China
The U.S. and China are holding trade talks in London after Trump’s phone call with Xi. Delegations from the United States and China convened in London to stabilize a tentative trade truce after a phone call between President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Talks led by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng follow last month’s 90-day tariff suspension. Contentious issues include AI chips, student visas, and rare earth exports. Jill Lawless and Didi Tang, Associated Press, June 9
U.S. hints at reprieve on some tech export restrictions as talks with China begin in London. Top U.S. and Chinese officials began trade negotiations in London following a call between Presidents Trump and Xi. The U.S. signaled readiness to ease some technology export curbs in exchange for increased Chinese exports of rare earth minerals. Khushboo Razdan and Ji Siqi, South China Morning Post, June 9
Japan
No-confidence motion against Ishiba Cabinet could lead to double election. With Japan’s parliamentary session nearing its end, tensions are rising within the ruling LDP and opposition CDP over the prospect of a no-confidence motion that could trigger simultaneous Lower and Upper House elections. While CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda has yet to commit, and Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba remains noncommittal on dissolution, a double election could either resolve gridlock or deepen instability depending on the outcome. Eric Johnston, The Japan Times, June 9
Japan confirms China's aircraft carrier sailed east of Iwo Jima for first time. The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning sailed through waters east of Iwo Jima in the Pacific Ocean for the first time, accompanied by several vessels within Japan’s exclusive economic zone near Minamitorishima. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi said Tokyo has strengthened surveillance and issued a message to Beijing. Fighter jets and helicopters were observed taking off and landing from the carrier. Mariko Katsumura and Liz Lee, Reuters, June 9
Japan gov't to release additional 200,000 tons from rice stockpiles. Japan will release another 200,000 tons of rice from its national reserves via direct contracts with major and small retailers to curb surging prices, Farm Minister Shinjiro Koizumi announced. The move follows earlier releases of 310,000 tons in auctions. Rice prices have doubled over the past year, and the government hopes lower-cost offerings from the 2020 and 2021 harvests will stabilize the market. Kyodo News, June 10
South Korea
Special probes loom for disgraced ex-president and wife. South Korea is preparing to launch three special counsel investigations targeting former President Yoon Suk Yeol and his wife Kim Keon Hee, focusing on Yoon’s December martial law order, alleged election and financial misconduct by Kim, and the death of Marine Cpl. Chae Su-geun during a 2023 rescue mission. The probes, involving 120 investigators, will absorb ongoing cases and begin formally in July following prosecutor appointments. Bahk Eun-ji, The Korea Times, June 9
Judges to reconvene over controversial ruling in Lee's election law case. South Korea's National Council of Judges will hold a second extraordinary meeting on June 30 to revisit the Supreme Court’s ruling in President Lee Jae-myung’s election law violation case. The court had overturned Lee’s acquittal and ordered a retrial, prompting concern over judicial independence. The council previously delayed issuing a statement to avoid influencing the June 3 election. Kim Han-joo, Yonhap News Agency, June 9
North Korea
Train service between Moscow and North Korea's Pyongyang to resume this month, says Russia. Russia and North Korea will resume direct passenger rail service between Moscow and Pyongyang on June 17, marking the first such route since its suspension in 2020. The eight-day, 10,000-kilometer journey will be the world’s longest direct train route. A second line linking Pyongyang and Khabarovsk will restart two days later. Gleb Stolyarov and Lucy Papachristou, Reuters, June 9
Chinese national pleads guilty in US to exporting arms to North Korea. Shenghua Wen, a 42-year-old Chinese man living illegally in the U.S., pleaded guilty to exporting firearms and ammunition to North Korea in violation of U.S. sanctions. Wen, who overstayed a student visa, received US$2 million for the shipments, which were routed through Hong Kong. Authorities also seized surveillance-related devices and ammunition at his residence. He faces up to 30 years in prison. South China Morning Post, June 9
Thailand
Senators seek special session to discuss border spat. Thai senators, led by Speaker Mongkol Surasajja, have called for an extraordinary parliamentary session to address the ongoing border dispute with Cambodia. While Cambodia agreed to reposition troops and restore damaged terrain, tensions remain high. Lawmakers want the government to present facts, affirm Thailand’s territorial claims, and reject the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. The session would also cover maritime disputes and broader national interests. Aekarach Sattaburuth, Bangkok Post, June 9
Paetongtarn govt faces pressure at home and abroad ahead of Cabinet reshuffle. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is facing mounting pressure as her administration prepares for its first Cabinet reshuffle. Internally, disputes have emerged over control of the Interior Ministry, with current minister Anutin Charnvirakul rejecting Pheu Thai’s efforts to claim the portfolio. Externally, tensions with Cambodia persist over disputed border areas, with each side taking measures that could reignite conflict ahead of a key bilateral meeting. The Nation, June 9
Myanmar
Myanmar junta boss thanks protector China on 75th anniversary of ties. Myanmar’s military leader Min Aung Hlaing praised China for its sustained support amid international isolation and domestic armed resistance during remarks marking 75 years of diplomatic relations. Beijing has provided diplomatic backing, arms, and pressured ethnic forces into negotiations. In return, Min pledged to expedite Belt and Road projects, welcomed China's international initiatives, and backed the One China Policy. Maung Kavi, The Irrawaddy, June 9
Myanmar junta promises voting in 267 townships. Myanmar’s military government announced plans to hold elections in 267 out of 330 townships in December or January, contingent on security conditions. The Union Election Commission said both first-past-the-post and proportional representation systems, along with electronic voting, would be used. Most opposition groups, including the exiled National Unity Government, view the election as illegitimate. Major parties like the National League for Democracy have been dissolved. The Irrawaddy, June 9
Cambodia
Tough talk drags on in Cambodia-Thailand border standoff. But tensions appear to be easing. Cambodia and Thailand continue to trade strong statements over their disputed border, but both sides have recently signaled an interest in peaceful resolution. The standoff follows a May 28 clash that left a Cambodian soldier dead. While Cambodia reaffirmed it had not withdrawn troops, military leaders from both countries reportedly agreed to reposition forces to preexisting lines to ease tensions. Sopheng Cheang, Associated Press, June 9
Philippines
Marcos: Sara impeachment will clearly cross over to 20th Congress. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said the impeachment trial of Vice President Sara Duterte will extend into the 20th Congress even if it begins under the current one. He noted that the Senate now controls the process and emphasized confidence in Senate President Chiz Escudero to manage the transition. Marcos added that legislative timing makes a conclusion in the current session unlikely. Catherine S. Valente, The Manila Times, June 10
Escudero takes oath as presiding officer for VP Sara's impeachment trial. Senate President Francis Escudero was sworn in as presiding officer for Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial, with other senators set to take their oaths as judges on June 11. The complaint was referred to the Committee on Rules. Senators disagreed over when the Senate becomes an impeachment court, with Escudero stating it would begin Wednesday while others argued it starts with the oath-taking. Bernadette E. Tamayo, The Manila Times, June 9
Turkmenistan
Turkmen authorities order social media campaign to showcase “positive image.” Turkmenistan’s presidential administration has ordered a nationwide social media campaign to promote the country’s image abroad by countering what officials label “foreign centers of ideological subversion.” Regional leaders must produce mobile phone videos of staged interviews depicting idealized rural life and inflated incomes. Content must follow strict visual standards and feature cultural elements. Vagit Ismailov, The Times of Central Asia, June 9
Northeast Asia
The Life of the Party: Past and Present Constraints on the Future of the Chinese Communist Party. This edited volume assesses the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) endurance and adaptability through its century-long existence, arguing that while it has historically managed internal and external pressures through ideological reinvention, centralized control, and selective flexibility, it now faces unprecedented risks under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Essays by leading China scholars highlight how the party’s Leninist legacy continues to define its organizational structure, economic governance, and security apparatus. Key tensions include the conflict between historical legitimacy and effective institutional learning, the party’s fraught relationship with globalization, and the contradictions inherent in Xi’s centralization of power. The CCP’s reliance on propaganda, repression, and controlled narratives has stymied its ability to respond adaptively to changing domestic and international conditions. Meanwhile, its economic strategy increasingly prioritizes political loyalty over innovation, undermining long-term productivity. Security policies are driven by a siege mentality, with internal threats viewed as paramount and foreign influences cast as existential dangers. As the party consolidates around Xi, it risks ossification and growing disconnect from the social forces it seeks to control. Whether the CCP can maintain its grip in the face of rising internal contradictions and global scrutiny remains an open question. Yvonne Chiu, Isaac B. Kardon, and Jason M. Kelly, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 9
The U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement Is Not Yet Obsolete. Despite heightened geopolitical tensions, the United States and China renewed the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (STA) in December 2024, preserving a decades-long framework for bilateral collaboration in scientific research. The updated STA includes notable revisions: a narrower scope focusing exclusively on government-to-government cooperation in hard sciences, commitments to protect the safety of participating scientists, and provisions for data transparency and reciprocity. Historically, the STA has supported breakthroughs in health, environmental science, and technology, yielding global benefits such as advancements in influenza surveillance and chronic disease treatments. However, recent U.S. policies such as expanded export controls, politicized funding, and restrictions on international research collaboration threaten the agreement’s efficacy. Meanwhile, declining co-publications and rising scrutiny of U.S.-based Chinese scholars have already diminished scientific output. Sustaining meaningful cooperation will require reversing funding cuts, depoliticizing research agendas, and empowering universities to uphold STA principles. Although limited in scope, the agreement remains a vital conduit for collaboration and knowledge exchange, essential for addressing shared global challenges. Ensuring its continued relevance demands a strategic commitment from both governments to separate beneficial scientific partnerships from broader political rivalries. Deborah Seligsohn and Scott Kennedy, CSIS, June 9
Pragmatism Without Principles? Poland-China Relations under Karol Nawrocki’s Presidency. Karol Nawrocki’s presidential victory marks a continuation of Poland’s internal polarization and introduces ambiguity in its foreign policy, particularly toward China. His urban-rural electoral divide, soft Euroscepticism, and nationalist rhetoric suggest a sovereignty-first agenda, resisting EU federalism and focusing on NATO alignment over EU defense structures. Nawrocki’s sporadic references to China, primarily in the context of defending pro-coal policies, indicate minimal strategic focus on Beijing, though his dismissal of EU climate initiatives may hinder cohesive EU–China engagement. While he champions Poland’s autonomy and cultural preservation, his closeness to the Trump-aligned U.S. administration hints at potential Indo-Pacific alignment against China, particularly in countering Sino-Russian cooperation. Yet, Washington’s policy volatility may compromise this alignment. Nawrocki’s presidency could dilute EU efforts toward a unified China strategy, prioritizing transactional diplomacy and economic pragmatism over normative coherence. His approach lacks a principled stance on human rights or democratic values, risking Poland becoming a divisive actor within the EU on China-related issues. As Poland’s head of state, Nawrocki wields considerable foreign policy influence, and his pragmatic, interest-driven orientation raises questions about Warsaw’s future role in shaping a coordinated European response to Beijing’s global ambitions.
Marcin Jerzewski, China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, June 10
When the ‘Chinese dream’ goes head-to-head against ‘America First.’ As U.S.–China tensions deepen, upcoming negotiations in London mark a pivotal test of whether the two global powers can defuse a trade war now escalating into a systemic rivalry over supply chains and national security. Following a phone call between Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, the two sides agreed to initiate a 90-day truce, during which China restricted rare earth exports while the U.S. intensified technology controls targeting semiconductors, aviation, and nuclear sectors. China demands the removal of eight “negative measures,” including tariffs, export controls, and what it sees as a politicized abuse of national security justifications. In turn, the U.S. resumed visa processing for Chinese students and acknowledged rare earth export license approvals as signs of de-escalation. Both sides are increasingly able to target each other’s economic vulnerabilities. China through materials, the U.S. through tech access, making mutual concessions more probable. Yet, this confrontation ultimately pits Trump’s protectionist “America First” agenda against Xi’s “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation, with ideological stakes underlying each economic move. Even if a compromise emerges in London, its sustainability remains uncertain, as each nation leverages industrial policy for strategic advantage. Sim Tze Wei, ThinkChina, June 9
AI chipmakers thrive as fortunes diverge in China’s semiconductor sector. China’s semiconductor industry witnessed an 18.5% revenue rise in 2024, yet over 40% of listed firms reported declining net profits. Major foundries like SMIC and Hua Hong suffered sharp profit drops despite increased sales volumes, with Hua Hong’s profits falling by 80%. In contrast, AI chipmakers and firms specializing in image sensors and high-performance computing, such as Will Semiconductor and Cambricon, reported robust growth, fueled by demand in AI training and intelligent driving. Structural overcapacity and macroeconomic headwinds have suppressed demand for analog and consumer-focused chips. U.S. export controls have further complicated operations, prompting China to accelerate domestic substitution through subsidies and strategic investment. Equipment firms like Naura and AMEC have benefited from this trend, though high R&D costs and continued reliance on imported core components remain obstacles. The Chinese government prioritizes long-term breakthroughs over short-term profitability, with leading firms encouraged to validate and adopt domestic technologies. While this has led to uneven financial outcomes, it represents an intentional strategy to achieve tech independence amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry. Overcapacity and resource misallocation risks persist, but officials view them as tolerable costs in pursuit of national strategic goals.
Liu Sha, ThinkChina, June 9
Southeast Asia
Crisis of Paralysis in Manila. The aftermath of the Philippines’ May 3 midterm elections has entrenched political deadlock among President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Vice President Sara Duterte, and Senate President Francis Escudero, each constrained by conflicting agendas and unresolved tensions. With both Duterte and Marcos factions electing five senators apiece and two unexpected center-left victories, the Senate lacks a decisive majority to proceed with Duterte’s impeachment trial. Marcos removed Duterte allies from his Cabinet while Duterte issued a veiled threat of violence if the trial advances. Escudero hesitated on initiating proceedings, citing procedural ambiguities about transitioning from the 19th to the 20th Congress. Political inaction, driven by concerns over public opinion and past impeachment fallout, shows the caution of senators. The President remains symbolically conciliatory but distant, avoiding direct involvement, possibly to retain leverage. As civil society regains activist vigor, demanding institutional accountability, pressure mounts for Senate action. A Supreme Court intervention may eventually resolve the procedural impasse, but until then, strategic silence and delay prevail. With the Senate’s credibility at stake and public sentiment shifting, a trial remains likely unless the Duterte bloc unifies against it. Manuel L. Quezon III,
, June 9Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia Rallies for Its Caliphate. Despite its 2017 ban, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) has increased its public and digital efforts to advance a pan-Islamist caliphate, exploiting both domestic discontent and the Israel-Hamas war. On April 27, 2025, HTI leaders demanded President Prabowo Subianto send troops to Gaza and establish the khilafah, echoing calls from international Islamic scholars for jihad against Israel. HTI organized mass rallies between November 2024 and February 2025, including a high-profile Jakarta protest drawing 30,000 attendees, framed as both religious observance and political mobilization. The group’s nonviolent public posture conceals online calls for jihad and martyrdom, reinforcing extremist narratives. HTI’s influence persists through extensive online networks, manipulating geopolitical crises and policy missteps, like fuel subsidy rollbacks and infrastructure failures, to erode trust in state institutions. Supporters glorify armed struggle and reject pluralism, portraying Indonesia’s democratic values as antithetical to Islamic doctrine. Some even see opportunity under Prabowo’s administration, interpreting past Islamist alliances as a potential opening for HTI’s resurgence. With pro-ISIS elements urging more militant actions, the group's rhetoric increasingly threatens Indonesia’s social cohesion. Countering HTI’s appeal will require coordinated efforts from the government, religious authorities, and civil society to uphold moderation and pluralism. Nurrisha Ismail, RSIS, June 9
No youth, no future for Myanmar. Myanmar’s political crisis has created an intensely militarised society where youth are central to both resistance and potential democratic renewal. Over 300 youth-driven People’s Defense Force (PDF) battalions have emerged in defiance of violent crackdowns, while the junta enforces aggressive conscription policies. Despite controlling limited territory, the military faces serious legitimacy challenges. Elections planned for late 2025 or early 2026 offer little hope without the inclusion of key opposition groups and safe conditions for voting. Myanmar’s youth are uniquely advocating for a federal democratic future and have taken progressive stances on issues like Rohingya rights, LGBTQ+ inclusion, and gender equality, framing the resistance not only as anti-authoritarian but as a broader movement for justice and national healing. Drawing parallels with youth-led democratic changes in Bangladesh and Kenya, Myanmar’s youth possess the innovation, values, and lived experience necessary to shape a post-military future. Their efforts toward reconciliation, interethnic coordination, and inclusive governance should be actively incorporated into peace processes and political planning. Any meaningful resolution must include and be co-led by Myanmar’s younger generation. Aung Tun, East Asia Forum, June 10
Next Challenge for Parti Keadilan Rakyat: Keeping its Anchor Role in Government. Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) faces a critical test in preserving its leadership within Malaysia’s unity government following Nurul Izzah Anwar’s elevation to deputy president, defeating Rafizi Ramli and triggering Cabinet resignations. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim dismissed nepotism accusations, citing internal democratic processes. Despite PKR's central role in government, it holds just 31 of 222 parliamentary seats, with its influence dependent on allies like the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Barisan Nasional (BN). Disputes over projected electoral performance have already surfaced, with contrasting views from party leaders on the number of federal seats PKR should contest. Strategically, PKR aims to move from an externally enabled leadership position to one achieved by design, necessitating dominance in seat negotiations and greater state-level presence. The upcoming Sabah state election is a testing ground, where PKR intends to contest 13 seats, up from seven in 2020. However, limited traction in state assemblies outside core territories complicates its long-term strategy. With UMNO openly eyeing dominance in the next general election, PKR’s path to retaining the prime ministership lies in securing stronger federal representation while managing intra-coalition competition over seat allocations. Adib Zalkapli, FULCRUM, June 9