The National Intelligence Council would reshape Japan’s clandestine services in two major ways: it would centralize decision-making under the Prime Minister, and create a chokepoint for all critical security data. Although membership of this council would most likely fluctuate, the proposal outlines the following key members: the Minister of Finance, the Justice Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the Prime Minister.

Intentionally vague, the legislation designates the Council to handle all “important matters concerning important intelligence activities.” The proposal specifically outlines this responsibility for a few tasks, including combating foreign intelligence, conducting analysis, and matters regarding collaboration between agencies. Perhaps the most important tool that the council would wield is its mandate to coordinate information, which would allow it to direct any agency to share national security intelligence as needed.

“In a complex and harsh international environment, the bill’s passage will help the government make informed decisions based on high-quality information,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara told the media after the legislative session. Mr. Kihara, a former Minister of Defense and chairman of the LDP research commission on security, will serve as Deputy-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council if approved by the House of Councillors.

Previously, the five organizations of Japan’s intelligence community worked separately, with little to no overlap. These included the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), the National Police Agency (NPA), the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO), and the Intelligence and Analysis Service with the Foreign Affairs Office (MOFA). The National Police Agency traditionally operates as the primary intelligence-gathering service, in accordance with Japanese law.

Mimicking the UK-style system, wherein a specific task is assigned to each agency with little overlap or partnership, Japan’s intelligence community has long been plagued by well-documented inefficiencies and an inability to command a foreign intelligence-gathering regime effectively. Recognition of these systemic obstacles led to the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 2013, loosely modeled after its U.S. counterpart, led by a core team of four Cabinet Ministers.

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The establishment of a National Intelligence Council would not function as a replacement for the NSC, but rather as its counterpart. Essentially, it would serve the same primary role of centralizing the command structure of Japan’s intelligence community as the NSC’s role was envisioned to be for national security policy over a decade ago. Structurally, Takaichi’s National Intelligence Council is clearly inspired by the NSC, which was a cornerstone of Shinzo Abe’s nationalist reforms.

From the beginning, Takaichi made clear that reforming Japan’s somewhat decentralized intelligence community was a top priority for her administration. Only hours into her tenure, Takaichi ordered Secretary Kihara to begin working on a plan to strengthen the command structure for Japan’s clandestine services. While significant at the time as an indicator for Takaichi’s upcoming legislative agenda, it was far from the first step taken towards the collectivization of Japan’s intelligence agencies.

In 2013, in an attempt to encourage information sharing and crack down on leaks to the press, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spearheaded the passage of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated State Secrets. Arguably, the result of U.S. pressure to halt the spread of classified information to regional adversaries, the law proved wildly unpopular in Japan, sparking fears of a return to an imperial-style intelligentsia that would severely damage civil liberties. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Abe, a mentor to Takaichi, defended the legislation as a necessary measure to eliminate the hemorrhaging of sensitive information from within the government.

“If information about our jet fighters or warships were leaked, it would endanger Japan,” Abe said in an address broadcast to the nation. “To protect lives, we must prevent intelligence from reaching terrorists. To secure life and property, we had to enact the secrecy law as quickly as possible.”

Despite her soaring popularity, the proposal still presents the same risks to Takaichi as it ultimately did for Abe. Even before the 2013 State Secrets law, the Japanese electorate had a finicky reputation when it came to national security legislation. In 1985, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s ruling coalition proposed a law that would authorize the death penalty for anyone convicted of state espionage, working under a very loose legal definition, which sparked national outrage.

Perhaps anticipating concerns from civil liberties groups and opposition in parliament, the law includes built-in safeguards intended to placate critics. This includes a stipulation that, under the new framework, the intelligence council cannot collect information on domestic elections, a restriction intended to discourage the ruling party from abusing its national security prerogatives for political gain.

Regardless, some experts warn that the proposal not only represents a monumental expansion of state power but is also mostly unwarranted. “If the parameters of what constitutes a ‘national secret’ expand and threaten the right to know, freedom of expression would be constrained,” Professor Masahiko Shimizu, a scholar on constitutional theory, told Kyodo News back in February when the law was still being debated.

If approved by the upper house of parliament, the National Intelligence Council is arguably the most significant reform to Japan’s intelligence community in the post-war era. Functionally, its centralization of control under the prime minister’s office and cabinet, along with the powers designated for its comprehensive assignment of duties, pushes Japan’s intelligence agencies towards a U.S.-styled structure. Symbolically, it’s another nail in the coffin for Japan’s historic policy of pacifist, decentralized governance.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

Takaichi’s modernization initiatives include constitutional reforms loosening the restrictions on weapon exports, restructuring Japan’s intelligence agency, incorporating UAVs into and expanding upon the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) security role. Takaichi’s defense spending increase coincides with pressure from the United States to pursue a larger burden-sharing role to meet a new 5% defense spending threshold. Furthermore, the modernization initiatives do more to promote strategic convergence between the United States and Japan by building upon the U.S. as a historic security guarantor for Japan. If Takaichi continues to repudiate pacifism in favor of power projection against China, then Japan, along with its Indo-Pacific allies, could shatter regional security.

Trajectory for Reform

Takaichi is able to leverage greater political support in the legislature for her agenda, which focuses on expanding defense policy for economic growth. Takaichi views herself as the ideological successor to Shinzo Abe. Over the past decade, Shinzo Abe promoted policies focused on increasing defense spending, relaxing defense industry regulations, and amending Article Nine of the Constitution. In February 2026, Takaichi implied during a press conference that she wanted to create an environment for a constitutional referendum as soon as possible. The government could formally propose revisions after the Upper House election in 2028, but challenges in the Upper House could undermine its plan. Revisions to the national charter would require the LDP to increase its seats in the National Diet’s Upper House to a two-thirds majority. If domestic support further increases, her policy goals become more feasible.

Also, Takaichi plans to revise three national security strategy documents aimed at expanding Japan’s Defense Industrial Base. Takaichi seeks to restructure and centralize the National Intelligence Bureau for intelligence collection and analysis by July 2026. This plan revises the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office by turning it into a command center, therefore expanding the scope of intelligence. A national intelligence council would act as the intelligence bureau’s secretariat. Takaichi envisions her intelligence agency to be modeled after the CIA and MI6 agencies. Establishing an intelligence apparatus could assist Japan in decision-making congruent with the goal of applying the JSDF to regional defense.

Weapons Exports

The constitutional revisions would primarily deregulate weapons export controls. Takaichi pursues a defense strategy hinged on domestic production from Japan’s Defense Industrial Base, implementing advanced technology and boosting arms sales. The prime minister heads the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser retains a strong leadership role within the institution, which reviews weapons exports. The weapons exports are limited to countries with pre-existing transfer deals and partnerships with Japan. The deregulation would lift a ban on making items exclusively for rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. Additionally, revisions would enable transfers of jointly developed weapons and systems to third countries. By design, this link between the Defense Industrial Base and the Japanese government seeks to maximize arms sales. The differences between offensive and defensive weapons remain blurred, as long-standing distinctions are undermined by distorted intentions.

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Modernization Efforts

Takaichi seeks to increase the role of the JSDF for regional security in East Asia as seen with previous deployments with the Philippines in the South China Sea. In 2022, Japan invested heavily in passive defense, munitions stockpiles, and readiness for the JSDF. It is unclear how the JSDF would cooperate with the U.S. military presence in Japan if the JSDF were to take on comprehensive defense responsibilities. One way the Japanese government could increase the role of the JSDF would be to create a system for declaring a state of emergency. Takaichi views China as a powerful, erroneous force diminishing regional security. Her call for urgency subverts diplomatic engagement with China. Modernization efforts are in full swing. Domestic development on Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles, with a range of 620 miles, was recently deployed to Kumamoto prefecture.

Also, Australia selected Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to upgrade the Mogami-class frigate to replace 11 ANZAC-class ships as Japan allocated nearly $64 million to support the Defense Industrial Base and arms sales. In 2026, Japan is preparing to spend $1 billion on the joint development of a sixth-generation Mitsubishi F-X fighter jet with the UK and Italy by 2035. Takaichi’s most recent visit to Washington concluded with a second round of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Investment Initiative announcement totaling $73 billion. Also, establishing a sovereign cloud-based platform for Japan’s government data system, as well as missile co-production, were discussed. Takachi views the growth of the Defense Industrial Base as a necessary step for strengthening Japanese national security.

Drone Manufacturing

Implementing UAVs offers a variety of pragmatic applications while posing new challenges. Takaichi aims to adapt to new fighting styles, starting with the adoption of UAVs, with an allocated $640 million. UAVs allow for coastal security, space-based capabilities, including satellites, tracking, military communications with a mass deployment of low-cost surface, sub-surface, land and aerial drones by 2028. Given Japan’s challenges with an aging population and an understaffed military, the turn to drones is seen as a pragmatic application of technology within the SHIELD program. Additionally, research and development for artificial intelligence-operated drones is a possibility. Takaichi plans a demonstration to extract rare earth minerals around Minami-Torishima Island this summer.

Currently, UAVs are imported from other countries, including China. Chinese drone manufacturers account for more than 90% of the drone supply in Japan. Japan intends to reduce its overdependence on China’s drone manufacturing by subsidizing up to 50% of the cost for research and development programs and capital investments. Ideally, by 2030, she wants to manufacture and use 80,000 drones for firefighting, infrastructure, and agricultural projects. Japan’s goal is to manufacture drone batteries and motors as well. The Economy, Trade, and Industry Ministry will start publicly inviting Japanese companies interested in participating in the framework, citing the need for standardizing drone parts and raising price competitiveness for supply chains.

Spending Pressures

The 2022 national security policy lifted the current GDP-defense spending to a 2% benchmark. Starting April 2026, Japan will enter its fourth year of a five-year program to double annual arms spending to 2% of gross domestic product, which is a 9.4% increase from 2025. Further increases in defense spending could become a divisive issue if inflation continues to demoralize the country. Japan’s economy suffers from anxiety based on a shrinking workforce, rapidly aging population, and the highest debt-to-GDP ratio, sitting near 240%of GDP. While gross domestic product is not a tell-all for how an economy is measured, fiscal constraints pose a greater threat, rather than legitimate political opposition, for Takaichi’s security agenda. Recently, the United States has sought a 5% increase in burden-sharing costs from its Indo-Pacific allies by 2035. The request allocates 3.5% dedicated to core security interests and 1.5% for infrastructure investments.

Tokyo currently spends $1.4 billion annually on American military utilities, facility maintenance, and wages for Japanese staff at U.S. military bases. This pre-existing fiscal commitment is part of the special measures agreement (SMA), up for renewal in 2027. U.S. Ambassador George Edward Glass stated that he would press Japan to contribute more to the burden-sharing costs. During President Trump’s first term, he suggested that unless Japan increases its defense spending to $8 billion, Japan would risk a withdrawal of roughly 54,000 U.S. troops. Even though hardline diplomatic engagement adds more pressure on Japan, a withdrawal scenario is unlikely due to homogeneity in defense posturing, but not impossible.

Buck-Passing

Takaichi’s “Japan First” agenda aims to connect defense modernization and economic reform. Japan adheres to a buck-passing strategy for its defense, with the U.S. acting as its security guarantor. The security interdependence allows Japan to be attached to Washington’s hegemonic ambitions. Takaichi realizes the dual-use of the U.S. military presence strategically positioned across Japan. Also, the American presence offers a veil of extended deterrence for Japan. The U.S. nuclear umbrella allows Takaichi to condemn China over issues such as Taiwan with ease. Additionally, if Takaichi views her defense reform project as strategic convergence within the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, then any previous hesitation to capitulate to outside fiscal pressure may be turned into diplomatic leverage to appease Washington. Takaichi’s willingness to amplify Japanese defense policy is not entirely a shift away from buck-passing, but somewhat of a pivot in how Japan strategically balances its defense priorities with Washington’s demands. Even though Takaichi echoes Washington’s China threat inflation, increasing defense can paradoxically jeopardize Japan’s national security in a volatile, multipolar world.

Editorial contributions by Kathryn Kremp

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

Free Association Status

The complexities of the free association legal status can be contested at times when discussing matters of sovereignty and self-governance. Wellington’s political will to control the decision-making of the Cook Islands’ foreign affairs on deep-sea mining is supported by the voices of great-power competition within and beyond New Zealand. Within the South Pacific, the policy goal is to advance New Zealand’s national security apparatus by exerting authority over the South Pacific. New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon, cites the duty to consult as a superseding authority over the constitutionality of the Cook Islands free association status. Therefore, according to Luxon, the Cook Islands must capitulate to the New Zealand national security apparatus. The precedent claimed by Luxon is based on the 2001 Joint Centenary Declaration, which reverses normalised autonomy into an obligation to align with New Zealand’s national security interests. Wellington seeks reassurance by adopting a strategic trust for a standard of consent for security implications, similar to the Australian foreign policy approach in the South Pacific. Additionally, New Zealand entered a political pact with Niue as Premier Dalton Tagelagi agreed to a celebration of their free association status, while collaborating on climate, economic, and national security issues. New Zealand is countering deteriorating relations with the Cook Islands by strengthening ties with Niue. The declaration includes a limitation on engagement with third-party pacts, which could compromise the established bilateral commitments. The New Zealand government’s foreign affairs strategy reveals a consistency of policy attempting to reorganize the infrastructure of authority in the South Pacific. Furthermore, Peters’ strict policy toward the Cook Islands comes after the Solomon Islands struck a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2023 over national security cooperation. Understanding how the New Zealand government defines its sphere of influence gives insight into the strategic importance of rare earth minerals surrounding the Cook Islands.

Obligation Undermines Sovereignty

Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown stated if the comprehensive agreement between the Cook Islands and China is not a national security threat, then there is no need for New Zealand to react with impunity. Since the agreement does not impact national security, the Cook Islands ought to conduct its foreign affairs without consulting New Zealand. Brown questions whether the New Zealand oversight is legally binding. Furthermore, the gray area between autonomy and expectation undermines independent decision-making. In this case, free association is less than, not equal to, full United Nations membership. Refuting Peters’ stance is an option for conducting their own foreign affairs. If there is an inconsistency in the legality of the free association and if the Cook Islands continues to pursue foreign relations with China on deep-sea mining, New Zealand ought to reshape its diplomatic engagement with the Cook Islands. New Zealand’s attempt to limit the Cook Islands as a perceived buffer state in its sphere of influence could be a form of political admission to a zero-sum strategy by Peters. A strategy that inadvertently promotes a compelling political reason for the Cook Islands to re-align. The policy return on investment does more to break ties with the Cook Islands than a diplomatic solution. New Zealand can improve relations with the Cook Islands rather than jeopardize regional cooperation in the South Pacific. China cannot be both a strategic economic partner to New Zealand while simultaneously a severe national security threat to Wellington by way of cooperation on rare earth minerals with neighboring states.

Rare Earth Minerals

Rare earth minerals continue to be at the forefront of resource extraction. It is, without a doubt, a key factor underscoring the diplomatic exchanges between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. The Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority estimates 6.7 billion metric tons of polymetallic nodules across the surrounding sea. The nodules include minerals such as cobalt, nickel, titanium, and rare earth elements like molybdenum, niobium, vanadium, tungsten, and zirconium. The estimated production is equal to 20 million metric tons of cobalt alone. The New Zealand government perceives the Chinese-Cook Islands partnership on deep-sea mining as undermining the authority of Wellington’s regional national security interests. Even though New Zealand has its own partnership with China, the perception out of Wellington is to maintain the ability to control the foreign affairs of the Cook Islands instead of giving the islands full self-governance. The American response to Beijing’s tightening export controls on rare earth minerals during the tumultuous trade relations was to seek alternative rare earth minerals in areas not dominated by Chinese acquisition. In August, the United States entered a cooperative agreement on deep-sea mining with the Cook Islands. The ongoing focus on rare earths by the United States is consistent, based on existing partnerships with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, and Cambodia within the Asia-Pacific. The administration also signed separate deals with Thailand and Malaysia seeking diversification of critical minerals and supply chain cooperation. Additionally, the administration hosted five Central Asian countries, another region with deep reserves of rare earth minerals. The American prioritization of access to rare earth minerals correlates with China’s economic advancements on rare earth minerals in the South Pacific.

Wellington’s buy-in on great-power competition repositions New Zealand’s policy at the expense of the Cook Islands’ independence. However, even if adopting a framework consistent with great-power rivalry, it is far from reflecting China’s legitimate investment in the Cook Islands. The Chinese government holds 5 ISA contracts in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with the Cook Islands being its furthest progressed deep-sea mining effort. China controls 70 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals and 90 percent of global rare earth processing. Therefore, Chinese cooperation with the Cook Islands might be due to access to rare earth minerals. China is the second largest donor to the Cook Islands after New Zealand, and since 1997, Beijing has financed infrastructure projects across the Cook Islands. Vice-Minister of Natural Resources Sun Shuxian explained the South Pacific voyage of a 4,000-ton advanced marine research vessel, the Da Yang Hao, for deep-sea research following an agreement with the Cook Islands. As the director of China’s State Oceanic Administration, Sun positioned China to continue supporting marine research on deep-sea mapping and marine life observation northeast of Rarotonga. China is a regional actor in the Asia-Pacific. Adopting a zero-sum stance trivializes complex bilateral relationships and trends, especially due to the serious economic fallout that would be nearly irreversible if further alienation continued toward China, not just against the Cook Islands. The actions taken by the government of New Zealand signal an intent to securitize part of Oceania’s resources, a trend identified in U.S.-aligned states adopting the American framework across the Asia-Pacific region in an effort to reduce overdependence on China.

Editorial contributions by Kathryn Kremp

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

The EU’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific illustrates two structural changes in the EU’s foreign policy. The first is the EU’s desire to reduce its reliance on the United States, as it increasingly recognizes that Washington is no longer a reliable ally. The second is that the Russia-Ukraine War has transformed the EU into a more security-driven actor, leading many capitals in the Indo-Pacific to view Brussels as a serious geopolitical player on the world stage.

The Transatlantic Alliance is on Life Support

One of the main drivers of Europe’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific is its desire to reduce dependency on the United States.

Europe, a traditional ally of Washington, is reeling from an apparent 180-degree turn in the Trump administration’s approach to the continent. InFebruary 2025, Trump insisted that the EU was formed to “screw” the United States. During JD Vance’s speech in Munich, he alleged that the real threat to the bloc came from within, not from Russia or China. The American national security strategy, released in late November 2025, advocated cultivating resistance in Europe, indirectly laying out plans to support far-right parties such as the AfD in Germany and the Rassemblement National in France. The height of transatlantic tensions occurred over Trump’s threats to invade Greenland and his threat to impose a 10% tariff on France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Finland since they sent troops to Greenland. (Note: Norway and the UK are not part of the EU).

Amid such threats, there is a growing realization across Europe that it must become strategically autonomous and not rely on American security. Many ardent Atlanticist countries, such as Germany, Denmark, Poland, and the Netherlands, are advocating strategic autonomy, something that has usually been limited to France. An Atlancist describes someone who supports the close relationship between the United States and Europe, particularly NATO. Notably, during a speech to the European Defense Agency on January 28, 2026, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, said that Trump has shaken the transatlantic relationship to its foundation and warned that Europe needed to take charge of its own security.

As part of the EU’s desire to become more independent of the United States, it has looked toward the Indo-Pacific, as many in that region have also sought to diversify away from Washington. One example is the uptick in diplomatic engagement between Europe and India, such as the conclusion of a free trade agreement after 2 decades, dubbed the “mother of all deals.” The European Union has also concluded a free trade agreement with Indonesia and is currently negotiating similar agreements with Thailand and Malaysia.

The Rise of a Geopolitical Europe

Another reason driving greater engagement between Brussels and the Indo-Pacific is the transformation of the EU’s foreign policy toward greater security centrality.

The European Union was initially formed as an economic trading bloc, not a security actor. As a result, its foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific focused on expanding trade relations. In fact, this was one of the reasons India did not invest in its relationship with the EU, as it did not perceive the EU as a serious geopolitical actor on the world stage, but rather as a normative trading bloc. By contrast, security cooperation with Indo-Pacific actors, such as India and Vietnam, was primarily limited to France.

However, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it has facilitated the commitment by Brussels to invest more in defense. Some examples include the ReArm Europe and Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiatives. In addition, many European countries, such as Germany, Poland, and Italy, that have traditionally avoided extensive defense spending, have committed to increasing it. Likewise, France has also been at the forefront of pushing for more defense spending beyond its traditional commitments, as French President Emmanuel Macron argued that “to be free in this world, [Europe] must be feared.”

The greater European commitment to investing more in defense has facilitated greater security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Some examples include the EU’s security and defense partnerships with India, Japan, and South Korea. Similarly, in Brussels’ recent agreement with Hanoi to upgrade their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, one of the pillars of cooperation includes security and defense.

While Brussels continues to have differences with India and ASEAN members over the Russian threat, these recent security cooperation initiatives reflect that an increasing number of countries are beginning to view the European Union as a rising geopolitical actor on the world stage.

The American and Russian disruption of the international system has led capitals across Europe and the Indo-Pacific to look to one another. In fact, it may be the start of the very Europe-Asia alliance that French President Emmanuel Macron envisioned during his Shangri-La address.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

If the return of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2023 was supposed to be the end of a huge redemption arc, the 2026 election now threatens to be the end of a political calamity. The supposed “Thaksin Deal,” a tenuous ceasefire between the Shinawatra dynasty and conservative establishment, has not simply weakened; it has unraveled. What was once advertised as reconciliation has come undone as transactional, fleeting, and deeply fragile. Instead of resolving Thailand’s long-running political drama, the deal only postponed confrontation, tying Thaksin’s name to institutions structurally hostile to electoral rule. Its unraveling has brought not closure, but a deeper crisis of trust in elite bargaining as a replacement for democratic accountability.

On Sunday, voters will choose between three viable futures, each defined by the mistakes of the recent past.

First is the People’s Party, the neon-orange phoenix rising from the rubble of Move Forward. Their momentum has proved resilient despite the dissolution of their predecessor and the banning of high-profile leaders. By themselves, they reign supreme over both the streets and the polls, protecting a generational movement that no longer recognizes the traditional power brokers as guardians of stability, but as an obstacle to be eradicated. Their appeal is not just generational but also structural: they express grievances linked to inequality, monopoly, and political exclusion that older parties had either addressed or ignored.

Their platform offers structural reform, including abolishing monopolies, dismantling entrenched privilege, and rewriting society’s covenant toward popular sovereignty rather than elite agreement. But their campaign plays out behind a Sword of Damocles. The threat of judicial intervention isn’t hypothetical: It’s a probability embedded into every vote they cast. In recent years, Thailand has taught the public to expect dissolution, disqualification, or procedural friction whenever reform forces gain momentum. This continual risk not only conditions electoral strategy but also public psychology, which normalizes the feeling that winning might not suffice.

Second is the incumbent power, Bhumjaithai, led by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul. Anutin, the survivor and consummate dealmaker, smiled his way through all the political carnage to the premiership in September 2025, after Paetongtarn Shinawatra had been ordered out by the judiciary. His campaign is ideologically thin but structurally dense on the ground, tied to patronage networks rather than populist passion. He provides “stability,” a euphemism for maintaining the status quo, financed by the establishment and the military. For conservative forces rattled by the unpredictability of the Shinawatras and alarmed by the People’s Party’s reformist aspirations, Anutin is a refuge. His authority comes not from popular legitimacy but from his role as a broker who cankeep things in balance among the powerful and those who oppose systemic change.

Then there is Pheu Thai. Once a force of Thai electoral politics, the party now looks like a baffled pugilist, punch-drunk and staggering. Last year, the firing of Paetongtarn revealed the tentative, conditional nature of its alliance with Thaksin and the broader establishment. And now, fielding Yodchanan Wongsawat, a family member to whom they owe dynastic continuity, the party has difficulty finding common ground. It is too weak for progressives and too treacherous for conservatives. The populist wizardry that once delivered landslides has been drained of its strength by broken promises, internal fractures, and an economy that it has been unable to rescue, leaving Pheu Thai caught between nostalgia and obsolescence.

The Implications: A Society Repurposed

The stakes of February 8 are much greater than parliamentary arithmetic. This election is a referendum not only on Thailand’s political identity and its political fate, but also on the boundaries and limits of development within its existing institutional framework.

First, the red-yellow divide that once characterized Thai politics is practically dead. Instead, there is a deeper struggle: System versus Reformers. Once symbols of anti-establishment resistance, the Shinawatras are now swallowed up and neutralized by their own structures. They have diminished to a vacuum occupied today by the People’s Party, a change from personality-based politics to the ideological polarization of the legitimacy of the system per se.

Second is the further judicialization of democracy. The concurrent push to craft a new constitution is an implicit concession that the 2017 charter, created under military rule, is structurally rotten and designed to limit popular representation and solidify the power of an elite. But public cynicism runs deep. Should the People’s Party win a landslide victory but be blocked by the appointed Senate, or dissolved by the Constitutional Court, the consequences can run farther than any one party. Such consequences are likely to undermine public trust in electoral participation forever, hastening the shift from direct authoritarian disruption to legalistic, indirect modes of control. Thailand seems to be moving beyond a period of coups by tanks to coups by gavel.

Third, lurking behind the political drama is economic stasis. Household debt remains at around 90 percent of GDP, choking off consumption and tying policy muscles. Political instability has overwhelmed serious economic reform, and nationalist slogans distract rather than resolve. The next administration will inherit an exposed economy and stymied control. But without meaningful authority or general legitimacy, new structural reforms that could spur backswing growth once again could be postponed.

The Verdict

The central question at the same time as Sunday approaches isn’t who will win, but whether the victory will be allowed to stand. For Thaksin Shinawatra, this election might be his final reckoning, the recognition that elite accommodation cannot ever substitute for institutional reform. For Anutin Charnvirakul, it’s a test of whether patronage outlasts popular appetite. For millions of Thai voters, particularly the young, it is a test of patience.

Thailand stands suspended between a deferred and an unreconciled future and a past that stubbornly refuses to let go. The people will speak on February 8. But outside the corridors of power, the more troubling question remains: is anyone really listening?

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard
Featured photo provided by Inthat Sermsukcharoenchai

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

The History of Pakistani and Saudi Military Relations

It is essential to note that close security ties between Riyadh and Islamabad are nothing new.

In 1947, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to officially recognize Pakistan. During the 1960s, Saudi Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz described Pakistan as Saudi Arabia’s “number one friend in the world.” In 1967, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first defense agreement, which stated that in exchange for Pakistan’s training the Saudi military, the Saudis would help them in their wars against New Delhi. In 1979, the Pakistani army took part in the operation to remove the religious zealots who occupied the grand mosque in Mecca. In 1990-91, Pakistan assisted Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War.

In the context of their history, the recent defense pact is merely emblematic of that close relationship. According to Md. Muddassir Quamar, “This pact is simply the formalisation of a long-standing Saudi-Pakistan understanding that goes back to the 1960s.”

The Saudi Insecurity About American Reliability

What makes this agreement stand out is its timing. On September 9, 2025, the Israelis launched a surprise military attack in Doha to target senior Hamas leaders. Nearly a week later, the Saudi government publicly announced its mutual defense pact with Pakistan. While the attack on Doha was the immediate spark, the structural concerns the Saudis — and by extension many Arab countries — had on the reliability of American security existed for several years.

President Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” doctrine was the early spark for Saudi concerns about American reliability. Under this foreign policy vision, the United States needed to reduce its commitments and involvement in the Middle East, as the rise of China and the Indo-Pacific had become a much higher priority. According to Trita Parsi, Iranian-Swedish writer and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, in an interview with the London School of Economics, the Obama administration’s negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known as the Iran nuclear deal, was in part a way to reduce its involvement in Middle East conflicts to focus on Asia.

Under the first Trump administration, even though the United States left the Iran deal, some of its decisions also reinforced Saudi insecurity. For example, in 2019, when the Houthis attacked Saudi oil fields, the Americans decided not to retaliate against the Houthis (and by extension Iran) on the side of the Saudis. During the Biden administration, one of the reasons the KSA re-established diplomatic relations with Iran was due to the perception that the United States was incapable of countering the Iranian threat.

Fast forward to today, Israel’s attacks on Doha were the final straw for the KSA. Even though the second Trump administration designated Riyadh as a major non-NATO ally, there is still no defense agreement like those the United States shares with South Korea or the Philippines. In addition, American officials are concerned that selling Riyadh the F-35s would undermine Israel’s regional military advantage.

The Unlikely Saudi Defense of Pakistan

Despite growing Saudi concerns about the reliability of American security, one key challenge for this agreement to be substantive is Saudi-Pakistani differences over India.

After the signing of the agreement, one of the main worries of New Delhi was the possibility that Saudi Arabia would fight on behalf of Pakistan against India. However, it is highly unlikely that Saudi Arabia will get involved in any future India-Pakistan conflict. While it is true that the Saudis have backed Pakistan in the past in its conflicts against India, it is essential to note that their support has been political, diplomatic, and financial. However, the Saudis have not militarily gotten involved in any conflict between India and Pakistan and are unlikely to do so in the future.

Aside from Saudi unwillingness to get involved in a future India-Pakistan military conflict, Riyadh is unlikely to damage its burgeoning economic relationship with New Delhi. According to The Economic Times, India and Saudi Arabia are seeking to conclude a bilateral investment treaty, which indicates that the two sides remain committed to deepening their economic relationship despite the recent defense pact.

Regarding the future of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), India’s participation in it is unlikely to be impacted by the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact. If anything, it is the ongoing war in Gaza that has put the corridor’s viability into question.

The Unlikely Pakistani Defense of Saudi Arabia

Another factor that would limit genuine mutual defense is Pakistan’s deep reluctance to extend its nuclear deterrence to the Saudis.

For many years, there has been a rumor that the Saudis funded Pakistan’s nuclear program during the 1980s and that the Pakistanis would give their nuclear weapons to the Saudis if asked. Bob Woodward’s book War showed a conversation between MBS and American Senator Lindsay Graham, with MBS saying, “I don’t need uranium to make a bomb. I will just buy one from Pakistan.” However, this recent defense agreement does not include any mention of Pakistan sharing its nuclear weapons. Importantly, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif told Pakistani media that a nuclear umbrella is not on the radar. The reason for Pakistan’s reluctance is related to Iran.

Just like how the Saudis will be unlikely to fight for India on behalf of Pakistan, “if a crisis erupted between Saudi Arabia and Iran tomorrow, Pakistan would likely evaluate its own national interests…before jumping in.” For example, in 2015, Pakistan refused Saudi Arabia’s request to join its war in Yemen, to remain neutral between the Iranians and Saudis. Most importantly, at a time when Pakistan’s ties with neighboring Afghanistan and India are strained, the last thing Islamabad wants to do is to provoke neighboring Iran.

Ultimately, given the geopolitical constraints of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the defense pact is not a revolutionary paradigm shift. Rather, it is the affirmation of a long-standing Saudi–Pakistani security partnership at a moment of global uncertainty.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

From Conception to (Almost) Execution

At the time of its announcement in 2004, China was the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) third-largest trading partner, with trade between China and the bloc projected to exceed $20 billion that year. By 2020, China had replaced the European Union (EU) as the GCC’s largest trading partner, with exchanges valued at over $161 billion. China, a net importer of energy since 1993, has become heavily reliant on hydrocarbon exports from the Middle East to fuel its rapid economic development and modernization. The Gulf countries, economically and politically stable compared to many others in the region, have become crucial partners for China in this regard.

What’s more, as the Gulf countries seek to diversify their economies away from rentier models supported by hydrocarbon exports, they have emerged as an attractive destination for Chinese exports and partnerships. The Middle East at large received an oversized flow of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) construction engagement in 2024 on the back of a 360% increase in Chinese investments into the region, despite a significant reduction in China’s foreign investments at the global level from the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) to the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025).

National development strategies in the Gulf, such as Saudi Vision 2030 and Kuwait Vision 2035, call for the development of sectors such as healthcare, tourism and hospitality, finance, and retail, among others. Gulf leaders, like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, have not been shy about their eagerness to align their own national development endeavors with China’s BRI and the benefits therein. China and the GCC countries have consistently affirmed their enthusiasm to cooperate and expand bilateral ties, which now include Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSP) with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait enjoy Strategic Partnerships, the second-highest designation in China’s diplomatic repertoire.

This agreement is not stopping short due to a lack of interest from either side. Following a suspension of talks in 2009, the two parties, in January 2016, stated their ambitious intent to hash out the agreement within that same year. Clearly, that did not play out as planned. In January 2024, Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat quoted China’s ambassador to the Kingdom as saying terms were 90% settled, though more “flexibility on both sides” was needed. With that in mind, what is the remaining 10% that has proven so difficult to wrap up that the process has dragged on for 21 years?

Trade-Offs of Free Trade

At the simplest level of analysis, FTAs look to lower barriers to trade, such as tariffs, and facilitate economic exchanges that align with a growing relationship between the involved parties. In a less-than-nuanced, somewhat generic imagining of the proposed agreement, this would involve a surge in GCC firms entering the Chinese economy and vice versa. The implications of this, however, have left both sides feeling hesitant about opening their economies to one another.

The expansion of GCC access to the Chinese energy market would, naturally, mean higher levels of competition facing China’s domestic hydrocarbon industry. There is a clear theme of China’s desire to protect these domestic producers being cited as a major roadblock for the proposed FTA. In reaction to China’s insistence on protecting its domestic producers by maintaining tariffs on GCC hydrocarbon imports, the GCC has “unilaterally stalled” negotiations in the past. While China can seek energy security from Russian crude oil or Australian liquefied natural gas (LNG), the GCC countries remain critical suppliers and indispensable to Chinese energy security.

Gulf leaders are likewise concerned for the long-term well-being of their domestic industries. Talks once again stalled in May 2024 when Saudi Arabia expressed worry over China’s proposed list of duty-free exports. This concern, in totality, is as much to do with troubles in domestic diversification as it is to do with Chinese demands. Across the GCC, progress in diversifying economies away from a reliance on energy exports has been far from linear.

While the UAE, for example, has positioned itself as a regional hub for trade destined for the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Asia — and even imports more goods from China than it exports — the trend across the GCC remains a major reliance on hydrocarbon exports. As Gulf states continue looking to reduce their reliance on energy sales, protecting domestic industries will be critical to developing properly diverse economies. As U.S. tariffs tighten around the world, Gulf leaders have to weigh whether Chinese exports blocked elsewhere will be redirected into GCC markets. Such an influx of Chinese goods could undermine local companies and bring about a slowdown in regional localization.

GCC Collective Action

Assuming terms could be reached on the above issues of contention, a path toward finalizing and implementing an agreement would be less than obvious. While the bloc can negotiate collectively and constituent interests certainly overlap in several areas, domestic concerns remain. Free trade deals are signed abroad, but they are fought over at home. Among the GCC states, there is meaningful divergence in both domestic and foreign policy priorities, and the gains from trade are clearly asymmetrical.

Saudi Arabia, with by far the largest population of the GCC countries (32 million), is particularly concerned about ensuring that its citizen population is employed and can contribute to the Kingdom’s economy. Whereas the UAE, whose population of 11 million are almost 90% foreign workers, does not share the burden of answering to a large citizenry when it comes to policies that affect the economy. As such, the UAE has emerged as a particularly liberal trade partner for outside powers such as the EU and China, with re-exports playing an outsized role in the Emirati economy.

While it has been noted that the GCC states tend to act in unity when confronted with major crises, such as the Sept. 9 Israeli strike on Doha, FTA negotiations are an area where the Gulf monarchies can afford patience. President Trump has made clear that he places great importance on relations with the GCC countries — Saudi Arabia and Qatar in particular — and all six of them remain firmly under the American security umbrella.

In Qatar, where there is a less robust history of cooperation and solidarity with the rest of the GCC, the most consequential pillar of economic cooperation has been secured at the bilateral level. With deals in place, such as two 27-year agreements for China to purchase a cumulative 8 million metric tons of LNG from the small state each year, a bloc-wide agreement becomes less crucial from Doha’s seat.

With differing interests and areas of concern held by the three major GCC powers of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, bilateral agreements become more attractive and attainable, even if a common interest in the conclusion of the China-GCC FTA persists among all parties involved.

Breaking the Impasse?

Meaningful progress toward the conclusion of a China-GCC FTA is less than likely in the near future. Chinese calls for Gulf partners to help accelerate the agreement are nothing new, and the one-sided nature of these statements, where China calls and the GCC countries echo, suggests China sees the lag in concluding the talks as more frustrating than the Gulf states do. As the Gulf states remain strategically aligned with the U.S., which maintains a large military presence in the region, an aversion to aggravating Washington by agreeing to free trade terms with China may also be incentivizing the GCC states to bide their time.

On the other hand, free trade with China is not clearly beneficial for many countries. Among the G7 states, none of which hold bilateral FTAs with China, the latter’s nonmarket practices have raised concerns of overcapacity, which could harm domestic industries on top of concerns about reciprocity in market access. The GCC already runs a major trade surplus with
China, so a new deal raises a hard question: what does the Gulf gain that it cannot already secure? As things stand, the Gulf states have more domestic interests to protect than it has to gain from tariff liberalization.

On the current trajectory, there will almost certainly be further calls from China to accelerate talks at both the China Arab States Summit and the China-GCC Summit in 2026. However, if such calls remain one-sided and formulaic, meaningful progress is not likely. If elements of protection for specifically sensitive sectors, for example, start appearing in official readouts, the agreement can be seen as having entered a different phase. Until then, however, the China-GCC FTA will remain an ambitious but elusive objective: a headline commitment that signals continued momentum in China-Gulf ties, but stops short of the domestic trade-offs required to make it real.

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

However, there is an overlooked aspect of colonial rule in India that should be acknowledged. French rule in India is either forgotten as a footnote or portrayed as “benign,” with the “mixing” of diverse cultures. In reality, the narrative of a benign French rule is a wholly simplistic one. French rule was characterized by opportunism to obtain maximum benefits for France at the expense of Indians.

History of French Colonial Rule

France’s interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) began in the 17th century. In 1664, the French East India Company (Compagnie des Indes Orientales) was founded. Throughout the 17th century, the state of relations between France and its main rival, the United Kingdom, had a significant impact on France’s policy in the IOR.

From around 1667 to 1746, the British and French had “peaceful coexistence” in South Asia, which was then replaced by immense rivalries with the Carnatic Wars. The various Indian princes and dynasties took advantage of this rivalry, siding with either the French or the British, or even switching sides if it gave them the most advantage.

After the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the French lost to the British, and their influence was limited to five trading posts, or comptoirs, such as Pondicherry. In 1954, the French withdrew their forces and transferred political authority to the newly created Republic of India. In 1956, India and France signed a treaty to formalize the handover, and the French parliament ratified it by 1962.

The “Benign” Policies

In Indian public discourse today, there is a dominant narrative arguing that the French “helped” the Indians fight the British militarily. On the one hand, this narrative contains an element of truth, such as how France sided with various Indian leaders during the Battle of Plassey against the British.

In addition, there were instances of how France gave refuge to various freedom fighters from the British. For example, the Indian freedom fighter Veer Savarkar was able to escape the British for a brief period by going to Marseille, France. In fact, many freedom fighters, such as Subramania Bharti, escaped to Pondicherry to avoid arrest by the British government.

Furthermore, some Indians did benefit from France’s policy of direct colonial rule, unlike Indians under the British policy of indirect rule, which did not extend similar benefits. In fact, one of the provisions of the 1956 treaty allowed the inhabitants of French India to choose to retain their French citizenship or to become Indian citizens within six months after the transfer of political authority back to India occurred.

During the 1930s, French newspapers such as Le Figaro and Le Temps drew comparisons between Mahatma Gandhi’s movement and the French Revolution, citing connections to their shared republican ideology. Gandhi himself adopted the French values of liberté, égalité, and fraternité, extolling the situation in Pondicherry as a model of what “representation” should look like.

The Strings Attached

However, these relatively “benign” policies were not driven by altruism but by opportunism. Crucially, the French choice to aid Indian independence activists was not necessarily due to an affinity with their ideology, but as a way to weaken Britain. France’s actions in India are very similar to how the French also aided the Americans in gaining independence for the same reason: to weaken the British.

Additionally, like the United Kingdom, France also had policies that limited the rights of Indians. For example, in contrast to the dominant narrative that France gave universal citizenship to Indians since 1848, not all Indians were given equal benefits. The first electoral class was composed of European/local elites, and the second class was composed of the working class. Thus, it was the Indians who comprised the first electoral class that received the full benefits.

Most importantly, the French did not simply “give up” their possessions to the newly independent India. Rather, it was a culmination of the efforts of Indian freedom fighters, such as V. Subbiah, who fought tirelessly to gain independence. Importantly, French atrocities during the 20th century in places such as Algeria and Vietnam illustrate that they acted no differently than the British to preserve their colonial empire.

Crucially, by the 20th century, France’s relations with the UK largely stabilized with the 1904 Entente Cordiale, which specified each country’s spheres of influence. With these developments, the French did not have much incentive to cause problems for the British over India. They handed over freedom fighters like Savarkar to London after the Entente Cordiale to ensure that the broader relationship was not damaged. Even though the French were previously willing to “aid” Indian freedom fighters, this incident demonstrates that Paris was willing to sacrifice Indian freedom fighters for its own interests.

Considering these factors, had the French succeeded in fully colonizing India, it would have been equally brutal, with the only difference being that Indians would have been speaking French, not English.

The Post-Independence Relationship Between India and France

Despite France’s own fair share of colonial atrocities, for the most part, India’s relationship with the French is largely positive. More broadly, colonial history is largely overlooked, aside from a few minor incidents such as when the Indian government renamed “Pondicherry” to “Puducherry” in 2006.

Aside from the geographical limit of French rule compared to the British, one key reason for that is that the Indians perceive the French as treating them as “equal partners.” This Indian sentiment is largely shaped by the perception that France’s insistence on strategic autonomy, as expressed through its Gaullist worldview, closely resembles India’s Nehruvian worldview of nonalignment.

Today, France is one of India’s most important strategic partners and is a critical supplier of weapons and nuclear technology. In 2016, France became the first foreign country to send in a military contingent during India’s Republic Day ceremony, the day India officially became a republic after gaining independence. Ever since Emmanuel Macron became president in 2017, the India-France relationship has only deepened. In fact, during Modi’s visit to Marseille in February 2025, he referenced Savarkar and thanked French activists who helped him.

By contrast, the modern-day relationship between the British and Indians is still marred with colonial hangovers, with films such as “RRR” reaching immense popularity. Even today, politicians like Shashi Tharoor still criticize the British colonial rule. In September 2025, after a Mumbai-based influencer reported that his bike was stolen while in the UK, Tharoor posted on X, “They’re learning from the British Museum!” Tharoor’s comment was in reference to how the British Museum contains many artifacts looted from India during colonial rule.

The differences in Indian politicians’ views toward French colonialism vs. British colonialism are shaped by the government’s broader strategic imperatives. Realistically speaking, the Indian government will not jeopardize its strategic partnership with France over colonialism.

However, the Indian government’s policies should not be an excuse to impede Indian scholars and the Indian people from critically evaluating every colonial power in Indian history, whether it is the British, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Austrians, the Swedes, the Danes, or even the French.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

Zero Day Attack imagined and visualized an unthinkable scenario for many, again reviving the question: how much of the Chinese threat should enter daily life, and how much should the Taiwanese people plan for?

An Old Threat, Always Present

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long threatened to “unify” the island of Taiwan with the mainland. In pursuit of this goal, the PRC has employed “gray zone” tactics to exhaust the Taiwanese people into favoring peaceful reunification. To date, China has relied on travel restrictions, cyberattacks, naval drills, and coercive trade measures to pressure Taipei. All the while, the threat of direct Chinese military force lurks in the background, with no way to know when—or even if—it might come.

Art Imitates Anxiety

The Washington Post found that as a sense of threat has grown, Taiwanese art and media have matched public anxieties. Films, television, video games, and board games depicting invasion scenarios have entered the market to mixed reactions. Some viewers find them unsettling, while others praise their realism.

Sentiment on the threat of invasion remains mixed. In Taipei, some residents have begun to take air-raid drills seriously, noting how the war in Ukraine makes their circumstances feel closer to home. On Kinmen, the Taiwanese island closest to mainland China, many remain skeptical that Beijing would risk a full-scale attack, believing it would be prohibitively costly. Others don’t want to prepare for or even discuss invasion possibilities for fear that the precautions themselves could provoke China. Whether due to generational, urban-rural, or cultural divides, Taiwan’s public mood varies widely. For some, drills and invasion-themed media feel unnecessary and unsettling; for others, they have become essential parts of civic life.

Echoes of Ukraine

A look back at Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine provides a useful retrospective on public sentiment under looming threat. A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll taken shortly before the invasion showed similarly divided views: 48.1 percent believed the threat was real, while 39.1 percent disagreed. Aligning public opinion on preparedness is difficult, and consensus may only emerge on the day a dramatic event happens. That leaves Taiwan’s government with a delicate task: not persuading people that war is possible, but shaping how society lives with that possibility.

Preparing for What May Never Come

How does a society prepare for a crisis that may never arrive? Each year, Taiwan holds drills that simulate a Chinese attack. Air raid sirens ring in Taipei, signaling for people to find shelter while businesses turn off their lights and lock their doors. Local governments also participate in “whole-of-society defense resilience” exercises, testing civilians’ emergency preparedness.

Authorities have distributed wartime scenario handbooks with evacuation maps and survival tips, while civic groups like Kuma Academy teach first aid, communications, and basic defense. “War impacts everyone,” the academy’s website notes, “and societal resilience requires citizens to defend themselves and contribute their skills.” Some Taiwanese have taken that message to heart: Al Jazeera reported on residents assembling go-bags, stockpiling essentials, and even training in fitness and first aid.

The Quiet Equilibrium

Even with Ukraine’s example fresh in memory, and with both government and civil society efforts expanding, life must go on. The tension between staying alert and staying sane has become Taiwan’s quiet equilibrium. Families might discuss evacuation routes at the dinner table, then return to the weekend plans. Teenagers scroll past civil defense posts on social media before landing on the latest celebrity news.

Fiction like Zero Day Attack may dramatize the island’s worst fears, but it also captures something deeper: the art of living normally in abnormal times. For now, most people in Taiwan seem to have made peace with uncertainty, carrying on as if tomorrow will come as usual — and making small, steady plans in case it doesn’t.

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

Tariffs Against South Korea

The U.S.–South Korea relationship continues a traditional security pact spanning the course of historical shifts in the world order. In the world today, being aligned with the U.S. does not automatically guarantee material benefits. Whether analyzing the Biden administration’s return to the unipolar moment or the Trump administration’s imperialist actions, the use of tariffs warrants a reassessment of bilateral ties. South Korea is an export economy, and tariffs threaten Korean exports, halting free trade in the process. In April, tariffs on South Korea were set at 25% on all goods. In late July, a deal was made that lowered tariffs on all goods to 15%. Additionally, a trade deal was agreed to that allocates $350 billion total to American investments and $150 billion specifically for shipbuilding cooperation. The purpose of the tariffs is a strategy to pressure Lee to capitulate to primacist demands. Lee can also make a judgment about a high-risk, lower-reward bilateral relationship that would be unsavory for China hawks in Washington. Lee’s pragmatic choice will not cut ties with the U.S., but could take action to neutralize the overreliance on their security relationship with the U.S. On the contrary, leveraging South Korean industry strengths, such as shipbuilding, in striking a deal with the U.S. administration is a strategic use of national strengths in diplomacy. This strategy could be continued, but placed in a different cooperative direction if Lee pursues diversification with regional and global partners.

Lee’s viewpoint of security and economy as a singular unit is essential to understanding the importance of ending overdependence on a great power rivalry. It is possible that a critical juncture of path dependency has already occurred, and Lee could arrive at the realization that it is too late to cut ties with the U.S. political structure that solidified long ago. As great power competition ultimately leads to confrontation, South Korea could struggle to break away if Washington escalates its rivalry with China. The more hostility coming from the U.S., in this case with tariffs, the higher potential for a souring of trade and possibly security relations. The trade weaponization against South Korea is due to the U.S. recognizing a significant trade relationship between South Korea and China. Additionally, the added pressure on South Korea as a means to engrain a bloc politics mindset by forcing a choice may not be the anticipated capitulation the administration thinks it will become. The use of China threat inflation as a premise more clear than truth, perversely justifies U.S. economic coercion against allies, the very same accusations it continues to use against China. Lee and other regional actors are unwilling to play trade roulette for the sake of U.S. primacy. The misguided justification of the China threat inflation is backfiring across the Indo-Pacific. Lee right sizing China could end the great power competition hysteria. Lee must embrace economic diversification by incorporating a multilateral strategy, but could pay a price, as economic diversification will leave an unsavory impression on the traditional security ally.

A Trade Partner in China

A strategic approach for diversifying the South Korean economy starts with strengthening economic cooperation with China. The China-South Korea relationship is maintained by China being South Korea’s largest trading partner. In 2015, the China-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (CSKFTA) established a trade partnership that liberalized trade and accessed the Chinese economy. In June 2025, Chinese exports to South Korea were $12.6 billion, and imports totaled $14.5 billion with a trade deficit of $1.9 billion. This bilateral trade relationship is essential for an export economy as China values South Korean semiconductors. Additionally, after a five-year hiatus, a trilateral meeting between South Korea, China, and Japan focused on rapprochement to strengthen free trade under a unifying threat of U.S. tariffs. Relations between the trio have remained strained with disagreements over territorial issues, sabre-rattling, and unresolved historical grievances. Rapprochement could be a point of leverage for Lee under the shared threat of economic tensions with the U.S. Increasing cultural ties within the trilateral cooperative is a challenging hurdle, but if resolved, it could provide multilateral economic advantages. Lee must go beyond maintaining and mending relations; the diversification strategy needs to expand to the BRICS economic bloc.

The BRICS Opportunity

Lee has the option to integrate the Korean economy into the BRICS+ alliance. BRICS nations comprise 40% of the world’s population and about 30% of global GDP. The International Monetary Fund projects BRICS contributing 50% of the worldwide GDP in the future. The New Development Bank is a BRICS financial institution that started as a $100 billion allotment. Lee can utilize the NDB to influence global economic governance on infrastructure and sustainability projects. Furthermore, the South Korean Indo-Pacific strategy, which prioritizes infrastructure development, provides a ready foundation for BRICS engagement. NDB integration could reduce overdependency on the IMF and the World Bank financial systems. Also, the contribution to BRICS initiatives could propel the integration process for South Korea. BRICS is rising as a powerful economic bloc of Global South emerging economies, and it is right to recognize a strategic economic opportunity based on multipolarity. A policy that emphasizes South Korean national interests as a credible reason for diversifying the export economy towards BRICS+ is a realistic choice. Since South Korea is not a BRICS+ member, diversification would require diplomatic outreach through strengthening cultural ties, similar to how Lee views improving cultural ties with China.

South Korea’s alignment with BRICS as a neutral partner, while maintaining diplomatic relations with the U.S., provides Lee with diplomatic leverage and advantages in a multipolar world. Overdependence on the U.S. is a weak point for South Korean sovereignty. Instead, Lee can focus on a relationship with the Global South. National strengths of South Korea include semiconductors, batteries, and shipbuilding, which were leveraged in the U.S. trade deal and could also appeal to new economic partnerships across the BRICS+ regions. Utilizing South Korea’s national strengths across industries can help tie together a credible policy of diversification for domestic and foreign audiences alike. South Korean engagement with BRICS+ is a strategy that looks beyond great power competition based on multilateral cooperation. Lee could establish access to new markets, supply chains, and cooperation on infrastructure projects with new partners, providing strategic incentives for the Korean economy. Lee should not fall into a geopolitical trap of having to engage in an escalation that leads to conflict among great powers.

Economic Diversification Increases Autonomy

As the U.S. views itself as a declining power, coercive tactics are arbitrarily justified toward states like South Korea. President Lee Jae-myung has a chance to change South Korean foreign policy. An oversimplified false choice of China or the United States only promotes great power hysteria. Economic coercion serves as a mechanism for zero-sum thinking that compels states to realign with great power interests. Neutralizing great power competition could provide material gains for South Korea. Diversification of exports across existing and new trade partnerships to increase independence away from great power rivalry is the solution. Lee can diversify the South Korean economy with deeper ties to China as well as across BRICS nations. The result is more independent decision-making in South Korea, which can leverage diplomacy and capitalize on opportunities for economic prosperity. This is the logical outline for an independent foreign policy based on South Korea’s national interest. South Korea has sovereignty; it is time to use autonomous action to neutralize great power competition.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

Underpinning the deepening bilateral relationship is the DPRK’s military support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu in Pyongyang on June 4, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un affirmed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would “unconditionally support” Moscow on Ukraine, a position he reaffirmed in his latest meeting with Lavrov.

Since the beginning of the conflict in February 2022, North Korea has increasingly become an indispensable part of Russia’s military strategy. In return, Russia has provided Pyongyang with a new injection of military and non-military aid needed to further improve the regime’s resilience in the face of sanctions and near-universal isolation from the international community.

Munitions Trade: A Growing Dependence

Since late 2022, North Korea has provided Russia with the munitions needed to continue its invasion of Ukraine. An analysis by the Open Source Center (OSC) and Reuters identified at least 64 arms shipments — totalling between 4.2 and 5.8 million munitions — between August 2023 and March 2025. A more recent analysis by South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the intelligence arm of the Defense Ministry, projected that North Korea has shipped about 12 million munitions since the beginning of the war in February 2022. Newer, more advanced weapons systems have also been sent to Russia from North Korea, including Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles and short-range surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. In exchange for its arms sales, North Korea has earned an estimated $20 billion in economic benefits, including an estimated $630 million from technology transfers, according to the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

With Russia’s expenditure of artillery rounds averaging around 10,000 a day, these munitions shipments enable Russia’s sustained artillery fire in Ukraine, a critical element of its current military strategy. Ukrainian intelligence analysts estimate that around 40 percent of shells fired by the Russian army were provided by North Korea. As Russia continues to exhaust its domestic weapons stockpile, this trend is set to continue as Kim has ordered the DPRK’s arms industry to operate at full capacity for 24 hours a day.

There are two primary reasons behind Russia’s growing dependence on North Korean arms. First, the two countries share a land border, allowing for easier and more secure logistical transport compared to other suppliers. Second, alternative suppliers such as Iran have faced increasing challenges due to sanctions and domestic constraints. Although Moscow is unlikely to rely exclusively on Pyongyang in the long term, North Korea’s current position allows it to negotiate with greater leverage — even under international sanctions.

North Korea Deploys Troops

In recent months, North Korea has begun funneling both military and civilian manpower to support Russia’s invasion. According to Ukrainian officials, North Korea is preparing to send an additional 25,000 to 30,000 soldiers to fight on behalf of Russia, adding to the 11,000 it sent in November 2024.

For North Korea, sending troops to fight in the Russian invasion of Ukraine provides the Korean People’s Army (KPA) with actual experience conducting combat operations in a technologically advanced battlefield environment. This could give them an edge in a hypothetical conflict with their neighbors to the South, who regularly engage in training exercises, but not actual combat.

For Russia, the arrival of North Korean troops is a welcome reprieve. Although Russia had seen its traditional spring conscription reach 160,000 recruits — the largest call-up in 14 years — its attempts to develop alternative sources to increase its troop count without ordering a politically unpopular second mobilization have been more modest. On July 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners to serve in the Russian army during draft periods. While the exact number of foreign nationals fighting on behalf of Russia is unclear, estimates range from around 1,500 to 15,000 volunteers, preventing Moscow from relying too heavily on foreign fighters. Therefore, it is unclear whether this decree will improve foreign recruitment numbers, making Pyongyang’s less-than-voluntary injection of troops even more valuable.

Non-Military Support Means Moderate Gains for Pyongyang

Russia’s war in Ukraine has opened a rare window for North Korea to circumvent sanctions and improve its economic and technological capacity. Under the 2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategy Partnership, Pyongyang receives critical foreign currency, energy supplies, and people-to-people contacts.

One notable example is the Khasan-Rajin logistics project that would establish a rail network linking North Korea’s northeastern city of Rajin with the eastern Russian border town of Khasan. During his visit to Pyongyang in June 2024, President Putin highlighted positive developments on the project, which is expected to be completed by 2026.

These projects have deepened ties between North Korean officials and Russian politicians representing eastern provinces such as Primorsky Krai, which had been dormant since the late 1990s. These ties are likely to form the basis for lasting cooperation between the two countries independent of the conflict in Ukraine.

Beyond tangible gains, the prestige of aligning with a global power like Russia enhances North Korea’s international standing — especially in negotiations with China. Recent trends show Pyongyang expanding engagement with Beijing, particularly in tourism, which could shift China’s perception of North Korea from strategic liability to useful buffer if U.S.-China tensions continue to rise.

Strategic Relationship: Concerns and Limits

Since signing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, U.S., South Korean, and Japanese officials have expressed concerns that Kim could seek major technology transfers from Russia in return, which would potentially enhance the threat posed by his military nuclear program. These concerns should be taken seriously, as there is little evidence of a resolution of the conflict in the near term. While Russia’s cooperation currently is relatively low-cost, its dependence on North Korea’s munitions could trigger more substantial concessions.

However, it is important to recognize the limits to this relationship. While Russia and North Korea’s bilateral relations continue to deepen, Russia is still predominantly a Western-focused power and does not have the capacity to effectively provide robust deterrence capabilities for both itself and the DPRK. Further, attempts to improve the DPRK’s naval force by the two countries have seen limited success.

Additionally, sending weapons to Russia could reduce the DPRK’s internal deterrence capabilities in the event of a crisis. As previously mentioned, North Korean factories have been at full capacity as early as February 2024, and it is unclear whether Pyongyang is able to realistically scale up production in the short term.

Rethinking U.S.-DPRK Negotiation Strategies

At its core, North Korea’s strategy is about regime survival. Deepening ties with Moscow not only deliver tangible benefits but also reflect a more flexible, long-term strategic calculus than previously assumed.

Rather than reacting with alarm, the United States and its allies should explore what conditions or incentives might persuade Pyongyang to scale back its arms transfers and troop deployments. A reactive approach may harden the alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang, while a more measured strategy could open diplomatic pathways. With the Trump administration currently reviewing its North Korea policy, a reassessment of negotiating assumptions is urgently needed. Pyongyang’s leverage has grown, and the U.S. must now consider what it is willing to offer in response.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

Sunni and Shia Overview

Iran and Pakistan have deep cultural ties, as Pakistan was part of the Persian-speaking Mughal Empire, and Shias make up 15-20% of its population. There are even rumors that the founder of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was born a Shia but later became a Sunni.

Sunni and Shia are Islam’s two main sects that emerged after Mohammed’s death in the 7th century. The Shia, which means the party of Ali, believed that direct descendants of Mohammed should be the successors, and supported Ali, Mohammed’s son-in-law, to be the next caliph. The Sunnis argued that it should be from the community and supported Abu Bakr as the next caliph.

Most Muslim countries today are predominantly Sunni, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan. The countries with a majority Shia population are Iran, Bahrain, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, while there are sizable minorities in Lebanon, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. According to some estimates, India has the second-largest Shia community by population, after Iran.

The West often frames the Sunni/Shia schism as this “ancient hatred.” While tensions between the sects predate Western colonialism, these differences were manipulated by the Safavid Shahs, Ottoman Sultans, and other rulers for political gain. Importantly, the media narrative of Sunnis and Shias engaging in “revenge attacks” against one another is a modern phenomenon that emerged in the late 20th century, and it was fueled by political actors and extremist ideologues who weaponized these sectarian differences for political power.

As Lebanese journalist Kim Ghattas, author of the book “Black Wave … ,” said on Fareed Zakaria GPS in February 2020, Sunnis and Shias killed each other less than Catholics and Protestants throughout history.

The Shah Years

Following the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, Iran was the first country to recognize it. From the 1950s, relations between Iran and Pakistan were cordial, as both countries were part of the U.S.-led security alliances, such as CENTO. Given India’s “nonalignment tilt” to the Soviet Union, the Iranians backed Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars.

There is a common narrative that Iran-Pakistan relations nosedived after the Iranian Revolution. However, according to Alex Vatanka in his book “Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence,” tensions emerged before the revolution.

The OPEC oil embargo of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War monumentally increased Iran’s oil revenue, spurring Iranian ambitions and influencing the Shah to pursue a more “independent” foreign policy. The new direction entailed normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1971 and pursuing détente with the Soviet Union. Consequently, it was in Iran’s interest to improve relations with India, seeing them as the regional hegemon after the 1971 war, and from this point on, Iran became “neutral” in the India-Pakistan conflict. Angered by the Shah’s neutrality, the Pakistanis then turned to the Arab countries.

Khomeini’s Revolution and Pakistan’s Pivot to Saudi Arabia

The fall of the Shah after the 1979 Iranian Revolution accelerated tensions between Iran and Pakistan. It replaced a “pro-American” Shah with a virulently anti-American Islamic Republic, and its raison d’être has been to “resist” the United States in the Middle East. Even though Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emphasized the pan-Islamic nature of the revolution, it started to turn sectarian when Khomeini challenged Saudi leadership in the Islamic World.

With the rise of revolutionary Iran, Pakistan deepened its relationship with the Gulf Arabs, particularly Saudi Arabia, to support the country in its conflict against India. The closeness of the Saudi-Pakistani relationship played out when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In response, the Saudis and the Pakistanis (along with the Americans and the Chinese) supported the Afghan Mujahideen, with factions ranging from religiously fanatical Salafis to left-wing Maoists.

Importantly, under Pakistan’s military dictator Zia ul-Haq, the country implemented very conservative religious policies, such as Islamizing the school curriculum, appointing clerics to make judicial decisions, and constructing religious seminaries across the country. However, many of these religious seminaries received significant Saudi money and taught (and still teach) the Saudi-inspired form of Wahhabism.

Wahhabism, a form of Salafism, is an extremely puritanical interpretation of Islam that developed during the 18th century by Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab in what is today Saudi Arabia. It is this branch that doesn’t consider the Shia to be Muslims or even other Muslims to be Muslim who disagree with their views. It is also the ideological foundation for groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other extremely radical and fringe Sunni Islamic movements.

Growing Tensions

The influx of Saudi money and Zia’s policies led to a significant uptick in radical Sunni Islamist parties, such as Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat and Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, throughout Pakistan, preaching anti-Shia violence and stirring up sectarian tensions. This one Sunni group that received Saudi money, “called for legally declaring Shias as being outside the pale of Islam.”

The rise of anti-Shia violence in Pakistan has at times clashed with Iran, since the Islamic Republic has championed itself as the protector of persecuted Shias worldwide. For example, in 1986, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called on the Iranian government to protect Pakistani Shias. During the 1990s, the Iranians started to fund Shia groups, such as Sipah-e-Mohammad, which exacerbated sectarian tensions within the country. And, like the Saudis, the Iranian government funded religious seminaries to propagate their ideology.

In 1998, the Taliban murdered eight Iranian diplomats and one journalist in their consulate in the city of Mazari-Sharif, Afghanistan. This incident caused immense uproar within Iran and nearly resulted in Iran going to war with the Taliban. Crucially, some in Iran alleged that it was the Pakistanis who ordered the Taliban to conduct this heinous act.

Later, during the civil war in Syria, the Iranian government recruited and trained Pakistani Shia militias, such as the Pakistani Zeinabiyoun Brigade, to fight on the Assad regime’s side. Eventually, in April 2024, the Pakistani government banned this group, arguing that it “is engaged in certain activities which are prejudicial to the peace and security.”

On top of these incidents, in 2016, the Pakistanis accused the Iranians of being complicit in allowing an “Indian spy,” Kulbhushan Jadhav, to operate from the Iranian province of Sistan and Balochestan. However, the Indians insist that he was not a spy.

Eventually, the tensions between Iran and Pakistan escalated into outright military tit for tat in January 2024 when the Iranians conducted targeted airstrikes in Pakistan against Jaish ul-Adl, a Baloch Sunni terrorist group that has been responsible for many terrorist attacks in Iran.

On many occasions, the Iranians argued that Pakistan was either complicit in the attacks or not doing enough to rein them in. In response, the Pakistanis launched retaliatory strikes, which they said were targeting the Baluchistan Liberation Army and the Baluchistan Liberation Front in Iran. The Baloch groups have targeted Pakistanis in the past, and Islamabad has accused Tehran of not doing enough to rein them in.

More recently, despite Pakistani statements condemning the Americans and Israelis during the 12-Day War, reports circulated that the Pakistanis may have allowed the Americans to use their airspace to attack the Iranian nuclear sites, which Pakistan has denied. The mere fact that this report circulated is indicative of the extreme mistrust between Tehran and Islamabad.

The “Cold Peace”

What has kept the “cold peace” between these two Islamic Republics in an environment of mutual distrust is doing the minimum to ensure that tensions don’t boil over to a larger military conflict.

As a result, any “cooperation” between the Iranians and Pakistanis has generally been limited to border security to counter the Baloch insurgency, which is a threat to Tehran and Islamabad. Beyond that, there is not much “cooperation” between Iran and Pakistan, not even trade. The Iranians trade more with Armenia annually than with Pakistan.

So far, neither side is politically interested in expanding the relationship beyond this, primarily because the two governments have different priorities. The Iranians have devoted much more attention and resources to the Middle East and its conflict with the Israelis and would rather not think about Pakistan. Likewise, the Pakistanis have been preoccupied with fighting the Indians and maintaining “strategic depth” in Afghanistan; they would not like to start a third front with the Iranians.

Hypothetically, even if a grassroots Iranian opposition movement removed the Islamic Republic and installed a secular democracy, the relationship between Pakistan and Iran is unlikely to change. For a post-Islamic Republic Iran, an economically vibrant India is much more valuable than an economically bankrupt Pakistan.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

With Thavisin ousted from office a year later by the Constitutional Court, citing ethics violations, his daughter, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, became the 31st prime minister, raising even more eyebrows for becoming the youngest PM in Thailand’s history and the second woman to hold the position, the first being her aunt, Yingluck.

For the general public, his return was not a pure coincidence; it was at least intentional for Thaksin himself as he returned to the elite establishment, escaping his criminal sentence for corruption and living life as a free man.

The political mood in Thailand, however, has been turned upside down once again in 2025 as now pressure is mounting from a political break-up within the cabinet, the border crisis turned full blown political drama show down with Samdech Hun Sen of Cambodia, and to top it all off, Thaksin himself is not attending the Supreme Court hearings which seek to send him back to jail. With all of these issues at hand, uncertainty is exigent for Thaksin as Thailand will be on its way toward treacherous political crossroads in the years ahead.

U-Turn to Establishment

In Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra has been seen as a radical reformer; his first term as prime minister in 2001-2005 has been widely seen as one of the most distinctive premierships in Thailand’s history. He was well known for many policies aimed at the reduction of rural poverty and the creation of universal healthcare, as well as introducing Thailand to the global market, positioning Thailand to be the next economic powerhouse at the time.

As it can be seen now, things did not last long for Thaksin’s premiership as he was ousted by the 2006 coup d’état over corruption allegations, the allegations for which he is still on trial at the Supreme Court in Bangkok, which is seeking to send Thaksin back for at least a year in jail after the royal pardon.

After decades in exile abroad, broadcasting and voicing his fight against the powerful establishment that once ousted him, Thaksin has championed himself as the leading figure of the middle class in Thailand, leading the decades-long feud with the conservative, elite establishment in the country.

After 15 years had gone by, Thaksin finally returned to Thailand, where he was greeted with fanfare and police trucks, to take him into custody the moment his private jet touched down. He then spent time in detention, then was transferred to the police hospital in Bangkok, citing serious medical concerns, before being released on parole on February 18, 2024. As his own daughter soon became the 31st prime minister later that year, Thaksin’s public image changed drastically. Many, once his supporters, have now seen him as being part of the establishment itself, and that he had cut a deal with his own former enemies for him to return to Thailand without serving a single night in prison.

There are many reasons for these two very conflicting parties to unite together, but one stands out and is the most probable: to combat the bigger enemy, the Move Forward Party — the young progressive party that won the most seats in the House of Representatives last election, with the conservative camp barely blocking them from forming a government.

It seems that after almost a decade of military rule and two major coups within the span of two decades, much of the Thai public has been left frustrated and seeking radical change, especially toward the elite establishment whom the public see as the common enemy; one who aggravates social inequalities and is to blame for the country’s stagnant economic growth.

This political truce between Thaksin and the conservative establishment, therefore, can be seen as the ultimate spell to crush the Move Forward Party with their radically progressive agendas, which would bring about massive disadvantages to the elite, to protect the benefits they enjoyed in being the ruling class in Thai society.

Thaksin’s House of Cards

The latest development in Thai politics has been seen as full of manipulation from Thaksin himself. From widely held views that the prime minister, his own daughter, has constantly served as a puppet for Thaksin or even to how most of the cabinet members have been working with Thaksin at one point or another in their political career, his fingerprints can be seen everywhere, in plain sight, throughout the entire administration. At one point, it seemed that Thaksin held all the cards of Thai politics in his hands, until he didn’t.

The first round of uncertainty began on May 28 with the first round of shots fired along the Thai and Cambodian border in the Emerald Triangle region between Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. While the Cambodian government has taken swift action to submit border disputes to the International Court of Justice, the reaction from the Thai government has been mild and mixed, vowing only to close borders, cut electricity, and restrict internet access across the border. This highlights the accusations that under the premiership of Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the Thai government has been led by an inexperienced leader. This is not to mention the leaked phone call between Paetongtarn and Hun Sen, the President of Cambodia’s Senate.

During the phone call, Paetongtarn was heard pleading Hun Sen not to take seriously the stance of the Thai army, whom she referred to as “being the opposite side than us” and promising to “give anything” for the situation to resolve, citing peace and that her administration has been “under constant pressure from the public.” As portions of the leaked phone call were made to the general public, Paetongtarn’s reputation was shattered as she was accused of treason and nepotism due to her informal wording on national matters, as heard on the call.

The consequences of the call were nothing short of disastrous. Paetongtarn has since been suspended from office, and with her departure, Thaksin’s house of cards has begun falling apart one by one, as Paetongtarn is the last viable candidate among Thaksin’s children to assume a role in an elected office. Thaksin himself is now facing charges that put both father and daughter on trial, which could potentially annihilate both of their political careers, and with them, the Shinawatras’ political dynasty.

Thaksin flew too close to the sun and got burnt. Now he and his family will have to face intensified legal pressure with weakening, polarized popular support, all the while, in the background, a growing hostility from the military stokes constant fear of a coup amongst the public.

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

During the period of authoritarianism following the 1962 coup, ethnic suppression was rampant. The promotion of Bamar—Myanmar’s majority ethnic group—culture increased tensions, leading to the creation of many ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) seeking to gain autonomy. Although the brief period of democracy from 2011 to 2020 would see many EAOs agreeing to ceasefires and a cessation of conflict, the 2021 coup reignited these conflicts and plunged the country into civil war. None of the current agreements has addressed the rebel groups’ desire for autonomy.

The civil war has been under a temporary ceasefire since April, following an earthquake on March 28th. This ceasefire, which was initially set to expire at the end of May, has been extended to the end of June. However, like many before it, this ceasefire is unlikely to bring any long-term resolution to Myanmar’s civil war. The three main reasons for this continued conflict are that the ceasefire agreements have failed to look at and address the root causes of the conflict and Myanmar’s history of ethnic tensions, disunity among the major opposition forces in the civil war—namely the People’s Defense Force (PDF) and various EAOs—in combatting the military junta (Myanmar’s armed forces), and a lack of international coordination on sanctions.

While both the PDF and EAOs are fighting against Myanmar’s military, their respective purposes in doing so are different and hinder the ability of the resistance to combat the junta effectively. The PDF, led by the National Unity Government (NUG), is seeking to topple the military junta and establish a democratic government, arguing for its legitimacy. However, the PDF cannot achieve this goal on its own and has been fighting alongside various EAOs to combat the junta across Myanmar. While the EAOs are working together, many are not fighting for the same goal as the NUG, and they are consolidating their efforts in the states where they are located.

The goal of many of these EAOs in fighting the junta is to secure autonomy for their region (or state), with the intention of forming semi-independent statelets, rather than removing the junta from the entirety of Myanmar. While such a goal would seem otherwise unobtainable, the civil war has given ethnic groups in Myanmar the ability to consolidate power in their respective regions, setting up their administrative models and structures of governance in their ethnic homelands.

Given the history of ethnic conflict in Myanmar and the increasing capacity of various EAOs, addressing the desires of the country’s different ethnic groups, especially those with military presence, is becoming a point of necessary consideration for a conflict-free Myanmar. The NUG has stated that the creation of a federalist system of government is possible, but given the history of ethnic suppression in Myanmar, skepticism would be unsurprising.

Although the junta holds just under a quarter of the total territory of Myanmar, this small segment contains approximately 60% of the country’s urban areas, which enables it to maintain a firm grip on Myanmar’s infrastructure and revenue sources. By holding these key areas, the military junta can sustain the conflict despite its significant loss in forces. The junta is also able to maintain itself with the support it receives from global and regional powers, such as India and Russia. Greater collaboration and a unified effort by the PDF and EAOs could be highly beneficial in combating the junta.

The international response to the civil war in Myanmar has been minimal. The United States and the United Kingdom have both levied sanctions against the junta and made efforts to inhibit the ability of high-ranking military members to access funds, but these sanctions remain piecemeal and inconsistent. International and regional organizations, namely the United Nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have avoided imposing sanctions and have legitimized the junta by engaging with its leadership. A key regional power, China, has played a very complex role in this conflict, having been both a supporter of the military junta, through the provision of arms and funding, while also being a proponent for peace by playing an important role in brokering some of the previous ceasefire agreements that have been in place throughout the conflict.

Although the current ceasefire has been extended, it is unlikely to last or bring peace to Myanmar, as many before it have failed to do. The military has announced an election, set to take place at either the end of this year or the beginning of 2026. However, analysts are concerned that the military will not be taking this opportunity to hold a fair and just election, but instead will be used to legitimize their rule with violence in the preceding months.

Even if this is a fair election, the junta’s control of most of Myanmar’s urban areas and the existing state of emergency make the prospects for peace uncertain. While the prospects for long-lasting peace in Myanmar are uncertain, ceasefires provide only a temporary reprieve and cannot be relied on as a permanent solution. For prolonged peace to come to Myanmar, the country must address its history of ethnic conflict and suppression.

Western Narratives of the Russia-China Relationship

Much of the Western discourse around the Russia–China relationship ranges from two extremes: treating it as an “existential threat” or inflating the historical mistrust that exists between the two countries.

The former view within Western policy circles sees the Russia-China alignment as a fundamental challenge to U.S. interests and the foundations of the postwar international system. However, this interpretation is due to a misinterpretation of the Sino-Russian “no-limits partnership” announced in February 2022. In fact, the original Chinese statement described the bilateral relationship as having “no boundaries to friendship” and “no areas off-limits for cooperation” (两国友好没有止境，合作没有禁区), but not unconditional commitment. The English rendering “no-limits partnership” collapses two separate ideas into a single, rigid-sounding label that never actually appeared in the original communiqué.

The latter perspective rests on how Western skeptics of the Russia-China relationship point to the checkered history between the two countries and portray the relationship as fundamentally unequal. This notion, that Moscow plays second fiddle, has shaped U.S. attempts to achieve a “Reverse Kissinger,” such as how in October 2024, Trump said to Tucker Carlson, “I’m going to have to un-unite them.”

In reality, these two extreme interpretations do not fully capture the nuances in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing. As demonstrated by their differing stances on India and Pakistan, the Russia-China relationship is a carefully managed, non-committal arrangement, designed to accommodate strategic disagreements.

Background of the Pahalgam Terrorist Attack

On April 22, 2025, the Resistance Front claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack that killed 25 Indians and one Nepali in Pahalgam, Kashmir. According to survivors of the attack, the terrorists intentionally killed Hindu tourists, and many officials/analysts now argue that the attack sought to provoke communal tensions in India. In response, the Indian government accused the Pakistani state of being behind it, given Pakistan’s history of not doing enough to crack down on terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba that launch terrorist attacks in India from Pakistani soil.

On May 7, 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor against terrorist sites in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In response, the Pakistanis retaliated by launching Operation Bunyan Marsoo, in which Islamabad claimed to have hit Indian military sites. Eventually, on May 10, President Trump announced an American-brokered ceasefire, ending the military exchanges.

Like other countries, Moscow and Beijing publicly claimed neutrality and urged India and Pakistan to “de-escalate.” However, Russia and China were “far from neutral” when taking into account Russia's historical relationship with India and China’s historical relationship with Pakistan.

Background: Russia’s Relationship With India and Pakistan

Since the Cold War, Russia (the Soviet Union) has been a long-standing strategic partner to India. Moscow has regularly used its veto power in the UN Security Council to block any UN resolutions critical of India on issues related to Kashmir and has been an important arms supplier. From 1955 to 1991, the Soviet Union supplied 66% of India’s arms imports. Many Indians, too, especially the older generation, view with nostalgia the time when the Soviets supported India during the 1971 India-Pakistan War (also known as the Bangladesh Liberation War). By contrast, the United States gave carte blanche to the Pakistanis even as it was well aware that the Pakistani military was committing a genocide against the Bangladeshis.

Following the Cold War, close ties between India and Russia have persisted, as India continues to import the majority of its arms from Russia. India also refuses to openly condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. This refusal has been a source of friction in India’s relations with the United States and the European Union. By contrast, relations between Moscow and Islamabad remained limited. This lack of importance is reflected in Vladimir Putin’s ten visits to India and zero visits to Pakistan. The lack of substantive relations is due in part to the lingering distrust Russia has because of Pakistan’s role in aiding the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War.

Background: China’s Relationship with India and Pakistan

While initially cordial, relations between India and China have been challenging ever since the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and it wasn't until 1988 that an Indian leader visited the PRC. Aside from the war, China’s close ties with Pakistan were a significant factor in Sino-Indian tensions. Since the 1960s, Beijing has been one of Islamabad’s most important partners, often referred to as the “all-weather friendship.” During the 1960s and 1970s, “China’s fear of Soviet encirclement dictated its close ties with Pakistan,” and Pakistan used its close ties with the United States to act as an interlocutor between Washington and Beijing.

After the Cold War, despite extensive economic ties, China’s relations with India continue to be marked by tensions, owing to China’s support for Pakistan. Within the past five years, Pakistan has imported about 81% of its weapons from China. Additionally, Beijing’s flagship BRI project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and its diplomatic support to Islamabad in the UN Security Council have only deteriorated ties with New Delhi.

When examining Russia and China’s role in the recent escalation of tensions, the differences between the two are shaped by this history.

Why Russia Backs India and China Backs Pakistan

When examining Russia and China’s role post the Pahalgam terrorist attack, the two have very different positions.

From Russia's perspective, it is in their interests to back India — or at least not to openly criticize New Delhi. As stated previously, India is one of Russia's top buyers of its weapons. With the advent of the Western-led sanctions regime over Ukraine, Russia seeks to mitigate its economic isolation. Consequently, Russia seeks to maintain its cordial relations with India to offset the impact of sanctions rather than risk alienating India, as cash-strapped Pakistan is unable to provide meaningful assistance. More recently, Russian media have spread narratives arguing that the Pakistanis have supplied weapons to the Ukrainians.

From China's perspective, its decision to back Pakistan is to keep India distracted, as it views with great paranoia the growing relationship between the United States and India. By ensuring that New Delhi must continuously address security concerns along its borders, Beijing delays India’s efforts to…consolidate influence in Asia-Pacific affairs.” In fact, one of India’s primary strategic nightmares is the possibility of a two-front war with China and Pakistan simultaneously.

Why These Differences Won’t Harm Cooperation

Despite Sino-Russian differences over India and Pakistan, they will not cause the “Reverse Kissinger” that some in Washington hope for. It is essential to note that during the Cold War, Sino-Soviet differences over India and Pakistan harmed the relationship due to the growing ideological rift and China’s growing perception that the Soviets posed a threat to its interests.

However, this is no longer the case today as ideology no longer shapes the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Moreover, the absence of institutional constraints—such as a NATO-style treaty— allows both countries the freedom to maneuver independently, as seen in South Asia. At the core, Russia and China share the view that the United States is their primary geopolitical adversary.

With this in mind, Russia and China’s differences regarding India and Pakistan don’t significantly challenge that fundamental view. Oddly enough, Russia’s support for India and China’s support for Pakistan are in part shaped by their competition with the United States.

Russia and China’s differences with India and Pakistan are indicative of the limitations found in using a black and white framework to analyze how countries conduct their foreign policy.

Four months into their so-called golden year, the messages of cooperation between the two countries are becoming difficult to ignore. China and Iran have conducted joint naval drills alongside Russia in the Gulf of Oman. Iranian oil exports to China have reached an all-time high, with increased use of the Chinese Yuan helping Iran avoid American sanctions on its oil exports. Likewise, they have tentatively offered diplomatic support regarding issues such as the renewed tension surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and U.S. sanctions.

Even so, this increased cooperation is not without risk. The deeper their alignment appears, the greater the potential for both nations to slide into a confrontational posture — even if neither seeks it outright. Yet for now, much of their coordination remains symbolic — a relationship built on sand, lacking the deep foundation needed to withstand long-term geopolitical pressure.

Economic Depth

Discussing the Gulf region without examining the role of oil and natural gas exports is nigh on impossible. Like its neighbors, Iran is considered a rentier state that relies heavily on selling its natural resources to generate revenue. However, unlike its neighbors, the Iranian economy faces a near-constant stream of sanctions hindering its ability to participate in the global market. This international climate incentivizes Iran to seek stable partnerships with the few nations willing to take on the political risk attached to Tehran’s invoices; so far, China has been a willing partner in this endeavor.

This cooperation has surged in 2025. China’s imports of Iranian oil rose to 1.8 million barrels per day in March, an all-time high, as concerns over U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed campaign of “maximum pressure” on Tehran rose. This campaign aims to deny Iran “all paths to a nuclear weapon” and counter its “malign influence abroad,” which would ostensibly be achieved in part by ”driving Iran’s oil exports to zero.” By some estimates, China already takes in 90% of Iran’s oil exports, with Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela accounting for much of the remainder. For Iran, China represents a reliable buyer in an unstable market while serving as a steady supplier for a sizeable portion of China’s hydrocarbon imports.

In the face of massive sanctions against Iran and a plethora of sanctions levied against China by the U.S., the use of the Chinese Yuan (RMB) in oil and natural gas transactions has become more frequent. This use of RMB allows China and Iran to bypass Western financial institutions and, consequently, Western regulators. Coupling this currency shift with a strategy of rebranding Iranian cargo as being of foreign origin — Malaysia, for example — China has allowed small, independent oil refineries colloquially known as “teapots” to absorb large quantities of Iranian oil while China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) keep their hands clean of sanctioned imports.

China has also enjoyed discounted rates on Iranian oil under the 25-year Cooperation Program that the two countries signed in 2021, saving the People’s Republic billions. As such, China maintains a vested interest in supporting Iran’s oil and natural gas exports, including investments totaling $280 billion into Iran’s oil, gas, and petrochemicals sector under the 25-year cooperation agreement. However, the follow-through on the many terms laid out in the 25-year agreement has been limited.

While energy trade forms the bedrock of the China-Iran partnership, symbolism currently outweighs tangible risks or rewards regarding their cooperation in the military and security domains.

Symbolic Security

China’s decision to pursue enhanced security cooperation with Iran is somewhat ironic. Even in its own backyard, only Qatar has maintained strong relations with the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, the increasingly assertive positions of powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have left Iran at odds with its neighbors in the region. As a result, China has maintained a narrative of cautious neutrality rather than properly endorsing Iran’s regional ambitions at the expense of its GCC partnerships.

In March, China, Iran, and Russia held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman, branded as Security Belt-2025. The exercise, in its fifth consecutive iteration, featured live-fire training and maritime security operations. Both sides publicly described the exercise as routine training to safeguard sea lanes and build interoperability. They are symbolically rich in allowing the participating countries to present the image of a united front against increasingly confrontational U.S. posturing, but are less than significant in terms of the practical advancement of military cooperation. Both Chinese and Iranian state-run media have emphasized that the exercises are “not targeted at any third party” and “enhance security rather than threaten stability.”

Iran’s regional alignment, defined by contentious relations with other Gulf powers, makes it a costly ally in matters of defense and security. Despite Iran's claims of defense self-sufficiency, Chinese firms have quietly supplied key components, like missile propellant materials. These transactions have not taken place at the state level, however, leaving China’s ruling elite with plausible deniability in the matter.

Iran’s positioning in the Middle East has suffered in recent months, weakened by the collapse of allied networks in Syria and Lebanon and by ongoing exchanges of fire with Israel. China, aiming to maintain balanced ties across the Middle East, is unlikely to pursue formal military agreements with Tehran amid Iran’s worsening strategic position.

Diplomacy Without Depth

China’s pursuit of stable diplomacy with the broader Gulf region hampers prospects for meaningful advancement in operational cooperation with Tehran. Beneath their projection of unity lie critical divergences: China maintains deep economic ties with Iran’s Gulf rivals, discouraging it from endorsing Tehran’s confrontational foreign policy. It has also adopted a stance of caution regarding Iran’s nuclear endeavors which falls far short of endorsement. These fault lines, though muted in joint statements, demonstrate that the Iran-China partnership remains one rooted in shared resistance rather than shared vision.

Still, these diplomatic signals serve a purpose. Iran reinforces the narrative that it is not isolated but backed by a major power. China has a cost-effective way to assert global relevance while challenging Western norms without overcommitting. Yet beneath the statements and summits, there has been little progress in terms of formal commitments or operational cooperation. Indeed, their cooperation in 2025 reflects a calculated alignment of interests shaped by circumstance, timing, and a shared resistance to Western pressure, not a unified vision.

A Partnership of Performance

China and Iran’s so-called golden year is not a turning point in global alignments. Their cooperation in 2025 has produced tangible benefits, especially on the economic front, and delivered well-timed political theater. However, the deeper patterns have not changed: China continues to mind its broader regional interests, while Iran presses outward to challenge its isolation. These moves broadcast intent, but not the emergence of a durable strategic bloc.

As the golden year rolls on, it is almost certain that China remains focused on larger strategic priorities, particularly its escalating trade war with the U.S., while Iran seeks to position its ties with Beijing as a counterweight to Western pressure. Even where their interests intersect, the underlying imbalances in ambition, leverage, and risk tolerance limit how far this partnership is likely to evolve. Neither side appears willing to take steps that would fundamentally redefine the relationship.

For all its choreography, the China-Iran partnership remains more reactive than deliberate. While the uncertain trajectory of American foreign policy has opened space for powers like China and Iran to assert themselves, their partnership is still uneven and narrowly scoped. The mismatches in economic scale, military investment, and diplomatic priorities suggest that Beijing and Tehran are not elevating a new axis — only navigating parallel frustrations with a system neither fully controls.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

While China’s economic ties with Gulf states have been growing for years, its mediation of the 2023 Saudi-Iran deal signaled a shift in Beijing’s presence in the region. Whereas China had previously approached the region on primarily economic terms, the Beijing-brokered deal between these two historical adversaries signaled for the first time that the People’s Republic had accrued notable leverage in Gulf affairs, even with a regional powerhouse like Saudi Arabia. As China continues to push for diplomatic weight in the Middle East, countries that do not consider a commitment to the shared values of a Western-led international order to be an integral part of their national identity would, at least at a glance, be a convenient audience for Beijing’s diplomatic charm.

While China’s economic footprint has expanded in the Middle East, the UAE’s security framework remains deeply tied to the West, revealing a careful balancing act between opportunity and necessity. China’s growing influence presents an opportunity for the UAE, not a replacement for its deep-rooted ties with the United States. Rather than choosing between the two, Emirati leaders have pursued a strategy of diversification by leveraging economic cooperation with China while maintaining critical security and defense ties with Washington.

However, as U.S.-China tensions escalate, the Gulf’s days of playing both sides may be running out.

Beijing has steadily embedded itself in the Emirati economic, technological, and infrastructure sectors and established itself as a major partner in the UAE’s development strategies. As China has sought heightened engagement with the Middle East through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the UAE has benefited from Chinese investments in ports, logistics, and industrial zones, among other areas. This enhanced cooperation seems to provide mutual benefits, particularly as Gulf states seek to expand their political and economic relations in all directions rather than simply further toward their traditional Western partners.

Through the BRI, China has positioned the UAE as a crucial logistics hub, using Emirati ports and free zones to facilitate trade flows across the Gulf, Africa, and South Asia. The two countries have also established a $10 billion joint investment fund that will support multinational projects in both countries and facilitate further investment in BRI projects worldwide. Indeed, the Gulf country’s geographic positioning roughly halfway between the two great powers of our time has proven valuable in both practical and symbolic terms.

According to the UAE Ministry of Economy, China is the UAE’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $86.7 billion in 2023. Imports from China made up the bulk of that figure at $77.4 billion, while non-oil exports totaled just $2.9 billion, with another $6.3 billion in re-exports. Beyond its trade with China, the UAE moves goods at an enormous scale, with re-exports alone reaching $183 billion in 2023. As U.S.-China tensions have reignited under Donald Trump’s second administration, the UAE’s trade relationship with Beijing may stand to blossom as shifting, if not outright volatile, American interests in the region arise.

Beyond trade, financial cooperation has also expanded. The UAE increasingly settles transactions in the Chinese yuan (RMB), reducing its reliance on the U.S. dollar. This cooperation is expected to grow since the Emirates joined the China-stewarded BRICS organization in early 2024, signaling the country’s willingness to associate with de-dollarization efforts in the international economy.

China has sought investments in the UAE that span key sectors, including supply chain management, technology and manufacturing, chemical engineering, green energy, and telecommunications. The Emirati strategy of modernization and diversification has attracted investment from numerous Chinese companies, creating jobs, bolstering development, and reinforcing the Emirates’ status as a hub for global business.

However, the UAE’s security foundation remains anchored in the West as the country has long depended on the U.S. and its allies for military protection, advanced defense technology, and strategic partnerships. While the UAE has pursued an economic balancing act between China and the West, its military commitments tell a different story — Washington still holds decisive influence.

Beyond its direct defense ties with Washington, which include hosting the U.S. Air Force’s 380th Air Expeditionary Wing at the Al Dhafra Air Base, the Emirates also host defense installations operated by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand at the Al Minhad Air Base. Historically, the U.S. and France have been major arms suppliers to the country with previous deals, including the UAE purchasing 80 French Rafale fighter jets as part of a $17.2-billion deal in 2021 and $2.2 billion on American high-altitude missile defense technology in 2022. While the Emirates took delivery of the first round of Rafale jets in January of 2025, defense exchanges with Washington have taken a hit in recent years, most notably when a proposed sale of F-35 jets fell apart in late 2021.

Outside of direct arms transactions, American and Emirati armed forces regularly conduct joint exercises across land (Iron Union, Native Fury), sea (Iron Defender), and air (Desert Flag) domains. In 2024, Emirati troops conducted land exercises on American soil for the first time in a move described by one U.S. Army General as highlighting the “proficiency of the UAE Land Forces and strength of our partnership.”

In regional affairs, the Emirates also remains generally aligned with the U.S., particularly regarding issues of international terrorism and regional balancing. The UAE threw its support behind the American War in Afghanistan, the only nation to contribute military troops to humanitarian missions in the war-torn country. They also contributed forces to the NATO-led military intervention in Libya.

It bears noting that the aforementioned aborted sale of F-35s, worth multiple billions, opened the door for China to pitch its newest J-35 jet as an alternative. However, progress in this area remains unclear. Nonetheless, it reflects Beijing’s continued openness to enhancing security cooperation with the Emirates. In 2018, the two countries upgraded their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, expressing a shared commitment to enhancing their bilateral ties and cooperation across various domains.

In 2023 and 2024, the two countries partook in joint air force exercises in Western China’s Xinjiang region, raising concerns about Chinese access to Western military technology as Emirati forces used French Mirage 2000 jets based at China’s Hotan Airport for the occasion. Notably, these jets are also used by Taiwan’s Republic of China Air Force, making any knowledge of their workings strategically valuable to China. Previously, China sold an undisclosed number of Hongdu L-15 jets, possibly stemming from an earlier proposition that hinted at the sale of 12 L-15s with an option for 36 more at an undetermined future date.

For now, the UAE’s engagement with China remains tactical rather than transformational. The Emiratis use these engagements to hedge against over-reliance on the West by exploring potential alternative arms suppliers. For China, they provide a figurative bridge to regional and Western engagement as Beijing’s efforts to expand multilateral ties around the globe continue.

However, taken within the context of increasingly unpredictable American strategic priorities at both the domestic and international levels, the balancing strategy pursued by countries like the UAE may prove more difficult to maintain in the coming years.

Abu Dhabi has, so far, navigated the U.S.-China rivalry with pragmatism, but growing external pressures are making neutrality harder to sustain. Rising U.S. pressure to curb Chinese influence within Emirati borders is already testing the limits of the UAE’s balancing strategy. From the collapse of the F-35 fighter jet deal in 2021 over Huawei concerns to broad American warnings that cooperation with China in sensitive sectors could leave lasting bruises on bilateral ties with Gulf countries, Washington has made it clear that it increasingly views China’s presence in the region as a direct threat to its interests.

So long as Washington sees China as a national security threat, the UAE’s balancing act edges closer to becoming a liability rather than an advantage. The deeper its economic ties with Beijing grow, the greater the risk to its defense cooperation with the West.

China’s ambitions may also strain its relationship with the UAE. An expanding Chinese military footprint in the Gulf could provoke stronger U.S. pushback and force Abu Dhabi to clarify its stance. If China moves beyond economic influence toward an open security presence in the region, ambiguity will no longer be an option. Meanwhile, the UAE’s financial realignment, seen in its rising yuan (RMB) trade settlements and BRICS accession, signals a shift away from dollar dependence but also risks limiting its access to Western financial systems. In an era of growing economic and security fragmentation, the UAE’s quasi-hedging strategy may no longer be sustainable.

For now, Abu Dhabi continues to thrive in a world of great power competition, but should the U.S.-China strategic competition devolve into a zero-sum game, neutrality could vanish. In that world, the Gulf’s balancing act isn’t a strategy but a countdown.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

Editorial assistance by Audrey C Scott

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

The recent revelation of governmental connections to the Unification Church, now called the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, is particularly concerning. Founded in Seoul, South Korea by Sun Myung Moon in 1954, the organization is a zealous offshoot of traditional Christianity. This includes reframing spiritual warfare as an ideological conflict between democracy and communism. Moon, who proclaimed to be the second coming of Jesus Christ, espoused controversial beliefs, such as professing that the Holocaust was necessary to prepare for the Lord’s dominion on earth. The church’s followers, informally known as, ‘Moonies,’ have expectedly developed a reputation for political extremism and radicalization. 

A total of 24 ministers, including finance chief Hiroaki Saito, were discovered to have ties to the fundamentalists in the investigation by The Asahi Shimbun. Responding directly to the paper, the finance minister said, “I was aware that this had become a social issue, but I didn’t fully understand the implications of and had asked for support as I had from other religious and civic organizations”

The budgeting mishap from early October was largely overshadowed by the Unification Church ties, although it is just as noteworthy. Between 2019 and 2021, Prime Minister Ishiba’s coalition in the party had failed to disclose 800,000 yen from fundraising, raising even more questions about the LDP’s financial integrity. Japanese law requires that any amount of money donated to a political organization must be available for public record, as well as the contributor’s identity. Furthermore, corporate donations are outright banned. “It was an administrative error, and I take this matter seriously,” Ishiba told the press. 

To his credit, Ishiba is taking these matters seriously. On October 6, the new prime minister told party members that certain candidates involved in the recent slush money scandal would not receive an official LDP endorsement. So far, the list includes six parliamentarians, including two members from Tokyo. “I supported Ishiba with my heart and soul in the party leadership contest. Now, I am being given a raw deal,” one member told The Asahi Shimbun. “I cannot stand the LDP being like this.”

Despite the small number of officials receiving discipline, Ishiba’s actions have proven quite unpopular with the rank-and-file, particularly regarding the timing of the decision. “Campaign broadcasts were recorded yesterday,”  Shinji Inoue, head of the Tokyo chapter, told The Asahi Shimbun. “We have received voices of discontent and dissatisfaction from constituencies of those [who will not be endorsed.] I wonder if the decision could not have been made sooner.”

Corruption is a theme that is becoming all too familiar for LDP administrations. This past January, high-level party members in several political factions, including the powerful Seiwa Kai, were caught violating Japan’s campaign finance laws to the tune of 600 million yen. Coincidently, it was also the catalyst that led to Ishiba’s rise, as the controversy eventually forced Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s resignation. The pattern of wrongdoing that is already emerging from the new prime minister’s administration is as concerning as it is typical for LDP governments. However, perhaps the result of this political recklessness speaks for itself. 

On October 27, Ishiba’s coalition was defeated in the snap election he had previously called, marking perhaps the beginning of the end for the new prime minister's scandal-plagued tenure. It was a stunning rebuke of a party that has dominated Japanese politics since the 1950s, however, it was also a rebuke of Ishiba’s inability to fix the LDP. “The public hoped for him to fix the LDP, but they are gradually becoming disappointed with the fact that he is becoming more like the LDP,” Izuru Makihara, a professor at the University of Tokyo, told the Washington Post.

Prime Minister Ishiba maintains confidence that his governing coalition can survive with some minor political tweaks, but the situation is looking increasingly dire. In an ironic twist, it appears that the same flurry of scandals that lifted Ishiba up could also be tearing him down.

Editorial contributions by Rachael Rhine Milliard

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

Dong is a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Admiral whose experience includes a two-year stint as deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, the naval wing of China’s Eastern Theater Command which overseas naval operations in the East China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Dong later served as deputy commander of the Southern Theater Command with jurisdiction over the South Sea Fleet which operates in the hotly-contested South China Sea. In addition to this experience, Dong also served as the ninth Commander of the PLA Navy from 2021 to 2023 and has been succeeded in this post by Admiral Hu Zhongming, who previously served as PLA Navy Chief of Staff.

Dong is the first defense minister to come from a naval background and takes up the post at a time where military relations between China and both the U.S. and its neighboring nations have been fraught with uncertainty and tension. Dong took office just two days before Xi called unification with Taiwan “inevitable” during his New Year’s Eve address, and just over two months after the high-profile removal of Li Shangfu from the post of defense minister. Li had served in the position for only seven months, making him him the shortest-serving Minister of National Defense in the history of the People’s Republic. 

Previously speculated successors to Li included the two Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the country’s highest decision-making body for military affairs. Generals Zhang Youxia - who has been described as “the highest Chinese uniformed officer” by the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and He Weidong. Gen. Liu Zhenli’s name also made rounds after he was named in an exclusive report by Reuters in October as Li’s likely successor, citing “five people familiar with the matter.”

Though the post of defense minister is once again filled, 10 weeks of confusion lingers around the question of what exactly happened involving Li Shangfu and another high-level official who was removed from office in a similarly unceremonious manner.

During the same Oct. 24 meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress which saw Li removed from all of his posts, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang was stripped of his last remaining official title of State Councilor after initially being removed from the post of Foreign Minister three months earlier. As in the case of Li, no reason was given for Qin’s removal, though speculation regarding his whereabouts had been running rampant after he had disappeared from public view two weeks prior to his official removal on July 25. The run-up to Li’s removal from office followed a similar pattern where he disappeared from public life for an extended period before being officially relieved of duty. Li’s last public appearance came at the end of August while attending the 3rd China-Africa Peace and Security Forum in Beijing.

Unlike Li’s, Qin’s removal from office was accompanied by an immediate announcement of his replacement. Wang Yi, who had previously served as Foreign Minister (2013-2022) and has, since Jan. 1, 2023, served as Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, was announced to once again be taking up the post of foreign minister. Wang is the first person to hold the office on two separate occasions. 

Without an official reason being given for Li’s dismissal, theories surrounding the situation are suspect-at-best to those outside of the circles familiar with the matter.

With Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in its 12th year, Li’s removal being related to charges of corruption is an understandable consideration - lingering questions about the true nature of the anti-corruption push aside. The removal of all of Li’s titles coming on Oct. 24, while Qin maintained his State Councilor status for months after being removed from his post as foreign minister in July, may hint that Li’s situation is more severe than Qin’s, whose dismissal is generally seen as being related to his personal conduct during his time as the Chinese Ambassador to the United States.Further speculation citing sources close to Qin suggests that his removal was motivated by pressure from Russia after Qin had been labeled as “pro-U.S.” owing to his oversight of China’s engagement with Ukraine during the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. However, other claims emerged in the months following his removal from office that Qin had instead died under unclear circumstances.

Finally, Li was removed from the CMC. As China’s paramount leader, Xi chairs the CMC, from which Li was removed on Oct. 24, when he was stripped of his other titles. Li’s name, at time of writing, remains on the list of members for the Communist Party of China (CPC) Commission, but is absent from the PRC Commission members list.

Few answers were properly revealed as this drama played out.

The fact that both Li and Qin rose to the ministerial level at the 20th National Congress of the CPC in November of 2022 suggested that they had both been heavily vetted according to Xi’s own criteria. That is to say, the consecutive, quiet removals of two high-level officials who had been elevated to their posts at the Party Congress which many saw as Xi’s ultimate consolidation of power was a shock to most observers. For all intents and purposes, both Li and Qin were assumed by many to have passed the Xi test before taking high office.

Citing 10 sources close to the matter, Reuters reported on Sept. 14 that Li had been placed under investigation on suspicion of corruption, at which point he had been absent from public life for two weeks. Specifically, the report suggests that Li is being investigated regarding corrupt practices in military procurement. Li previously led the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission (EDD), putting him in charge of military procurement, from 2017 to 2022. Two sources indicated that eight other officials from the EDD are under investigation as well.

During his time as Ambassador to the United States, Qin was rumored to have been involved in an affair with TV presenter Fu Xiaotian , who was said to have had a child in the U.S. through surrogacy. According to the Financial Times, Qin began limiting contact with Fu after being promoted to the post of foreign minister, which led to Fu dropping hints surrounding their relationship on social media. Fu disappeared from public view around the same time as Qin. Multiple sources have said that this ordeal resulted in an investigation as to whether or not Qin’s conduct had compromised China’s national security. Qin has not been seen in public since June 25.

The same meeting which saw Dong elevated to the post of Minister of National Defense also saw nine military officials removed from their roles in the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislative body.

Among those removed were Gen. Li Yuchao and Zhang Zhenzhong. Li was one of multiple individuals removed from the PLA Rocket Force – which overseas both nuclear and conventional missiles - in July while being investigated by the CMC’s anti-corruption unit. In July, Zhang, then-deputy to Li, and Liu Gangbin, a former deputy of Li, were also placed under investigation for corrupt practices. Liu Zhen, writing for South China Morning Post also reports that Li Chuanguang who had been deputy commander of the rocket force from 2016, and Zhou Yaning, who proceeded Li as commander, were also removed from their NPC posts. Lu Hong, currently heading rocket force equipment development, was also stripped of his NPC title. Crucially, Liu notes, NPC members are immune from arrest or criminal charges. The removal of multiple officials from the NPC could suggest that further discipline is impending for the individuals involved.

Many observers have called these rapid, successive removals of high-level officials and escalation of Xi’s signature anti-corruption drive, with the military currently finding itself centered in Xi’s sights. Questions of poor oversight, ongoing crackdowns on corruption, and even espionage have circulated in the absence of official word on the fates of Qin, Li, or the others recently removed from their posts for ostensibly disciplinary purposes.

Such recent upheavals within the Chinese political and military leadership highlight a pervasive sense of disarray and unpredictability in the country’s notoriously structured and regimented political system. Considering the opaque nature of the working of Chinese politics, any revelations regarding the true nature of these recent shifts in leadership are likely still beyond the horizon.

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.

The recent collapse of Intel's planned acquisition of Israeli chipmaker Tower Semiconductor marks the latest chapter in the escalating U.S.-China tech competition. As Intel aimed to enhance its position against industry leaders like Samsung and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), China's regulatory intervention under its Anti-Monopoly Law halted the deal in its tracks. This event, far from an isolated business transaction, serves as a vivid illustration of the broader geopolitical struggle between the U.S. and China in the technology sector. With new regulations, executive orders, and strategic corporate moves, the Intel-Tower deal's failure is emblematic of the complex and often contentious landscape that defines the ongoing tech war between the world's two largest economies.

While this may appear to be a relatively small event, it has larger implications for Intel's competitive positioning. To compete with successful semiconductor foundries like Samsung and TSMC, Intel sought to purchase a smaller foundry with the expertise needed to further its goals. Tower was essentially its only option, especially after Intel's past failure to acquire GlobalFoundries. Given that Intel is an American company and Tower Semiconductors is an Israeli firm, the situation raises a compelling question: What does China have to do with this?

In June of 2022, China amended its Anti-Monopoly Law, introducing new requirements with far-reaching implications for international business transactions. Under this law, parties must submit transactions that involve a change of "control" for approval. China's competition authority, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), interprets this term broadly. It encompasses not only mergers and acquisitions but also joint venture transactions and certain minority investments. This applies even when no party involved is based in China, as was the case with the Intel-Tower deal.

The SAMR's interpretation of "control" is expansive and extends to various situations. Even the acquisition of a minority stake may require filing if it includes certain rights. These rights can range from board representation, and significant veto powers, control over key decisions such as the appointment or removal of the CEO, to approval of the annual budget or business plan.

The revenue thresholds for these regulations, when converted to U.S. dollars, are as follows:

At least two parties to the transaction must each have revenue of $55 million or more in mainland China.

The parties' combined annual group revenues globally must be at least $1.4 billion, or they must have combined revenue of at least $277 million in mainland China.

Just one week prior, the Biden administration issued a new Executive Order (EO) focusing on regulating U.S. outbound investments to China in specific technology areas, including semiconductors and Artificial Intelligence (AI). This EO mandates that U.S. individuals notify the government about transactions with Chinese entities involving certain technologies, and it includes prohibitions and notification requirements to control investment flows. This follows the October 2022 export controls, which aimed to restrict China's access to high-end semiconductor devices with potential military applications. Beijing's apprehension over Intel's purchase of Tower can be understood in this context, as China feared the acquisition might hinder its firms' collaboration with Tower, given the growing U.S. limitations on China's tech sector.

China's slow-rolling of the Intel-Tower deal is not an isolated incident. In November of 2022, DuPont's planned purchase of Rogers Corporation encountered a similar obstacle, with Chinese regulators withholding approval. This led to a breakup fee of $162.5 million. Intriguingly, neither the Intel-Tower deal nor the DuPont-Rogers deal involved Chinese companies. 

Intel CEO Patrick Gelsinger traveled to China multiple times this year. “Intel’s presence in China is very important because the country is one of the world’s largest markets, and also one of Intel’s most important markets,” he said during a visit in April. He also visited in July, where he met with New H3C Group, a prominent Chinese IT firm, and with xFusion Technologies on environmentally friendly data center innovations. The visit also celebrated two decades of Intel's presence in Chengdu where it has an assembly and testing facility. China stands as the chip company's biggest market beyond the U.S., contributing to 27 percent of the company's worldwide revenue in fiscal year 2022.

During his July visit to China, Gelsinger announced the launch of the Gaudi 2 processor, designed specifically for AI deep-learning applications. This move aligns with strategies by other American firms, such as NVIDIA, to release specialized chips for the Chinese market, navigating around the U.S. export controls implemented in October 2022. An Intel spokesperson emphasized at the launch, “The availability of Gaudi2 in China continues Intel’s nearly 40-year history of delivering innovative yet legally-compliant products to this key growth market."

Washington is closely monitoring the measures taken by companies like Intel and NVIDIA to circumvent export controls, prompting the Biden administration to consider further tightening regulations on chip exports to China. This potential action would build upon the export controls introduced in October 2022, reflecting growing concerns over technology transfer. In a related move, the Commerce Department has blacklisted one of Intel's largest clients, Inspur. Reuters reported that “Inspur's Chinese-listed subsidiary had nearly $10 billion in sales in 2021, and Inspur Group is the world's third-largest supplier of the servers used in data centers that power cloud computing.” 

Intel's financial challenges began to surface even before its unsuccessful attempt to acquire Tower Semiconductor. In 2022, the company's profits took a sharp dive, plummeting by 60 percent, while revenue declined by 20 percent. Amidst this financial turbulence, the collapse of the planned $5.4 billion purchase of Tower might have unexpectedly worked in Intel's favor.

The halted deal potentially spared Intel from the complex task of integrating Tower's outdated technology and grappling with its weaker profit margins. This unexpected turn of events may have aligned more closely with Intel's renewed emphasis on cutting-edge fabrication, a core aspect of its strategic vision.

Additionally, the anticipated 15% drop in Tower's revenue for the year, coupled with extended scrutiny by Chinese authorities, provided Intel with a potentially timely exit from an agreement that was becoming increasingly questionable. This escape route may have helped Intel avert further negative impacts on its share value and maintain its strategic alignment with key clients, such as the U.S. Department of Defense and Qualcomm.

Ultimately, the termination of Intel's acquisition of Tower Semiconductor is more than a business decision; it's another episode in the ongoing U.S.-China tech war. While the collapse of the deal may have spared Intel from potential challenges, it also shows the pervasive influence of geopolitical tensions on global commerce. As companies like Intel navigate this complex landscape, the strategic implications of the U.S.-China rivalry continue to shape the future of the technology sector.

The views and information contained in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of The Asia Cable.