integrate local food supply chains to reduce costs and foster community ownership, and adopt robust governance mechanisms including transparent procurement and real-time reporting. Financial sustainability can be strengthened through PPPs and redirecting subsidies toward child nutrition. Jakarta’s 2019 school food program offers a viable prototype, showing that targeted rollouts with controlled spending can yield positive results. Indonesia must resist political pressures for rapid national deployment and focus instead on deliberate, accountable, and community-integrated strategies. With prudent planning and execution, MBG has the potential to transform child health and education, but mismanagement could undermine its goals and waste valuable resources. Eko Sumando, East Asia Forum, March 21
Sound of Resistance: Indonesian Youth Expression of Social and Political Critique. Indonesian youth are increasingly using music and digital platforms to express dissatisfaction with social inequality, political elitism, and democratic backsliding. Genres like hip-hop, punk, and indie rock serve as vehicles for critique, with lyrics targeting corruption, state violence, and authoritarian tendencies. This cultural resistance extends online, where musicians and fans circulate messages of dissent through social media and streaming services. Events such as the 2019 student protests and the 2024 election cycle have further galvanized youth expression, revealing disillusionment with formal political channels. Instead of engaging through traditional institutions, young Indonesians often mobilize through decentralized, creative communities that blend art with activism. However, these forms of resistance face obstacles, including censorship, legal threats, and co-optation by political elites. Despite these challenges, the resilience and innovation of youth-led movements demonstrate a commitment to democratic ideals and accountability. Dian Maya Safitri, Fulcrum, March 19
Shaping Indonesia’s Democracy: Youth Alight Amidst #DarkIndonesia. Indonesia’s youth have emerged as a potent force in defending democratic values amid perceived threats to civil liberties, as demonstrated by the resurgence of the #DarkIndonesia movement. Triggered by legislative changes and judicial decisions seen to undermine anti-corruption efforts and judicial independence, youth mobilization has spread across digital platforms and public protests. The movement shows dissatisfaction with President Joko Widodo’s support for controversial reforms, including the weakening of the Corruption Eradication Commission and the Constitutional Court’s ruling enabling his son’s vice-presidential candidacy. Unlike traditional political engagement, youth activism has taken on decentralized and issue-driven forms, often coordinated through social media under hashtags like #ReformasiDikorupsi and #MahkamahKeluarga. Despite lacking formal organizational structures, these movements demonstrate agility and broad reach, drawing participation from students, artists, and civil society. While often dismissed as transient, this wave of activism shows continuity with earlier reform-era mobilizations and reflects a growing generational commitment to transparency, fairness, and institutional integrity. Made Ayu Mariska, Fulcrum, March 21
Central Asia
How China is Adapting to Tajikistan’s Demand for Security Cooperation. China’s security engagement in Tajikistan has intensified, not as a unilateral imposition, but in response to Dushanbe’s requests for support amid regional instability and internal threats. Tajikistan, facing declining Russian military backing and proximity to Afghanistan, has turned to Beijing for aid, resulting in Chinese investment in surveillance infrastructure, joint military exercises, and the construction of a paramilitary base. These initiatives, including Huawei-led surveillance systems and training support, reflect China’s interest in preventing cross-border terrorism, especially in Xinjiang. The cooperation aligns with China’s broader regional strategy, yet it is driven by Tajikistan’s authoritarian regime seeking tools to suppress dissent and maintain power. While Russia remains Tajikistan’s formal security guarantor, China’s growing footprint includes institutionalized agreements and high-level visits, such as Xi Jinping’s 2024 trip to Dushanbe. Bilateral relations are now shaped by more than 300 agreements, including those under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, showing a maturing partnership molded by local demands rather than Chinese imposition. Edward Lemon and Ruslan Norov, Carnegie Endowment, March 20
South Asia
As the world goes regional, India thinks global (perhaps to its detriment). India’s growing global aspirations are evident in its emphasis on international issues at high-profile forums like the Raisina Dialogue, yet this comes at the cost of attention to its immediate neighborhood. While India promotes itself as a global bridge and prioritizes trade talks with Western partners, it remains absent from major Asian trade pacts such as RCEP and CPTPP, and has even sought to renegotiate its agreement with ASEAN. This disconnect is striking given Asia’s economic dynamism and the mounting instability across South Asia, including financial crises, territorial disputes, and political unrest in several neighboring countries. Despite these challenges, discussions at Raisina overlooked regional concerns, focusing instead on global issues such as peacekeeping in Ukraine. In contrast, China’s Boao Forum focuses on regional security and economic stability, reflecting a strategic focus on its periphery as it navigates strained ties with the United States. The juxtaposition of these forums highlights diverging strategic priorities: India aims for global influence while neglecting regional volatility, whereas China contains external ambitions to shore up internal and border stability. Both approaches reveal gaps—India risks ignoring immediate threats, while China’s regional fixation may limit its broader leadership potential. Chietigj Bajpaee, Lowy Institute, March 19