China
China’s ethnic affairs overseer to take Communist Party helm in Xinjiang. Chen Xiaojiang, a Han Chinese official with a background in ethnic affairs and water resources, has been appointed party secretary of Xinjiang. The move may elevate him to the Politburo, reinforcing Beijing’s push for integration and control in the strategic region. Chen replaces Ma Xingrui and previously led the National Ethnic Affairs Commission, breaking a six-decade precedent of minority leadership. William Zheng, South China Morning Post, July 1
Chinese President Xi Jinping calls to regulate exercise of power to fight corruption. Xi Jinping urged stricter oversight of power within the Communist Party to strengthen anti-corruption measures, advocating transparent and traceable mechanisms. Addressing the Politburo, he emphasized discipline, austerity, and public supervision, while warning against excessive local enforcement. Xi reaffirmed the party’s eight-point rules and called for visible deterrents to curb misconduct and reinforce governance legitimacy. William Zheng, South China Morning Post, July 1
China's Huawei must face U.S. criminal charges, judge rules. A U.S. judge denied Huawei’s request to dismiss most of a 16-count federal indictment alleging racketeering, trade secret theft from six U.S. firms, and bank fraud related to its Iran dealings via Skycom. The case, initiated under the China Initiative, continues with trial set for May 2026. Huawei pleaded not guilty and called the case a politically motivated attack. Jonathan Stempel, Reuters, July 1
South Korea
South Korea's former president Yoon defies summons in martial law probe. Former President Yoon Suk Yeol skipped a second summons by special prosecutors investigating his 2023 martial law declaration, citing a court hearing and need for preparation. A new order requires him to appear on July 5. Prosecutors warned an arrest warrant could follow. Yoon was impeached in April and claims the probe is a politically driven “witch hunt.” Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, Reuters, July 1
Lee's trial over alleged misuse of public funds postponed. A South Korean court postponed President Lee Jae Myung’s trial on embezzlement charges to allow him to fulfill constitutional duties, suspending proceedings indefinitely. Lee was indicted for misusing ₩106.5 million from Gyeonggi province while governor. This marks the third trial delay, with two other cases already on hold. The court clarified preparatory steps are separate and could proceed independently. Yi Wonju, Yonhap News Agency, July 1
North Korea
N. Korea already using Russia's Pantsir-S1 air-defense system: report. North Korea has deployed Russia’s Pantsir-S1 air defense system around Pyongyang, according to Ukrainian military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov. Russian personnel are retraining North Koreans to operate the systems independently. The transfer follows a 2024 defense pact under which Pyongyang sent arms and troops to Moscow in exchange for advanced military technology. Yi Wonju, Yonhap News Agency, July 2
N. Korea's delegation of elite military academy leaves for Russia amid deepening ties. Kim Kum-chol, president of Kim Il Sung Military University, led a North Korean delegation to Russia to visit its top military academy, signaling increased cooperation in defense education. The trip follows a mutual defense treaty signed in 2024 and builds on prior exchanges. Kim, under U.S. sanctions for aiding Russia's war in Ukraine, last visited Russia in July 2024. Kim Soo-yeon, Yonhap News Agency, July 1
India
Trump says U.S. could reach trade deal with India, casts doubt on deal with Japan. President Donald Trump said the U.S. is close to a trade deal with India, noting its readiness to lower barriers for American firms, potentially avoiding steep tariffs set for July 9. However, he expressed skepticism over reaching terms with Japan, threatening tariffs up to 35% over trade imbalances, including rice imports. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent confirmed progress with India. Andrea Shalal, David Lawder, Reuters, July 1
Thailand
Blow for Thailand's government as court suspends PM from duty. Thailand’s Constitutional Court suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra over a leaked call with Hun Sen that sparked accusations of dishonesty and breaching ethical standards. The case has fractured her coalition, led to protests, and revived tensions with the military-backed establishment. Paetongtarn apologized but remains in the cabinet as culture minister during the investigation. Panu Wongcha-Um and Panarat Thepgumpanat, Reuters, July 1
Thailand's Deputy PM Suriya to become caretaker premier, minister says. Deputy Prime Minister Suriya Juangroongruangkit will serve as Thailand’s caretaker prime minister following the suspension of Paetongtarn Shinawatra over ethics allegations linked to a leaked call with Hun Sen. Suriya, also the transport minister, assumes interim leadership as Paetongtarn has 15 days to respond to the court’s charges. Panarat Thepgumpanat and Devjyot Ghoshal, Reuters, July 1
Vietnam
Vietnam rolls out sweeping anti-corruption plan with tighter grip on public finances. The Vietnamese government has launched an extensive anti-corruption initiative to overhaul public finance oversight and enforce stricter accountability standards. The plan includes legal and ethical reforms, intensified audits, and job rotations to prevent power consolidation. It also mandates protection for whistleblowers and penalizes false complaints. Vietnam News, July 1
Cambodia
No border talks until Thailand fully reopens checkpoints, says PM. Prime Minister Hun Manet declared that Cambodia would not hold military negotiations with Thailand unless all border crossings are reopened. The standoff stems from a May skirmish and unilateral closures initiated by Thailand. Manet cited inconsistency in Thai leadership and demanded clear authority to negotiate. He dismissed accusations of interference in Thai politics and reaffirmed Cambodia’s commitment to sovereignty. Taing Rinith, Khmer Times, July 1
Philippines
China sanctions former Philippine senator on maritime claims. China imposed entry bans on former Philippine senator Francis Tolentino for “egregious conduct” over the South China Sea dispute, including sponsoring laws defining sea lanes and maritime zones. The move followed the end of Tolentino’s term and reflects Beijing’s stance against foreign actions it views as threats to sovereignty. Tolentino called the sanction a “badge of honour.” Joe Cash, Liz Lee and Mikhail Flores, Reuters, July 1
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan transfers anti-corruption authority to National Security Committee. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a decree dissolving Kazakhstan’s standalone Anti-Corruption Agency and transferring its functions to the National Security Committee as part of broader administrative reforms. Strategic policy and outreach duties will shift to the Agency for Civil Service Affairs. Dmitry Pokidaev, The Times of Central Asia, July 1
Uzbekistan
Rumors of Chinese land deals spark public unease in Uzbekistan. Persistent rumors that Uzbek farmland is being transferred to Chinese investors have fueled public distrust despite government denials. A viral video of an agricultural official suggesting land reallocations escalated concerns. Authorities maintain foreign land ownership is illegal. The backlash highlights anxiety over growing Chinese influence, with past land seizures and large-scale projects intensifying scrutiny. Alexander Thompson, Eurasianet, July 1
Visa application office for Uzbekistan opens in Pakistan. Uzbekistan inaugurated a visa application office at TCS headquarters in Karachi to facilitate travel and boost economic ties with Pakistan. The move followed meetings between Uzbek Ambassador Alisher Tukhtaev and TCS CEO Khalid Awan, who praised Uzbekistan’s regional connectivity strategy. Discussions included plans for cargo flights between Karachi and Uzbek cities and culminated in a cooperation agreement between TCS and Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce. Uzbekistan Daily, July 1
Northeast Asia
The Israel–Iran ceasefire is a relief for China. But the war exposed Beijing’s lack of leverage. China gained short-term economic and geopolitical advantages from the Israel–Iran ceasefire, including greater access to Iranian oil and opportunities to invest in reconstruction. However, the conflict showed Beijing’s inability to influence either side. China’s cautious response reflected its limited trust and shallow ties with both nations. The war also exposed China's vulnerability through the Strait of Hormuz, where future instability threatens its energy security. Despite efforts to promote its security and development initiatives, China’s passive stance during the conflict weakened its credibility as a mediator and strategic actor in the Middle East. Ultimately, U.S. military dominance, not Chinese diplomacy, proved decisive in protecting regional and Chinese interests. Ahmed Aboudouh, Chatham House, June 30
Electric Trucks and the Future of Chinese Oil Demand. China’s diesel and gasoline demand continues to decline amid electrification in both light and heavy transport sectors. Diesel consumption dropped from 4.7 to 4.0 million barrels per day between April 2023 and 2025, driven by reduced construction, rising LNG truck use, and expanding electric vehicle sales. Electrification in heavy trucking is gaining momentum, with electric models reaching 8.9% of sales by April 2025. Battery swap technology addresses charging constraints, enabling broader adoption. Estimated oil displacement from vehicle electrification reached 1.11 million barrels per day in May 2025, potentially rising to 1.76 million by mid-2026. This trend threatens long-term Chinese crude imports and could boost refined product exports as domestic fuel demand weakens. Rogan Quinn, Rhodium Group, July 1
Washington stands strong in its Taiwan policy. The U.S. State Department's revised Taiwan fact sheet, which omits explicit opposition to Taiwan independence and softens language on international participation, has increased tensions with China but aligns with Washington’s long-standing One China policy. The updates subtly reinforce support for Taiwan amid growing Chinese aggression, including the April 2025 Strait-Thunder military drills. President Lai Ching-te's robust security strategy has further strained cross-strait ties. While Beijing condemned the U.S. changes as provocative, Washington insists its policy remains unchanged. The move reflects strategic ambiguity, supporting Taiwan within the bounds of the One China framework while signaling resistance to coercive Chinese actions. Truly Tinsley, East Asia Forum, July 2
Does North Korea Really Have So Few ICBMs? The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency recently estimated North Korea has “10 or fewer” deployed ICBMs, a figure at odds with extensive open-source evidence. North Korea has tested and declared operational three ICBM types, Hwasong-15, Hwasong-17, and Hwasong-18, since 2017, and paraded at least 17–21 launchers, with signs of ongoing production. Possible reasons for the low estimate include U.S. intelligence on mock-ups, slower missile or warhead production, stricter U.S. criteria for deployment, or limited warhead availability. Still, if Pyongyang chooses, it likely has the capacity to deploy over 50 ICBMs by 2035, particularly in response to expanded U.S. missile defenses. Vann H. Van Diepen, 38 North, July 1
Why Third Parties Matter in the U.S.–China Relationship. Stalled U.S.–China bilateral talks often fail to address pressing global issues, but involving third-party nations can create openings for meaningful cooperation. While great power rivalry frequently paralyzes development initiatives in the Global South, third-party needs can serve as leverage to push Washington and Beijing toward coordination. The Iran–Israel crisis, for instance, offered an opportunity for U.S.–China–Gulf cooperation on energy security that went unrealized. Track II dialogues suggest that belief in inevitable conflict is a major barrier. Strategic restraint and backchannel diplomacy with regional partners can build trust, prevent escalation, and signal responsible global leadership. Jesse Marks, U.S.-China Perception Monitor, July 1
Not in My Backyard: Local Opposition to Chinese Green Tech Investments in Slovakia. Local opposition to a €1.2 billion Chinese battery plant in Šurany shows the growing tensions between economic growth, environmental justice, and democratic accountability in Slovakia. While national elites support such investments for their alignment with EU green goals and industrial upgrading, local communities express deep concerns about health risks, water contamination, and inadequate public consultation. The backlash contrasts with the acceptance of a similarly valued Volvo EV plant in Valaliky, partly due to brand perception and clearer community engagement. Divergent EU and Chinese ESG standards further complicate regulation and risk assessments. Slovakia’s high trade exposure to China heightens vulnerability to economic coercion, making robust national ESG frameworks and participatory governance essential to balance strategic autonomy with sustainable development. Dominika Remžová, China Observers, July 1
Made in China or spent in China? Beijing’s impossible balancing act. China’s aspiration to become a consumption-driven economy is constrained by structural economic imbalances that favor investment over household spending. While consumer spending has grown, its share of GDP remains low at 40% in 2024, far below global averages. Decades of high savings and financial repression have fueled an extraordinary investment rate averaging 43%, sustaining China’s manufacturing dominance. However, moving toward consumption would require reducing investment, an untenable trade-off for Beijing amid global trade tensions and strategic competition. The leadership faces a fundamental dilemma: maintaining manufacturing strength to assert economic sovereignty or pivoting to a consumer-led model to meet long-term development goals. Amit Kumar, ThinkChina, July 1
Southeast Asia
Signalling Policy Credibility: Indonesia and Thailand's Pursuit of OECD Membership. Indonesia and Thailand’s bid for OECD membership shows their commitment to transparency, governance, and market liberalization amidst global uncertainty. Both nations view accession as key to escaping the middle-income trap and securing sustainable growth, with Indonesia aiming for full accession by 2028, Thailand by 2032. The process involves many reforms, including aligning tax policies, modernizing regulations, and improving institutional independence. While Indonesia faces scrutiny over its export policies and governance structures, Thailand confronts democratic credibility issues. Despite challenges, their accession could catalyse economic integration in ASEAN and strengthen ties with global partners. It may also stimulate reforms across the region, though risks of widening inequality within ASEAN persist. Dipinder S. Randhawa, RSIS, July 1
Thailand Faces Growing Instability with Paetongtarn’s Intransigence. Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra faces mounting political turmoil following a leaked call with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen, in which she disparaged a Thai general and sought cross-border assistance. The scandal triggered the Bhumjaithai Party’s exit from the ruling coalition and a no-confidence motion backed by the opposition. Senate President Mongkon Surasatja has petitioned for her suspension, citing alleged “treason.” Protests are escalating as legal cases mount against Paetongtarn and her father, Thaksin. With a slim parliamentary majority and falling public support, her refusal to resign or call early elections deepens instability, as coalition partners weigh defection and the Constitutional Court reviews her eligibility to remain in office. Termsak Chalermpalanupap, FULCRUM, July 1
South Asia
India’s state and central governments still aren’t speaking the same language. India’s language policy disputes have resurfaced through the National Education Policy (NEP), revealing deeper tensions between central authority and state autonomy. The policy’s three-language formula is criticized by non-Hindi-speaking states as a covert attempt to impose Hindi, especially since Hindi-speaking regions often bypass learning other Indian languages. Despite Hindi's large reported speaker base, the count is inflated by including dialects seeking distinct recognition. English remains the dominant language of commerce and the only nationally neutral choice, yet only 10.6% of Indians speak it. As economic goals clash with linguistic nationalism, prioritizing English education over Hindi imposition may be key to addressing India’s employability crisis and leveraging its fleeting demographic dividend. Rojan Joshi and Alexander Titus, East Asia Forum, July 1