<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[The Asia Cable: Silk Road Monthly]]></title><description><![CDATA[Chronicling China's engagement with Central Asia.]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/s/silk-road-monthly</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 18:29:50 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.theasiacable.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Nick Ayrton]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[theasiacable@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[theasiacable@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Nick Ayrton (孔澜岳)]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Nick Ayrton (孔澜岳)]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[theasiacable@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[theasiacable@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Nick Ayrton (孔澜岳)]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: April 2025]]></title><description><![CDATA[Tashkent sits in a difficult position. Its economic relationship with Beijing has proven to be critical, while officials must also address domestic concerns over Chinese influence. Chinese businesses, investments, markets, and language schools are on the rise in Uzbekistan, and anti-Chinese sentiments have come with it, as locals remain concerned over land disputes, debt dependency, and influence.]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-april-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-april-2025</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2025 12:01:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/06fc5104-e2d5-427a-9884-da064864d781_1080x1080.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png" width="1456" height="246" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:246,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:764384,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/i/163656527?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!p1V5!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F626c5333-53a1-45cc-be63-1161f9eb457f_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2><strong>Managing Sinophobia</strong></h2><p>Tashkent sits in a difficult position. Its economic relationship with Beijing has proven to be critical, while officials must also address domestic concerns over Chinese <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/chinas-expanding-footprint-in-uzbekistan/?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email">influence</a>. Chinese businesses, investments, markets, and language schools are on the rise in Uzbekistan, and anti-Chinese sentiments have come with it, as locals remain concerned over land disputes, debt dependency, and influence.</p><p>These concerns have resurfaced after reports of <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/uzbekistan-farmers-forced-land-transfers-chinese-investment/33392599.html">land transfers</a> in the Fergana Valley. Farmers told RFE/RL&#8217;s Uzbek service that land has been taken by the state and then sold off to Chinese businessmen. Many farmers displayed their frustrations after they felt they were pressured to sell off their land.</p><h2><strong>First EU-Central Asia Summit Beckons Greater Investment Competition</strong></h2><p>On April 3, the first EU-Central Asia Summit kicked off in <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-central-asia-summit-china-global-gateway-belt-road-bri/33369751.html">Samarkand</a>, Uzbekistan, signifying an intent for strong future ties for the European Union and Central Asia. As expected, the event kicked off in grand display, with endless official <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/with-successful-summit-the-eu-and-central-asia-take-tentative-steps-closer/">black Humvees</a> and security, traditional performances, and as many cameras as could fit inside the venue. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reaffirmed that the EU will pledge over <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/04/04/">$10 billion</a> to support infrastructure projects in Central Asia and announced an additional <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-central-asia-china-russia-samarkand/33373713.html">12 billion</a> euros in investments through the EU&#8217;s Global Gateway. The EU&#8217;s commitment is widely viewed as a means to rival China&#8217;s Belt and Road Initiative projects in the region, providing Central Asian states with greater investment options.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-april-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs!</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-april-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-april-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>China Seeking to Increase Position in Central Asian Arms Market</strong></h2><p>Russia has had its hands tied with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, seeing a sharp decline in arms exports in the past three years. Russia&#8217;s occupation efforts have seen China and a few European countries pick up where it left off, as Beijing has sold drones to Kazakhstan in 2024 and anti-aircraft systems to Uzbekistan in early 2025. Now Beijing is looking for its next sale, as it is currently in talks with Tashkent over the procurement of JF-17s, the advanced, all-weather, joint Pakistani-Chinese-made fighter jets. In the past six years, China has been the fourth largest arms exporter in the world, after the U.S., France, and Russia.</p><h2><strong>China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Updates</strong></h2><p>The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway showed off another ceremony in Kyrgyzstan with the construction of a major tunnel in the Jalal-Abad region. The route through southern Kyrgyzstan will be incredibly mountainous, with the Jaman-Davan tunnel proving to be one of the longest and most important in the project. The construction is expected to cover <a href="https://24.kg/ekonomika/327864_j_d_kitay_kyirgyizstan_uzbekistan_48mostov_postroyat_vramkah_proekta/">12.5</a> kilometers and will be one of 27 tunnels in the entire project. The total length of the railway is projected to cover <a href="https://timesca.com/kyrgyzstan-breaks-ground-on-first-tunnel-of-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway/">523</a> kilometers, with 46 bridges needing to be built as well to facilitate the route. Over <a href="https://24.kg/vlast/327765_vkyirgyizstane_nachali_stroit_tonnel_dlya_j_d_kitay_kyirgyizstan_uzbekistan/">half</a> of the railroad will traverse through Kyrgyzstan. The project is estimated to create 20 thousand jobs and is expected to significantly boost regional <a href="https://daryo.uz/en/2025/04/30/construction-of-key-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-facilities-kicks-off-in-kyrgyzstan">connectivity</a>, particularly for the isolated Fergana Valley.</p><p>Some analysts argue that the new railway, which would make Kyrgyzstan the second Central Asian country to connect with China via rail, pits Kyrgyzstan against Kazakhstan, triggering regional transit <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-emerges-as-competitor-to-kazakhstans-rail-network/">competition</a>. However, given the single-track availability of the CKU through the mountains, it significantly limits the number of wagons that trains will be able to manage, and is therefore not viewed as a feasible project to unseat the volume of cargo traffic entering Kazakhstan. It will, however, provide an alternative route into China from Central Asia, potentially making certain shipments shorter and connecting southern Xinjiang (Kashgar) directly to Central Asia for the first time.</p><h2><strong>China-Uzbekistan Visa-Free Regime</strong></h2><p>Uzbekistan&#8217;s Foreign Ministry has confirmed that it will implement a <a href="https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/uzbek-foreign-ministry-visa-free-regime-with-china-to-take-effect-soon/?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email">visa-free regime</a> with China, allowing citizens to travel freely in each other&#8217;s countries for a period of up to 30 days. The agreement was originally signed this past December, and speculation was churning after delays in the agreement&#8217;s implementation.</p><h2><strong>Central Asia&#8217;s Energy Crossroads: A Shift Away from Russia?</strong></h2><p>As Russia&#8217;s gas exports decline, Central Asia faces critical energy decisions. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/the-time-is-now-for-kazakhstan-to-achieve-energy-independence-from-russia/">Kazakhstan</a>, long reliant on Russian transit routes, now has a chance to achieve greater independence. Meanwhile, Gazprom is desperately seeking alternative markets as Europe turns away. Kazakhstan could finally push for the long-discussed Trans-Caspian pipeline, reducing dependence on Russian infrastructure. However, Moscow&#8217;s attempts to supply gas to northern Kazakhstan complicate the equation, making energy diversification a delicate balancing act.</p><p>With Europe cutting imports and Ukraine&#8217;s transit agreement set to expire, <a href="https://vlast.kz/english/64819-gazprom-finds-an-alternative-market-in-central-asia.html">Gazprom</a> is turning to Central Asia. Yet, experts argue the region lacks the profitability of European markets. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan need gas but may leverage Russia&#8217;s weakened position to negotiate better terms. China has further disrupted Gazprom&#8217;s plans by rejecting a proposal to transport additional Russian gas through Kazakhstan&#8217;s pipeline network. Beijing cited infrastructure limitations and instead reaffirmed its preference for the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline via Mongolia. This setback deepens Gazprom&#8217;s financial troubles, as the company struggles with mounting losses and project cancellations. If Kazakhstan moves forward with alternative pipelines and Gazprom fails to dominate the region, a historic shift could occur. Central Asia might emerge as an independent energy hub, further solidifying China&#8217;s <a href="https://eurasianet.org/china-spikes-gazprom-gas-export-plan-in-central-asia">influence</a> in Eurasian energy trade.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: March 2025]]></title><description><![CDATA[Trade and Investment Bolster Chinese Ties to Central Asia]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-march-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-march-2025</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Apr 2025 21:01:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/3af74bab-e439-42fb-b8b7-fb36ab5f98d4_1080x1080.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png" width="1456" height="246" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:246,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:1071585,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/i/160448599?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!IwTe!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1fa2cec7-3876-499b-8b91-f70354b3b0cc_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2><strong>New Rail Routes Launched in Central Asia, Bypassing Russia</strong></h2><p>New <a href="https://eurasianet.org/new-rail-routes-launched-in-central-asia-bypassing-russia">rail routes</a> have been established across Central Asia, providing alternative trade corridors that bypass Russian territory. These developments reflect regional efforts to diversify logistics networks amid the obstacle of Russian sanctions. On March 4, a container <a href="https://railways.kz/ru/news2025/ktzh-i-crct-zapustili-novyj-servis-po-marshrutu-kitaj-evropa/">train</a> left Chengdu, China, destined for Lodz, Poland. The travel time will take 40 days and will pass through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and T&#252;rkiye before connecting to the European rail network. A <a href="https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2025/03/04/kitai-ikazahstan-zapustili-zheleznuyu-dorogu-dlya-perevozok-vevropu-vobhod-rossii-a156982">secondary route</a>, which was approved this past June, will cross the Caspian Sea from Kazakhstan and will traverse through the Caucasus and T&#252;rkiye.</p><h2><strong>Gold Plot Auction Highlights Chinese Investments in Uzbekistan</strong></h2><p>Uzbekistan&#8217;s <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/03/gold-plot-auction-heightens-focus-on-chinese-investments-in-uzbekistan/?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email">gold plot</a> auction has reignited debates around the growing influence of Chinese investments in its resource sector. Critics argue that these investments, despite bringing much-needed capital and technology, also raise stark concerns over resource sovereignty and transparency. The government insists that foreign investment is crucial for economic modernization, but public skepticism persists, fueled by perceptions of unequal benefits in these partnerships.</p><p>Uzbekistan&#8217;s Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company is the fourth largest in the world, and accounted for over <a href="https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/03/27/the-surging-gold-price-is-boosting-central-asias-economies">15%</a> of Uzbek state revenue as of 2023. The state-owned company is planning an initial public offering in the London Stock Exchange as a means to attract foreign investment.</p><h2><strong>Criticism of Chinese Economic Practices Surges in Uzbekistan</strong></h2><p>Anti-Chinese sentiment is on the rise in Uzbekistan, particularly through social media channels after reports surfaced indicating that Chinese individuals and entities are <a href="https://eurasianet.org/social-networks-in-uzbekistan-buzzing-with-criticism-of-chinese-economic-practices">buying up</a> properties in Uzbek cities. China is Uzbekistan&#8217;s largest trading partner, with total turnover reaching <a href="https://eurasianet.org/china-enhances-position-as-central-asias-economic-overlord">$13.8 billion</a> last year and $11.8 billion of that figure making up Chinese imports. With an increasing presence in many of Uzbekistan&#8217;s industries, including auto, gold, and agriculture, many citizens are concerned of China&#8217;s increasing presence in the double-landlocked country.</p><h2><strong>New Border Warehouse to Boost Kyrgyz Agricultural Exports to China</strong></h2><p>Kyrgyzstan has launched a new border <a href="https://timesca.com/new-border-warehouse-to-boost-kyrgyz-agricultural-exports-to-china/">warehouse</a> to enhance agricultural exports to China, improving logistics and market access for farmers. The facility is expected to streamline storage and customs processes, addressing inefficiencies that previously hampered cross-border trade. The warehouse is located in western Kyrgyzstan, in the city of Ulugqat, near the Xinjiang border, and will serve as a hub for shipments passing through the border checkpoints of Irkeshtam and Torugart.</p><h2><strong>Kazakhstan and China Strengthen Water Cooperation</strong></h2><p>In a committee <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2025/03/kazakhstan-china-enhance-cooperation-in-water-resources/">meeting</a> on March 19, Kazakhstan and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on managing shared <a href="https://qazinform.com/news/kazakhstan-china-strengthen-cooperation-in-water-sector-68d559">water</a> resources, putting emphasis on transboundary river systems. The <a href="https://centralasiaclimateportal.org/for-the-first-time-water-authorities-of-kazakhstan-and-china-signed-a-memorandum-of-understanding-and-cooperation-in-the-field-of-water-resources/#:~:text=The%20Ministry%20of%20Water%20Resources,Resources%20for%20the%20first%20time.">agreement</a> aims to improve water allocation, prevent ecological conflicts, and address rising concerns over resource scarcity.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-march-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs!</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-march-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-march-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>China Adapts to Tajikistan&#8217;s Security Demands</strong></h2><p>Tajikistan is increasingly turning to China for <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/03/how-china-is-adapting-to-tajikistans-demand-for-security-cooperation?lang=en">military</a> support. Despite Tajikistan&#8217;s impoverishment, this is not a one-sided partnership. With Chinese support to silence Pamiri dissent in Gorno-Badakhshan and mitigate security threats emanating from <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-approves-chinese-base/31532078.html">Afghanistan</a>, Tajikistan is able to establish regime stability and act as a buffer between Afghanistan and China to deter instability.</p><h2><strong>Central Asia&#8217;s Critical Minerals Draw Global Interest</strong></h2><p>The global race for critical minerals has intensified, with Central Asia becoming a key battleground. The U.S., EU and China are vying for access to the region&#8217;s rich <a href="https://eurasianet.org/wrestlemania-central-asian-style-great-powers-battle-for-regions-critical-minerals">deposits</a>, each pursuing distinct strategies to secure supply chains. While the U.S. and the EU have displayed interests, and even with France signing a <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2025/03/13/brgm-uzb/">$5 million</a> mineral deal during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev&#8217;s visit on March 11, they both remain years <a href="https://eurasianet.org/us-and-eu-drumbeat-for-central-asias-critical-minerals-grows-louder">behind</a> Chinese involvement. China has established control of nearly all leases for rare earth mining in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and is heavily involved in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as well.</p><h2><strong>Turkmenistan&#8217;s Push for Greater Regional Engagement</strong></h2><p>Turkmenistan is moving away from isolationism &#8212; at least when it comes to gas. Recent <a href="https://eurasianet.org/turkmenistan-is-trying-to-come-out-of-its-shell">gas deals</a> with Iran and T&#252;rkiye will see Ankara supplied with 1.3 billion cubic meters of gas by the end of this year. Additionally, Kazakhstan&#8217;s state-run QazaqGaz will <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/2025-02-21/zhnb-qazaqgazgazpipeplans/?utm_source=in_materials">expand</a> a pipeline connecting it with Turkmenistan, which would see an expected doubling of Turkmen gas headed to Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan&#8217;s diversification efforts would see it lower its reliance on gas exports to China. Currently Turkmenistan sees around <a href="https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/petroleum-gas/reporter/tkm">90%</a> of its gas headed through the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asia%E2%80%93China_gas_pipeline">China-Central Asia pipeline</a>, an industry that was dominated by Russia prior to the pipeline&#8217;s construction in 2009.</p><h2><strong>Declining Caspian Water Levels Threaten Key Transport Corridors</strong></h2><p>Falling water levels in the Caspian Sea pose a serious threat to critical trade routes connecting Central Asia, Russia and China. Experts warn that declining levels could disrupt shipping lanes and harm regional trade, as cargo capacity has decreased by over <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/declining-caspian-water-levels-threaten-russian-and-chinese-corridor-plans/">20%</a> in the Caspian in the past year. Falling water levels can also impact shore lines and ports, possibly requiring new deep-sea ports or downsizing cargo ships</p><h2><strong>$400 Million Cotton Cluster Investment in Southern Kazakhstan</strong></h2><p>The Chinese company Xinjiang Lihua Group announced plans to <a href="https://timesca.com/chinese-investor-to-launch-400-million-cotton-cluster-in-southern-kazakhstan/">invest</a> in a $400 million cotton-textile cluster in Kazakhstan&#8217;s Turkestan region, aimed at modernizing the textile sector. The project includes advanced processing facilities and supply chain upgrades to boost production efficiency.</p><h2><strong>New Investment in Uzbek Hydropower Plant</strong></h2><p>The Bank of China is planning to <a href="https://tashkenttimes.uz/national/14914-bank-of-china-will-finance-the-mulalak-hydroelectric-power-plant-project-uzbekhydroenergo">finance</a> the construction of the Mulalak Hydropower Plant on Pskom River in northeastern Uzbekistan. The project, overseen by Uzbekhydroenergo, has undergone evaluations and received government approval, allowing implementation to begin. The contractor for the project is expected to be Chinese, as stipulated in agreements between Uzbekistan&#8217;s Ministry of Finance and the Chinese government.</p><p>The Mulalak Hydropower Plant is part of Uzbekistan&#8217;s strategy to enhance energy security and boost <a href="https://kun.uz/en/news/2025/03/29/china-to-finance-mulalak-hydropower-plant-construction-in-uzbekistan?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email">renewable</a> energy sources. The funding process follows strict feasibility studies to ensure technical and economic viability before government approval. Similar projects, such as the Pskom and Chatkal hydropower plants, have successfully passed expert reviews and received presidential endorsement. The investment payback period has been considered, though specific financial details remain undisclosed. Once final agreements are signed, a tender will be announced for the project&#8217;s execution.</p><h2><strong>Kazakh Business Leaders Look to China for EV Market Growth</strong></h2><p>Kazakh tycoon <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenes_Rakishev">Kenges Rakishev</a>, chairman of the Fincraft Group, is pivoting from oil and gas to cleantech, focusing on <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/3301654/why-tycoon-kazakhstan-wants-partner-china-ride-overwhelming-ev-wave">electric vehicles</a> (EVs), batteries, and solar panels. Recognizing China's dominance in the EV sector, Rakishev sees Kazakhstan as a natural partner for China due to its mineral abundance in nickel, cobalt, and lithium. His company, Kaznickel, already supplies these minerals to Chinese businesses, and he aims to strengthen ties further. Rakishev believes China's early investments in securing mineral supplies and its advancements in EV technology give it a significant edge over Western competitors. Kazakhstan's strategic location and mineral wealth position it as a key player in the global EV supply chain. With 80% of Chinese goods to the EU passing through Kazakhstan, Rakishev sees an opportunity for the country to serve as a hub for Chinese EV manufacturing.</p><h2><strong>New Coffee Processing Plant Coming to Kazakhstan</strong></h2><p>The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is providing a <a href="https://www.ebrd.com/home/news-and-events/news/2025/ebrd-supports-operations-of-empire-manufacturing-kazakhstan.html#">loan</a> of around $10 million to Empire Manufacturing Kazakhstan (EMK) to build a <a href="https://www.foodbusinessafrica.com/food-empire-expands-in-central-asia-with-us30m-coffee-factory-in-kazakhstan/#:~:text=KAZAKHSTAN%20%E2%80%93%20Singapore%2Dlisted%20Food%20Empire,supply%20capabilities%20in%20the%20region.">$30</a> million modernized coffee processing plant in the Khorgos Free Economic Zone on the Chinese border. Once operational, the plant will export around <a href="https://timesca.com/ebrd-finances-coffee-processing-plant-at-kazakh-chinese-border/">50%</a> of its coffee products to markets in Central Asia and the Caucasus. EMK is a subsidiary of Food Empire Holdings, a multinational corporation listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: February 2025]]></title><description><![CDATA[Delays, Uncertainty, and Hesitation Challenge Regional Ambitions]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-february-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-february-2025</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2025 13:03:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/d21aec5c-32a2-401a-b769-640e2d16632f_1080x1080.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png" width="1456" height="246" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:246,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:951535,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/png&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/i/158396209?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!Szqz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb3b10ae6-4086-49b9-aae0-b3aafa037af8_1920x325.png 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div></div></div></a></figure></div><h2><strong>Kyrgyzstan Introduces Sovereign Bond</strong></h2><p>China is Kyrgyzstan&#8217;s largest creditor, amounting to over 35% of the small Central Asian country&#8217;s foreign debt, primarily through investments from China&#8217;s Ex-Im Bank. In efforts to diversify its financial partnerships and lessen its debt to China, Kyrgyzstan is issuing ten-year sovereign <a href="https://www.azernews.az/region/236764.html#:~:text=Kyrgyzstan%20plans%20to%20issue%20sovereign,bonds%20is%20about%2010%20years.">bonds</a> in Hong Kong to raise $1.7 billion. The specific bond <a href="https://timesca.com/kyrgyzstan-raises-first-sovereign-bond-to-mitigate-chinas-growing-influence/">yield</a> remains undisclosed, but analysts expect the rate to be set relatively high. The influx of cash could create risks and spur inflation, leaving potential investors wary.</p><h2><strong>Chinese EVs Surge in Central Asia</strong></h2><p>Followed by the rapid development of the Chinese EV market, Central Asia is now seeing a surge in Chinese EV imports. Central Asian governments are providing tax breaks for consumers and setting up localized production, as was seen with BYD&#8217;s new <a href="https://vlast.kz/english/61607-chinese-electric-car-production-kicks-off-in-uzbekistan.html">factory</a> in Uzbekistan this past June. For the very first time, Uzbekistan saw the <a href="https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2025/01/10/e-cars/">import</a> of hybrids and EVs overtake traditional gasoline vehicles in 2024, marking a relatively surprising development in the Central Asian automobile space.</p><p>Since independence, Central Asia has prioritized importing <a href="https://thecityfix.com/blog/secondhand-vehicles-in-developing-countries/">second-hand</a> vehicles from the U.S. or Europe, which serve as a quick and cheap way to transport its citizens. However, these second-hand vehicles often did not meet the fuel economy, exhaust emissions and safety <a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/01/used-car-exports-to-africa-development-opportunity-davos-2023/">standards</a> of the countries they were exported from, as they ended up being significant contributors to Central Asia&#8217;s air quality struggles.</p><p>Despite the recent influx of EVs, these vehicles remain largely unaffordable to most Central Asians. The cost of repairs, maintenance and electricity for EVs is much cheaper than that of second-hand cars, but the upfront cost of a new Chinese EV in Central Asia poses a barrier for most drivers. However, government-imposed tax breaks and subsidies can help that. With more EVs coming into the region, and projects such as a new EV <a href="https://www.akchabar.kg/ru/news/prezident-dal-start-stroitelstvu-zavoda-po-vipusku-avtomobilej-xjqqehkeggrhjusa">production plant</a> in Bishkek, the construction of EV <a href="https://ru.globalvoices.org/2024/09/23/122878/">charging stations</a> throughout Uzbekistan, and the BYD production facility in Jizzaq, Central Asia is seeing more than just a rise in Chinese EV imports, but an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/shifting-gears-chinas-advanced-ev-hegemony-in-central-asia/">invested commitment</a> to cleaner and more technologically advanced vehicles for the future.</p><h2><strong>Direct Rail Shipment Launched From China to Afghanistan via Central Asia</strong></h2><p>On Feb. 10, a Chinese freight train departed Chongqing&#8217;s Tuanjiecun station for Hairatan, Afghanistan. This marked the first <a href="https://russian.news.cn/20250210/2cc43686de004b7f9e0466e4911e1d2b/c.html">direct rail</a> route between Chongqing and Afghanistan. The train passed through the Khorgos checkpoint on the Kazakh-Xinjiang border and then headed through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan before reaching Afghanistan. The route takes approximately 12-15 days, and saves around 20% of the time and cost compared to road transportation. The shipment was primarily transporting <a href="https://timesca.com/new-freight-train-route-links-china-to-afghanistan-via-central-asia/">telecommunications</a> equipment from Chinese tech company, ZTE, which was sent to support the development of Afghanistan&#8217;s telecommunication infrastructure.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-february-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thanks for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs.</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-february-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-february-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>Chinese Investing in Kazakh Metallurgy Production</strong></h2><p>On Feb. 17, China's East Hope Group (EHG), announced plans to <a href="https://timesca.com/chinese-company-to-invest-over-12-billion-in-kazakhstans-non-ferrous-metals-sector/?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email">invest</a> over $12 billion in Kazakhstan's non-ferrous metals sector. The project involves constructing a large industrial park focusing on deep metal processing and manufacturing finished goods for export to the European Union, Central Asia, and China. The project is expected to create up to 10,000 <a href="https://minexforum.com/2025/02/21/east-hope-group-to-build-major-industrial-park-in-kazakhstan-investing-over-12-billion/#:~:text=Chinese%20conglomerate%20East%20Hope%20Group,%2C%20Central%20Asia%2C%20and%20China.">jobs</a>. EHG has established a subsidiary in Kazakhstan and completed preliminary studies of potential sites across several regions. The company plans to commence detailed site assessments soon. Kazakh Invest, represented by Chairman Yerzhan Yelekeyev, has pledged comprehensive government support for the project, emphasizing its significance for Kazakhstan's industrial sector.</p><h2><strong>Kazakhstan Seeks Funding for Almaty Metro Expansion</strong></h2><p>On Feb. 18, Almaty Mayor Yerbolat Dossayev held talks with Wang Chunying, President of China&#8217;s Exim Bank, to secure funding for the expansion of Almaty's <a href="https://el.kz/en/almaty-akimat-and-china-exim-bank-discuss-funding-for-metro-expansion_400013670/">metro</a> system. The project, estimated at approximately <a href="https://en.trend.az/business/4007113.html">$1 billion</a>, aims to enhance the city's public transportation infrastructure. The proposed metro <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2025-02-18/engk-nknk-kazakhstan-seeks-funding-for-almaty-metro-expansion-in-china/">expansion</a> includes extending the existing line to the Barlyk market and constructing a new line connecting the subway to the airport. This development is expected to alleviate traffic congestion and improve urban mobility in Almaty.</p><h2><strong>Chinese Company Launches Digital Substation in Uzbekistan</strong></h2><p>On Feb. 21, Shanghai Electric commissioned Uzbekistan's first <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/power-digitalization-uzbekistans-first-digital-substation-successfully-completed-302381428.html">digital substation</a>, Zafarabad 220kV Digital Substation in Jizzakh. Occupying approximately 75,000 square meters, the substation aims to enhance the power supply in the <a href="https://www.adb.org/projects/47296-001/main">Jizzakh Region</a> and surrounding areas. With a capacity of 400 megawatts, it is expected to double the electricity supply to households and businesses, addressing heating issues previously caused by shortages of natural gas and electricity.</p><p>The substation is equipped with two 250 MW autotransformers, reducing network voltage from 220 kV to 110 kV for efficient load distribution. Its fully automated control system and advanced monitoring capabilities enhance operational efficiency and safety by quickly identifying faults and adjusting network loads to prevent power disruptions. Initiated in <a href="https://www.shanghai-electric.com/group_en/c/2024-11-26/578622.shtml">2021</a>, the project was financed by the <a href="https://www.adb.org/projects/47296-001/main">Asian Development Bank</a>, with Shanghai Electric winning the turnkey construction contract through a tender process.</p><h2><strong>Longest Bridge in Central Asia Coming to Tajikistan</strong></h2><p>On Feb. 22, Tajikistan's Ministry of Transport signed an <a href="https://www.mintrans.tj/news-page/details/736">agreement</a> with China's Zhejiang Communications Construction Group Co. Ltd to construct Central Asia's longest road bridge. The bridge, spanning <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202502/1329232.shtml">920</a> meters over the Surkhob River in the Nurobod District, will extend to a total length of 1,500 meters when including access roads. The project, valued at approximately 427.5 million yuan (around $60 million), is scheduled for completion within <a href="https://en.inform.kz/news/central-asias-longest-road-bridge-to-be-built-in-tajikistan-34aeb8/">four years</a>.</p><p>This initiative is part of the third phase of the <a href="https://en.fergana.news/news/136784/">Obigarm&#8211;Nurobod highway</a> construction, aiming to enhance Tajikistan's transportation infrastructure and bolster its role as a regional transit hub. The feasibility study involved collaboration between local engineers and South Korean experts.</p><p>Zhejiang Communications Construction Group Co. Ltd, a state-owned Chinese corporation, specializes in designing and building transportation infrastructure, including ports, highways, and bridges. The company operates in 139 countries and has been involved in major projects such as the 36-kilometer Hangzhou Bay Bridge, the world's longest transoceanic bridge.</p><h2><strong>Kazakhstan Selects Site for Nuclear Power Station</strong></h2><p>On Feb. 25, the Kazakh government officially designated the <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-selects-site-for-its-first-nuclear-power-station">Zhambyl district</a> in the Almaty region as the site for the country's first nuclear power plant (NPP). This decision follows a nationwide referendum held on October 6, where <a href="https://www.kt.kz/eng/government/kazakhstan_selects_site_for_its_first_nuclear_power_plant_1377974738.html">71.12%</a> of voters supported the construction of the NPP, with a voter turnout of 63.66%.</p><p>Four companies have been <a href="https://azertag.az/en/xeber/kazakhstan_selects_site_for_its_first_nuclear_power_plant-3434351">shortlisted</a> as potential technology suppliers for the NPP's construction: China's CNNC, South Korea's ICHNP, Russia's Rosatom, and France's EDF. The project aims to address Kazakhstan's growing energy needs and reduce reliance on coal-fired power plants, which currently account for approximately 70% of the country's electricity production.</p><h2><strong>China Engaging in Trans-Afghan Projects</strong></h2><p>On Feb. 24, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) held <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2025-02-26/engk-nknk-china-to-engage-in-trans-afghan-transport-corridor-project/">discussions</a> in Beijing to explore collaboration on the Trans-Afghan Transport Corridor. This initiative aims to enhance connectivity between Central and South Asia by developing key railway routes, including Termez&#8211;Mazar-i-Sharif&#8211;Kabul&#8211;Peshawar and Herat&#8211;Kandahar&#8211;Spin Boldak. Kazakhstan has committed to supplying essential materials for these projects, such as crossties and clamps.</p><p>Additionally, Afghan Acting Minister of Public Works Mohammad Esa Sani met with Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Zhao Xing to discuss the <a href="https://thekabultimes.com/afghanistan-china-discuss-wakhan-corridor-trans-afghan-railway-projects/">Wakhan Corridor</a> and Trans-Afghan Railway projects. The Wakhan Corridor, situated in northeastern Afghanistan, serves as a direct link between Afghanistan and China's Xinjiang region. It is an extremely mountainous region and very difficult terrain to construct infrastructure projects. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/01/wakhan-corridor-highway-afghanistan-china/">Roads</a> are being built, but it remains a slow process.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: January 2025]]></title><description><![CDATA[Delays, Uncertainty, and Hesitation Challenge Regional Ambitions]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-january-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-january-2025</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2025 17:04:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/63cd2f64-2e59-4f31-9d1a-6616cc11f5e5_1080x1080.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>It&#8217;s 2025. Don&#8217;t Wait Up for TAPI</strong></h2><p>As years goes by, Turkmenistan continues to search for ways to diversify its gas exports. The vast majority of Turkmen gas exports are destined for China through the <a href="https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/CentralAsia/CentralAsia_index.shtml">China-Central Asia</a> pipeline. Turkmenistan has pushed for the ambitious Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline for decades, and yet, it seems as if there is never enough progress in negotiations to remain optimistic. Security risks, a lack of political cooperation, and the mammoth price tag (approximately $8 billion) keep investors hesitant from committing to the project. If constructed, the project would see the assembly of an 1,800 km pipeline, connecting Turkmenistan&#8217;s <a href="https://galkynysh-gasfield.com/home-en.html">Galkynysh gas field</a> with Fazilka in eastern India. In the most recent <a href="https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13836-the-first-phase-of-the-tapi-gas-pipeline-from-serhetabat-turkmenistan-to-herat-afghanistan.html">meeting</a> this past September, TAPI announced the inauguration of the first section of construction from Serhatabat, Turkmenistan to Herat, Afghanistan. However, representatives from India and Pakistan were absent from the inauguration ceremony, opting instead to wait for tangible progress before formally committing.</p><h2><strong>A New Infectious Disease From China Arises, Doctors Downplay Concerns</strong></h2><p>Human metapneumovirus (HMPV), a common respiratory virus, has spread around Asia from China, into India, Malaysia and Kazakhstan. In mid-December, <a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-human-metapneumovirus-and-why-are-cases-rising-in-china/">health agencies</a> in China reported a spike in respiratory infections. Despite the recent surge, health experts note that HMPV has been around for over 60 years. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokaev downplayed concerns after two children under 14 were <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/2025-01-06/zhrb-meta-virus-kz/">diagnosed</a> with HMPV in western Kazakhstan at the beginning of January. By mid-January, China <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/despite-international-concerns-doctors-say-china-flu-like-virus-is-no-covid-19/7936751.html">reported</a> that infection rates of HMPV had already declined, however international health experts are calling for more transparency from China.</p><h2><strong>Despite Inauguration, CKU Already Delayed</strong></h2><p>The long-awaited China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project was finally inaugurated and the <a href="https://en.inform.kz/news/investment-agreement-signed-for-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-project-037f5b/">investment agreement</a> was signed last year. Once completed, the railroad will <a href="https://eurasianet.org/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-officially-launched-but-sidetracked-at-least-until-summer">connect</a> Kashgar in Xinjiang to Andijan in eastern Uzbekistan through Kyrgyzstan. This will be the first westward railroad from China outside of Kazakhstan, showing a significant interest from the Chinese to diversify potential trading routes, particularly after Western sanctions disrupted Chinese trade through <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/12/trade-corridor-wars-china-russia-iran-west/">Russia</a>. Despite getting the go-ahead, construction has now been delayed until <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202412/27/content_WS676eabb1c6d0868f4e8ee51f.html">July</a> and is slated to last for approximately six years.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-january-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs!</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-january-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-january-2025?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>AIIB Investing in Tajik Hydro</strong></h2><p>The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has <a href="https://www.aiib.org/en/news-events/news/2025/aiib-supports-clean-renewable-energy-development-in-tajikistan-and-central-asia.html">approved</a> financing of $500 million, starting with a $270 million loan, to fund the Rogun Hydropower Plant in Tajikistan. On January 6, AIIB officially announced the funding plan, following the project&#8217;s approval in December, and will help develop the 3,780 MW plant on the <a href="https://timesca.com/aiib-commits-500-million-to-tajikistans-rogun-hydropower-project/">Vakhsh River</a>. The plant will feature a 335-meter dam and a 170-square-kilometer reservoir. The project aims to alleviate Tajikistan&#8217;s winter power shortages by improving electricity access to around <a href="https://www.theasset.com/article/53224/aiib-approves-us-270-million-loan-for-tajikistan-hydro">10 million</a> people. As Central Asia&#8217;s energy demand is set to triple by 2050, the project is expected to enhance regional energy security and decarbonize power grids. Tajikistan, despite ranking eighth in global hydropower potential, currently utilizes only 4% of its capacity.</p><h2><strong>Gwadar Struggling to Gain Traction</strong></h2><p>Gwadar Port, the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-struggles-to-bring-trade-to-china-built-port/7932597.html">$250 million</a> Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, is struggling to attract commercial activity. The <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-gwadar-port-shows-chinas-belt-and-road-can-fail/a-68992914">deep-sea</a> port was constructed in 2007 and integrated into a special economic zone (SEZ) with the aim of turning Gwadar into a major coastal trading hub. As a key node in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Gwadar was built as a means to bypass both the Malacca Strait and India to reach Europe. However, Gwadar, situated in Pakistan&#8217;s desolate Balochistan province, has faced disruptive <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/pakistans-port-city-gwadar-in-chaos/">protests</a> and threats of <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-struggles-to-bring-trade-to-china-built-port/7932597.html">insurgency</a> ever since its unveiling. Balochistan faces chronic <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/balochistan-pakistan-information-black-hole">underfunding</a>, as Gwadar residents have long been <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1649437">deprived</a> of proper drinking water, health, and education facilities, paving the way for retaliation. Balochis have displayed their <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1649437">frustration</a>, arguing that the Gwadar port provides minimal opportunities or direct economic development for locals. Consistent attacks on Chinese workers and project sites in Balochistan have raised concerns over the viability for investment, threatening Gwadar&#8217;s future.</p><h2><strong>Distancing From Russia?</strong></h2><p>Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a decree to order the development of alternative transport routes. Uzbek exports intend to avoid &#8220;<a href="https://www.spot.uz/ru/2025/01/13/trucking-industry/">problem countries</a>,&#8221; described as countries in which transportation is experiencing difficulties, or in other words, sanctions. In order to improve trade efficiency, the decree notes that Uzbekistan must reduce its <a href="https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-unveils-plan-to-upgrade-middle-corridor-trade">dependency</a> on Russia as a logistical trade route. The Uzbek Ministry of Transport aims to improve the country&#8217;s position in the Logistics Performance Index from 88 to 55 by 2030.</p><h2><strong>Russia&#8217;s Evolving Relationship with Central Asia</strong></h2><p>Analysts suggest that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has significantly <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/beyond-western-narratives-unpacking-russias-strategic-role-in-central-asia/">altered</a> Eurasian geopolitics, impacting Moscow's standing in Central Asia. Central Asian nations have maintained a neutral stance on the war, refraining from supporting Russia's actions. This neutrality is interpreted as a cautious distancing from Moscow's policies and reflects a decline in trust among Central Asian states. In response to Russia's preoccupation with Ukraine, these nations are actively seeking stronger relationships with other global powers such as China, T&#252;rkiye, and the West. The shift in alliances is perceived to diminish Moscow's traditional role as the dominant power in the region, leading to a potential realignment of geopolitical influences. China was particularly active in 2024 with big <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/01/22/power-shifts-and-progress-in-central-asia/">investments</a> along the middle corridor in Afghanistan, the CKU railroad, and in Georgia&#8217;s deep sea port in Anaklia. China also continued as the region&#8217;s largest trading partner, seeing almost <a href="https://eurasianet.org/china-enhances-position-as-central-asias-economic-overlord">$95 billion</a> of goods exported to Central Asia.</p><p>This, however, does not indicate that Russia is no longer a significant player in the region. Trade between Central Asian states and Russia has <a href="https://tass.com/economy/1790685">increased</a> considerably since the start of the war, with Central Asian countries often positioning themselves as re-export hubs for Russia to bypass sanctions. However, from a cultural standpoint, an increasing number of Central Asian students are now opting to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/what-happens-to-central-asian-youth-after-following-chinas-educational-silk-road/">study</a> in China, while simultaneously Russia has seen a decline in popularity in the Russian language and culture in the region. Central Asian states are exhibiting greater autonomy, however, their dependence on Russia and China continues to influence local decision-making.</p><h2><strong>Chinese Drones Coming to Kazakhstan</strong></h2><p>Yesil Technology Company, a subsidiary of China's Shaanxi Kaizhuo Electronic Technology Company plans to establish a $12 million industrial <a href="https://timesca.com/chinese-company-to-manufacture-drones-in-kazakhstan/">drone</a> production facility in Almaty. Construction is set to commence in March 2025, encompassing a 50,000-square-meter area dedicated to manufacturing, research, and testing. This initiative aims to create <a href="https://invest.gov.kz/ru/media-center/press-releases/high-tech-drones-to-be-produced-in-kazakhstan/">500</a> new jobs and will focus on integrating advanced UAV technologies across various sectors, including agriculture, environmental protection, and emergency rescue operations.</p><p>In a parallel development, Kazakh Invest has signed a memorandum of understanding with China's Polyking New Horizons Technology Industry Co., Ltd. to establish an industrial park in Kazakhstan. This <a href="https://timesca.com/chinese-company-to-develop-low-altitude-technologies-and-intelligent-manufacturing-in-kazakhstan/">$200</a> million project will integrate drone technologies, smart city solutions, and advanced manufacturing systems, with an expectation to create 1,000 new jobs. These collaborations underscore Kazakhstan's commitment to becoming a regional leader in high-tech industries and capitalizing on the burgeoning global market for low-altitude technologies and intelligent manufacturing.</p><h2><strong>Winter Is Here, and so Is the Air Pollution</strong></h2><p>This Winter, Bishkek has experienced insufferable levels of smog, ranking <a href="https://kaktus.media/doc/515194_bishkek_zanimaet_trete_mesto_v_mire_po_yrovnu_zagriazneniia_vozdyha.html">third-worst</a> in the world in December, after Hanoi and Delhi. In an attempt to provide a long-term solution, Bishkek city hall decided to remove its <a href="https://vlast.kz/english/63675-the-end-of-the-line-for-bishkek-trolleybus-fleet.html">trolleybus network</a>, replacing it with Chinese Ankai battery-electric buses. Bishkek&#8217;s mayor claimed the trolleybuses were unprofitable, ugly, and lacked flexibility. The decision was widely unpopular, seeing opposition party leaders arrested before municipal elections, and the leader of the Social Democrats, Temirlan Sultanbekov going on <a href="https://rus.azattyk.org/a/dney-golodovki-delo-temirlana-sultanbekova-i-istoriya-ego-aresta/33272808.html">hunger strike</a> for over two months. Activists claim China&#8217;s Ankai buses will provide little to no benefit for the city compared to the trolleybuses.</p><p>Transportation in Bishkek is the second highest contributor of <a href="https://24.kg/english/318446_Bishkek_tests_Chinese_catalytic_converters_to_combat_air_pollution/">emissions</a> after residential heating. However, a new experiment developed by China&#8217;s QIngdao State University may help. The Chinese university will test out <a href="https://timesca.com/bishkek-tests-chinese-catalytic-converters-in-effort-to-reduce-air-pollution/">catalytic converters</a> as a means to reduce vehicle emissions. The devices will convert hazardous compounds into less hazardous ones. Only around 15% of vehicles in Bishkek currently use catalytic converters; with the success of this experiment and proper implementation, Bishkek could see this as a potential short-term solution to its smog problem.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: December 2024]]></title><description><![CDATA[On Dec. 1, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi chaired the fifth China-Central Asia foreign ministers&#8217; meeting in Chengdu.]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-december-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-december-2024</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 03 Jan 2025 13:01:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/da13a01d-4697-41b1-ba37-dbe13fe81728_7008x4672.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>China-Central Asia Foreign Ministers Convene in Chengdu</strong></h2><p>On Dec. 1, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi chaired the fifth China-Central Asia foreign ministers&#8217; <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202412/t20241203_11537458.html">meeting</a> in Chengdu. The meeting highlights Chinese relations and its heightened presence in Central Asia. Since Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China has sought alternative trade routes <a href="https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3265200/how-trans-caspian-middle-corridor-can-help-revive-asia-europe-trade?module=inline&amp;pgtype=article">outside</a> of Russia to avoid European sanctions. Resultantly, around <a href="https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3290117/why-china-taking-more-responsibility-central-asia">80%</a> of cargo from China heading to Europe passes through Kazakhstan.</p><p>Additionally, anti-Chinese sentiments throughout Central Asia are persistent, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, due to China&#8217;s growing influence in the region and the treatment of Central Asia&#8217;s Turkic kinship in Xinjiang. Chinese private security companies provide oversight for Chinese infrastructure projects and investments in the region, and will be present throughout the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway. As Chinese engagement with Central Asia continues to expand, more meetings and dialogue platforms will persist.</p><h2><strong>Xinjiang Strengthens Regional Ties Amid U.S. Sanctions</strong></h2><p>China's Xinjiang region is enhancing ties with Pakistan and Central Asia to counter U.S. sanctions. The U.S. Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which <a href="https://timesca.com/amid-sanctions-chinas-xinjiang-strengthens-ties-with-central-asia/">bans</a> imports linked to alleged forced labor in Xinjiang, has also been adopted through similar measures in Canada, the UK, and the EU. This sanctions regime has driven Beijing to deepen Xinjiang&#8217;s regional cooperation to mitigate economic and geopolitical pressures.</p><p><a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3289009/chinas-xinjiang-eyes-closer-ties-pakistan-and-central-asia-offset-us-sanctions?module=perpetual_scroll_0&amp;pgtype=article">Khunjerab</a> Port, Xinjiang's sole border crossing with Pakistan, recently transitioned to year-round operations. From April to October, the port saw over 11,000 vehicles and 40,900 tons of goods cross. Pakistan, a long-standing ally of Beijing, plays a pivotal role in China's regional strategy, particularly as it continues to develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CPEC&#8217;s progress faces challenges, particularly terrorism. In October, a <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-karachi-explosion-bla-chinese-killed-38cddd2b80b066b1194872dc45e954e1">suicide bombing</a> in Karachi killed two Chinese nationals, with the separatist Balochistan Liberation Army claiming responsibility. This has led to joint counterterrorism drills by Chinese private security companies and Pakistani forces.</p><p>Xinjiang's Chairman, Erkin Tuniyaz, recently led a meeting with officials from Kazakhstan&#8217;s Zhetysu region, where they signed agreements on cross-border tourism and discussed trade, infrastructure, security, and agriculture. Xinjiang&#8217;s Khorgos port also hosts a cross-border cooperation center that facilitates duty-free trade and business exchanges, allowing <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-karachi-explosion-bla-chinese-killed-38cddd2b80b066b1194872dc45e954e1">purchases</a> up to $1,104 per day.</p><p>Trade between Xinjiang and Central Asia reached 283.67 billion yuan in 2023, a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3289009/chinas-xinjiang-eyes-closer-ties-pakistan-and-central-asia-offset-us-sanctions?module=perpetual_scroll_0&amp;pgtype=article">50%</a> increase over the previous year. Despite this growth, experts warn that trade may expand cautiously due to potential secondary sanctions from the West.</p><h2>Trail Lithium Transport</h2><p>On Dec. 5, China and Kazakhstan&#8217;s Department of Transportation Heads agreed to begin a trial transport voyage for <a href="https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/transport/press/news/details/897440?lang=ru">lithium-ion</a> batteries along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) in December. It is unclear why this trial shipment has begun, however, it is theorized the lithium could be supplied for <a href="https://vlast.kz/english/61607-chinese-electric-car-production-kicks-off-in-uzbekistan.html">BYD&#8217;s</a> new factory in Jizzaq, Uzbekistan, which began production this past July.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-december-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs!</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-december-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-december-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>Russia Divests Uranium Assets in Kazakhstan to Chinese Firms</strong></h2><p>Russia's state nuclear corporation, <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-uranium-stake-kazakhstan-china/33243378.html">Rosatom</a>, is divesting its stakes in significant Kazakh uranium deposits to Chinese entities. Uranium One Group, a Rosatom subsidiary, has sold its <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-sells-out-of-vast-kazakh-uranium-deposits-to-china-/7904119.html">49.979%</a> stake in the Zarechnoye mine to Astana Mining Company Limited, ultimately controlled by China's State Nuclear Uranium Resources Development Company. Additionally, Uranium One is expected to relinquish its <a href="https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2024/12/18/china-replaces-russia-in-kazakh-uranium-mines/">30%</a> stake in the Khorasan-U joint venture to China Uranium Development Company Limited, linked to China General Nuclear Power Corporation. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-sells-out-vast-kazakh-uranium-deposits-china-2024-12-17/">Kazatomprom</a>, Kazakhstan's state-controlled nuclear resources company, will maintain its existing stakes in these projects.</p><p>The Zarechnoye mine holds approximately 3,500 tons of uranium reserves, while the Khorasan-U deposit contains about 33,000 tons, with an expected operational lifespan until 2038. In 2023, Uranium One produced 4,831 tons of uranium in Kazakhstan. Kazatomprom remains the world's largest uranium producer, accounting for roughly 20% of global primary uranium production. After the sale, Rosatom will still control combined reserves of 255,000 tons of Kazatomprom deposits.</p><h2><strong>Diversifying Trade, Mitigating Risk</strong></h2><p>When managing the future of trade routes, it remains a fine balance between cost and risk mitigation. The development of the Middle Corridor, officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Route (TITR), has seen the volume of cargo transport increase <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2024/08/cargo-transportation-along-middle-corridor-grows-63-in-seven-months/">68%</a> to <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2024/12/kazakhstan-china-introduce-digital-cross-border-permits-to-facilitate-shipments/">3.8 million</a> tons from January to October 2024. The European Union&#8217;s Global Gateway and China&#8217;s Belt and Road Initiative have both invested in key projects to facilitate the development of the TITR.</p><p>With Russia&#8217;s continued war of aggression against Ukraine, shipments across Eurasia have been forced to bypass Russia due to European sanctions. Kazakhstan&#8217;s <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/middle-corridor-looks-to-insulate-global-supply-chains-from-geopolitical-risk/">dry ports</a> of Khorgos and Dostyk have both increased in capacity, <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-middle-corridor-a-geopolitical-game-changer-in-eurasian-trade/">port</a> developments in Baku (Azerbaijan), Aktau and Kuryk (Kazakhstan) facilitate trans-Caspian shipments, and the long-awaited China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is set to begin construction next year. This new railway will be the first east-west railway from China going outside of Russia and Kazakhstan. Seeing the impact of sanctions on Russia, this new railway further helps to diversify trade routes and mitigate future risks as global geopolitical tensions continue to rise.</p><h2><strong>China Invests $1.8 Billion in Kazakhstan's Wheat Processing Sector</strong></h2><p>China's Dalian Hesheng Holdings Group is set to <a href="https://primeminister.kz/ru/news/olzhas-bektenov-obsudil-s-rukovodstvom-kholdinga-dalian-group-stroitelstvo-predpriyatiya-po-glubokoy-pererabotke-pshenitsy-29495">invest</a> up to $1.8 billion in an industrial park for deep wheat processing in Kazakhstan's Akmola region. The project will be <a href="https://timesca.com/china-to-build-wheat-processing-plant-in-kazakhstans-akmola-region/">implemented</a> in multiple phases, with an initial investment of $500 million to $800 million, and up to an additional $1 billion for the second and third phases. Phase one will process 1 million tons of wheat annually, with plans to expand to 3 million tons per year. Construction is slated to begin in the second quarter of 2025, generating approximately <a href="https://www.grainunion.kz/en/article/3492#:~:text=China%20to%20Invest%20%241.5%20Billion%20in%20Wheat%20Processing%20in%20Kazakhstan&amp;text=The%20Chinese%20company%20Dalian%20Hesheng,the%20second%20quarter%20of%202025.">2,000</a> jobs.</p><p>The project includes a coal-fired thermal power plant and a coal chemical complex, capable of producing 150,000 to 400,000 tons of liquid ammonia annually for fertilizer production. Kazakhstan&#8217;s Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov has highlighted the venture&#8217;s alignment with the nation&#8217;s goals to boost value-added goods in agriculture, especially as the country experiences record grain harvests.</p><p>Kazakhstan-China agricultural collaboration is growing rapidly. Earlier this year, <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/103745/">CITIC Construction</a> announced a $1 billion deep grain processing facility in Kazakhstan's Almaty region. Wheat, which constitutes <a href="https://www.world-grain.com/articles/20842-kazakhstan-to-build-wheat-processing-plant">80%</a> of Kazakhstan's grain production, has seen export volumes to China rise from 750,000 tons in 2019 to 3.5 million tons in 2023. This industrial park is expected to modernize Kazakhstan's agricultural sector and stimulate logistics and trade, reinforcing the country&#8217;s role as a net agricultural exporter.</p><h2><strong>China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Project Commences</strong></h2><p>On Dec. 27, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/a-ceremonial-start-to-construction-of-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway/">inaugurated</a> the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway in Tosh-Kutchu, Jalal-Abad. This 523 km line will connect Kashgar in China with the Uzbek rail system, passing through Torugart, Makmal, and Jalal-Abad in Kyrgyzstan, aiming to enhance regional connectivity and position Kyrgyzstan as a transit hub in Central Asia. The project, in discussion for decades, has now secured China's approval, with the Kyrgyz segment receiving an investment of 33.9 billion yuan (US$4.7 billion). Construction is expected to begin in July 2025 and conclude by 2031.</p><p>The route is projected to transport <a href="https://timesca.com/important-deal-signed-for-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-project/">15 million</a> tons of cargo annually, adding an additional transit route through Central Asia, and the first through Kyrgyzstan. This will be the first direct rail link connecting Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to China&#8217;s rail network, helping to further diversify China&#8217;s trade routes, lower transit times, and help connect southern Kyrgyzstan to the rest of the world. Currently, the majority of cargo passes through the Khorgos and Dostyk checkpoints on the China-Kazakhstan border before being able to divert south into Bishkek or Uzbekistan.</p><p><a href="https://vlast.kz/english/60686-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-between-optimism-and-concern.html">Concerns</a> remain over the importance of the rail line, as some analysts argue that since the line will only traverse through the south of Kyrgyzstan, it poses minimal benefit for the Kyrgyz people as it fails to connect the north and south of the country. Others are concerned about the financial <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/who-will-actually-benefit-from-the-china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railroad/">burden</a> this project may put on Kyrgyzstan, in addition to the possible displacement of local communities, and project transparency. Reportedly, a <a href="https://kloop.kg/blog/2024/12/27/zhaparov-dal-start-stroitelstvu-zheleznoj-dorogi-kitaj-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan/">railway</a> connecting Balykchy to Makmal is currently under <a href="https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/stroitelstvo-zheleznoj-dorogi-balikchi-kochkor-prodolzhaetsya-postroeno-35-km-puti-rkfcuebzfzfneuuk">construction</a>, a route that would connect Bishkek to southern Kyrgyzstan. However, there has been minimal reporting on this project, its progress, and when, or if, it will be completed.</p><h2><strong>Tianshan Shengli Tunnel Breakthrough</strong></h2><p>On Dec. 30, drilling of the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3292756/chinese-tunnel-crews-punch-through-xinjiang-mountains-record-setting-expressway">Tianshan Shengli</a> Tunnel, a 22.1 km expressway cutting through the Tianshan Mountains in Xinjiang, was completed. The tunnel, expected to be the world&#8217;s longest of its kind, will cut travel time between northern and southern Xinjiang from three hours to 20 minutes, improving connectivity of Xinjiang&#8217;s two largest cities, Urumqi and Korla. Construction began in April 2020 and finished 18 months ahead of schedule using advanced boring technology.</p><p>The project is expected to open to the public in <a href="https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202412/1326006.shtml">October 2025</a> after road building, electrical engineering, and interior design work are completed. The project, part of a 56-km expressway, has been forced to tackle high altitudes of 1,000 meters and extreme temperatures well below zero degrees. Once operational, the tunnel will cut down transport time and help shorten supply chains and support Xinjiang&#8217;s connectivity to Central Asia.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: November 2024]]></title><description><![CDATA[On October 6, the construction of Kazakhstan&#8217;s first nuclear power plant was given the green light after 71% of voters said yes at the nuclear power construction referendum. Four companies from France, South Korea, China and Russia are competing for the contract, with Russia&#8217;s Rosatom being hailed as the favorite.]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-november-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-november-2024</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 02 Dec 2024 15:01:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/2d6ab527-5b35-4caa-972c-ed62352df441_1080x1080.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>Kazakh Nuclear Plant Consortium</strong></h2><p>On October 6, the construction of Kazakhstan&#8217;s first nuclear power plant was given the green light after <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-nuclear-power-referendum/33146657.html">71%</a> of voters said yes at the nuclear power construction referendum. Four companies from France, South Korea, China and Russia are competing for the contract, with Russia&#8217;s <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/3281263/kazakhstan-votes-whether-build-first-nuclear-plant">Rosatom</a> being hailed as the favorite. Reports are now indicating that Kazakhstan is considering forming a <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/11/120_385460.html">consortium</a> of the four nations for the project. Kazakhstan wants the best technologies available for the construction of the nuclear power plant and believes that a consortium might be the best solution. If <a href="https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13828-kazakhstans-first-npp-economics-and-geopolitics.html">Rosatom</a> wins the contract for the project or joins as a key consortium member, it will signify its continued economic and political influence in the region.</p><h2><strong>China-Central Asia Going Visa Free?</strong></h2><p>After <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-china-visa-free-travel-/32679356.html#:~:text=The%20Kazakh%2DChinese%20agreement%20on,medical%20treatment%2C%20and%20business%20trips.">Kazakhstan&#8217;s</a> 30-day visa-free agreement with China, which came into effect in November of 2023, Kazakhstan has seen a <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2024-11-01/engk-yeri-kazakhstan-sees-surge-in-chinese-tourists-after-visa-free-travel/">64%</a> increase in tourism from China in 2024. This past week Uzbekistan followed suit, signing its own visa-free <a href="https://daryo.uz/en/2024/12/01/uzbekistan-and-china-establish-30-day-visa-free-regime#:~:text=visa%2Dfree%20regime-,Uzbekistan%20and%20China%20establish%2030%2Dday%20visa%2Dfree%20regime,for%20up%20to%2030%20days">agreement</a> with China, which will allow 30-day visa-free travel for tourists between the two countries. Since March of 2021, Uzbekistan has had a 10-day visa-free agreement with China. Uzbekistan&#8217;s new visa agreement with China comes just after China updated its visa-free <a href="https://visasnews.com/en/china-visa-free-policy-extended-to-30-days/">list</a>, which allows 38 countries 30-day visa-free travel. This agreement is another step for Uzbekistan to open its borders as it was largely closed off up until 2016 under its previous president, Islam Karimov.</p><h2><strong>Upstream River Discussions</strong></h2><p>On November 1, Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, Kazakhstan&#8217;s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, met with the Chinese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Zhang Xiao, to discuss the joint use and <a href="https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-and-china-begin-negotiations-on-joint-use-of-transboundary-rivers/">distribution</a> of water from transboundary rivers, namely the Irtysh and Ili rivers. Both rivers originate in Xinjiang and have historically been a cause of <a href="https://eurasianet.org/china-has-won-water-dispute-with-kazakhstan#:~:text=Two%20major%20rivers%20flow%20from%20Chinese%20Xinjiang,the%20way%20of%20the%20disappeared%20Aral%20Sea.">tension</a> between the two countries. China has not signed the UN&#8217;s <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XXVII-5&amp;chapter=27&amp;clang=_en">Watercourse Convention</a>, whereas Kazakhstan ratified the agreement in 2001. Signatures from both parties would require equitable use of transboundary bodies of water. Without agreements on transboundary bodies of water, downstream droughts, dried-up fisheries, farming and agriculture cycles, and a source of renewable energy can be impacted. Upstream countries hold greater leverage in negotiations, as has been seen with <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/06/17/climate/water-conflict-us-mexico-heat-drought/index.html#:~:text=Tensions%20are%20rising%20in%20a,in%20a%20hotter%2C%20drier%20world.">U.S.-Mexico</a> tensions over the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers and <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-mekong-river-dams-expected-to-worsen-southeast-asian-economies-during-drought-/7211918.html">China and Southeast Asian</a> countries over the Mekong River.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-november-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs!</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-november-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-november-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>Four Central Asian Entities Land on the U.S. Sanctions List</strong></h2><p>On October 30, the U.S. added <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2700">275</a> businesses and individuals to its sanctions list. Four Central Asian businesses, Kazstanex (KZ), Uzstanex (UZ), LLC The Elite Investment Group (UZ), and LLC Service Fly Bishkek (KG) were added to the sanctions list. In an elaborate <a href="https://eurasianet.org/four-central-asian-entities-added-to-us-sanctions-list">trade scheme</a>, Kazstanex and Uzstanex were found to have procured machinery from Europe, before sending the machinery to a Chinese company, Shanghai Winsun Co., to then have the machinery resent to Open Systems Dynamic Technology in Russia. The shipments of European-manufactured machinery are believed to be used in the Kremlin&#8217;s war efforts in Ukraine. All pertinent individuals involved in the trade scheme were also put on the sanctions list.</p><h2><strong>From Trash to Treasure</strong></h2><p>Kyrgyzstan signed a $95 million deal with Chinese company JunXin to build a <a href="https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-chinese-firm-scores-a-sweetheart-deal-to-turn-bishkeks-garbage-into-profits">waste-to-electricity</a> plant just outside of Bishkek. The project is projected to be completed by November 2025 and will process 1,000 tons of garbage a day into electricity. Bishkek city will pay JunXin $17 per ton of garbage and JunXin will sell the electricity back to Bishkek, with an initial power of 20 MW/h. The plant hopes to increase its capacity to 3,000 tons in the future. The plant will cost Bishkek an estimated <a href="https://www.chemanalyst.com/NewsAndDeals/NewsDetails/kyrgyzstan-partners-with-chinese-firm-to-launch-garbage-to-electricity-power-31302#:~:text=The%20facility%20will%20process%20up,produced%20being%20sold%20for%20profit.">$6 million</a> per year to dispose of its garbage.</p><p>Bishkek has both a waste management and an air quality problem. This project is aimed at relieving the issues of the Altyn Kazyk landfill, which has been smoldering for decades and impacting the health of around 30,000 nearby residents. Bishkek has claimed that the plant will meet the EU&#8217;s emissions standards for waste incineration. While this plant may greatly benefit its waste management problem, there are currently no reports that the plant will improve Bishkek&#8217;s dire air quality situation.</p><h2><strong>New Cargo Terminal in Baku</strong></h2><p>On November 12, Azerbaijan, China and Kazakhstan formalized an <a href="https://caspianpolicy.com/research/category/azerbaijan-kazakhstan-and-china-announce-new-cargo-terminal-in-baku">agreement</a> to establish a joint cargo terminal at the Port of Alat, about 70 km south of Baku, during COP29. This facility, part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), aims to enhance container train traffic, initially <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/107643/">accommodating</a> 300,000&#8211;350,000 containers annually. <a href="https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-azerbaijan-and-china-establish-joint-cargo-terminal-in-baku/">Featuring</a> a universal cargo yard, a covered warehouse, and a container area, the terminal is set to support the &#8220;middle corridor,&#8221; a transport route providing an alternative trade corridor that circumvents Russia and Western sanctions. In March, a train successfully traveled <a href="https://caspianpolicy.com/research/category/azerbaijan-kazakhstan-and-china-announce-new-cargo-terminal-in-baku">3,200</a> miles from Xi&#8217;an to Baku via this route in just 11 days. The agreement follows Kazakhstan&#8217;s September announcement to construct a new <a href="https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-and-china-to-increase-cargo-transportation-along-trans-caspian-route/">container port</a> in Aktau, further expanding regional transport infrastructure.</p><h2><strong>Cross-Border Attack on Chinese Workers in Tajikistan</strong></h2><p>On November 18, a <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/attack-afghan-tajik-border-death-chinese-national-taliban/33206367.html">cross-border attack</a> from Afghanistan killed one Chinese national and injured four more, one of whom was Tajik. The attack was reportedly carried out by armed personnel from Afghanistan either involved in drug trafficking or a militant group onto the Zarbuzi Gorge in southern Tajikistan. The Chinese workers were reportedly working at a gold mine in the region. The event has not yet been addressed by Tajik officials.</p><p>Following this event, on November 28, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) signed an <a href="https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/security/20241129/china-reportedly-concerned-over-the-security-of-its-operations-in-tajikistan">agreement</a> to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan border. Given the threat emanating from Afghanistan, this attack should only bolster Chinese involvement in Tajikistan with actions such as investments in the Tajik military and local law enforcement. Numerous extremist groups are present in Afghanistan outside of the ruling Taliban, including Islamic State Khoresan Province (IS-KP), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Jamaat Ansarullah.</p><h2><strong>First Chinese Rail Shipment Arrives in Afghanistan</strong></h2><p>On November 23, the first Chinese freight <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/china-afghanistan-freigh-train-link-taliban/33214113.html">shipment</a> arrived in Afghanistan, reaching Mazar-i-Sharif and Hairatan via rail after traversing Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The rail line in Mazar-i-Sharif, part of the former Soviet infrastructure, was <a href="https://www.sinfin.net/railways/world/afghanistan.html#:~:text=The%20Soviet%20Union%20built%20two,probably%20sometime%20in%20the%201960s.">decommissioned</a> following the Soviet withdrawal but has since been reopened for commercial use by Uzbekistan Railways under an agreement with the Afghan government. This rail line is a critical segment of the proposed Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway, planned in 2023 to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/uzbekistan-and-the-new-realities-of-trans-afghan-trade/">connect</a> Tashkent, Kabul, and Peshawar. The arrival of this shipment signals China&#8217;s intent to strengthen economic ties with Afghanistan and support regional connectivity through initiatives like the new rail project.</p><h2><strong>Kyrgyz Russia-Bound Auto Exports</strong></h2><p>This month, Kyrgyzstan hit a <a href="https://www.autostat.ru/news/58835/">12-year high</a> for automobile exports to Russia, with 112,000 vehicles being shipped north. Ninety-three percent of the cars were manufactured in <a href="https://24.kg/obschestvo/310618_kyirgyizstan_prodoljaet_postavki_novyih_avtomobiley_vrossiyu_vosnovnom_kitayskih/">China</a> and were made up of European, Japanese, Chinese and Korean car brands. Of the cars destined for Russia from Kyrgyzstan, the majority were all Chinese brands, namely Geely, Chery, GAC, and Haval. Since Russia&#8217;s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Central Asian countries have found themselves in the re-export business to help Russia avoid sanctions. However, even prior to the war, Kyrgyzstan was in an interesting position: Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian country that is a member of the EU&#8217;s GSP+ group, the WTO, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). This provides Kyrgyzstan tariff-free or lower tariff access to multiple markets, particularly the Chinese, Russian and EU markets, making the small, landlocked Eurasian nation a prime market for re-export. Kyrgyzstan&#8217;s sharp auto export increase to Russia of 45% from 2023 highlights the impact of both Russia&#8217;s war on Ukraine and EU and American tariffs on Chinese automobiles.</p><h2><strong>Regional Chinese Ex-Im Bank Office Opens in Tashkent</strong></h2><p>On November 22, China opened a <a href="https://24.kg/ekonomika/312163_eksimbank_kitaya_otkryil_regionalnoe_predstavitelstvo_vtashkente/">regional office</a> for its Export-Import Bank in Uzbekistan&#8217;s capital. The bank will coordinate activities of the eight Caucasus and Central Asian countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Talks were held with the Eximbank delegation over potential new projects in Central Asia, particularly in hydropower, transport, telecommunications and water management.</p><h2><strong>Renewable Energy in the Land of Gas</strong></h2><p>Kazakhstan&#8217;s Samruk-Kazyna state fund signed an <a href="https://www.interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/108177/">agreement</a> with the Chinese sustainability company, SANY Renewable Energy will build a $114 million plant to construct <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2024/11/kazakhstan-and-china-cooperate-to-build-114-million-wind-turbine-component-plant/">wind turbine</a> parts in Kazakhstan&#8217;s Zhambyl region. The plant is expected to be built by the end of 2025 and is projected to create over 300 jobs. The plant will <a href="https://www.evwind.es/2024/11/30/kazakhstan-and-china-partner-for-sany-wind-turbine-plant/102989">produce</a> nacelles, hubs and towers for wind turbines, with only the blades being left out of the plant&#8217;s production.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: October 2024]]></title><description><![CDATA[After a decade of construction and delays, officials say the North-South highway in Kyrgyzsatan is projected to open at the end of this year. However, not unlike many infrastructure projects in Central Asia, the highway has gone well past its original construction timeline. In 2014 it was announced that the project was supposed to take just five years to complete, and yet, ten years later there&#8217;s still no official end in sight.]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-october-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-october-2024</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 12:03:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/3f89624a-f01b-4118-862e-447118028d72_1080x1080.png" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>North-South Highway</strong></h2><p>After a decade of construction and delays, officials say the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/kyrgyzstans-new-north-south-highway-nears-completion/">North-South highway</a> in Kyrgyzstan is projected to open at the end of this year. However, not unlike many infrastructure projects in Central Asia, the highway has gone well past its original construction timeline. In 2014 it was announced that the project was supposed to take just five years to complete, and yet, ten years later there&#8217;s still no official end in sight.</p><p>The project is being funded by the China Export-Import Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). China Road and Bridge Corporation is leading the construction of the project. Despite the delays and concerns of repayment, some Kyrgyz are excited about the highway potentially bridging the cultural divide between the north and south of the country.</p><h2><strong>Trans-Caspian Transport Route</strong></h2><p>China and Kazakhstan met to push <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2024/10/china-kazakhstan-to-increase-volume-of-cargo-flow-via-titr/">trade</a> along the Trans-Caspian Transport Route (TITR), otherwise known as the &#8216;<a href="https://middlecorridor.com/en/">middle corridor</a>&#8217; from 600 trains annually in 2025 to 2,000 by 2029. Rail projects to expand trade between the two countries are underway to increase cargo traffic to the Aktau and Kuryk seaports.</p><h2><strong>Kazakhstan&#8217;s Nuclear Referendum</strong></h2><p>On October 6, Kazakhstan went to the <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-nuclear-power-referendum/33146657.html">polls</a> to vote on whether to build the country&#8217;s first nuclear power plant. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/nuclear-power-referendum-passes-in-kazakhstan/">71%</a> of voters voted in favor of the power plant, with around 64% of eligible voters taking part in the referendum. Election monitors argued that the government was very publicly in favor of the power plant and presented the public with mostly one side of the story.</p><p>Kazakhstan is the largest <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/nuclear-power-referendum-passes-in-kazakhstan/">uranium producer</a> in the world and views nuclear energy as an <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/3281263/kazakhstan-votes-whether-build-first-nuclear-plant">environmentally friendly</a> alternative to solar and wind.</p><p>It is estimated that the nuclear power plant will <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/3281263/kazakhstan-votes-whether-build-first-nuclear-plant">cost</a> between $10-12 billion to build. It is still unclear which company will be awarded the contract, but early reports indicate that Russia&#8217;s <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/3281263/kazakhstan-votes-whether-build-first-nuclear-plant">Rosatom</a> is the favorite. &#201;lectricit&#233; de France, China National Nuclear Corporation, and Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power are also in consideration.</p><h2><strong>Uzbek FDI Diversification</strong></h2><p>With China and Russia as its top two foreign direct investors (FDI), Uzbekistan is taking steps towards FDI <a href="https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-emphasizing-fdi-diversity">diversification</a>. New deals with South Korea and Saudi Arabia have focused on water management and trade expansion, including Saudi Arabia&#8217;s <a href="https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/utilities/miahona-explores-potential-of-water-wastewater-treatment-plants-in-uzbekistan-jqf4ww7d">Miahona</a> signing a deal at the beginning of October to build four new wastewater treatment plants in Ferghana and Jizzaq. Uzbekistan signed a series of preliminary agreements with South Korea worth around $9.5 billion, while Saudi Arabia has reportedly committed over <a href="https://president.uz/ru/lists/view/7198">$30 billion</a> in investments in Uzbekistan.</p><h2><strong>Kazakh Grain Exports</strong></h2><p>Kazakhstan is planning to expand its <a href="https://timesca.com/china-and-afghanistan-are-the-main-importers-of-kazakh-grain-and-flour/">grain exports</a> to China and Afghanistan and has also resumed grain exports to Iran. Significant grain exports are also being sent to other Central Asian countries along with Russia, T&#252;rkiye, and Italy.</p><p>In the first nine months of this year, Kazakhstan has exported 1.3 million tons of grain to China by rail and is planning to reach 3 million tons by the end of the year. Grain exports headed for Xinjiang through the <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2024-10-09/engk-tank-kazakhstan-aims-to-expand-grain-exports-to-china/">Khorgos</a> port can be shipped without any fees.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-october-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs!</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-october-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-october-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>China&#8217;s Global South Strategies in Central Asia</strong></h2><p>China&#8217;s role as a &#8216;<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/can-chinas-global-south-strategy-achieve-its-objectives-in-central-asia/">south-south</a>&#8217; development partner in Central Asia differs by country. While Central Asian countries may often be seen as a monolith, their differences in economic standing, Sinophobic public sentiment, and positions within regional economic organizations significantly impact their respective relationships with China.</p><p>Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two smallest Central Asian nations have both become heavily indebted and dependent on China for economic projects and security cooperation. Kazakhstan on the other hand has built up a much larger economy and established greater diversity with its trading partners, leading towards a more balanced economic partnership with China.</p><p>With each state, China holds different <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/the-view-from-the-ground-chinas-evolving-strategy-in-south-and-central-asia/">goals</a>. In Afghanistan, China aims to secure its Xinjiang border, which has taken precedence over economic deals. However, in Kyrgyzstan, economic partnership and development remain China&#8217;s key intention. To reach country-specific goals, strategic messaging, adaption to local customs, and flexible loan repayments are seen as critical for China to maintain its relationships with Central Asian countries.</p><p>Despite heavy investments across Central Asia, anti-Chinese sentiments among civil society remain high, as protests and attacks on Chinese private security companies, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, warrant slight concerns over China&#8217;s relationship with the region.</p><p>To improve its standing with the region, Chan Young Bang, the former economic advisor to Nursultan Nazarbayev, recommends China distance itself from Russia, take a softer stance on Taiwan and improve transparency concerns.</p><h2><strong>Chinese-Kazakh Relationship Through International Organizations</strong></h2><p>Alibek Kuantyrov, a senior Kazakh diplomat, argues that <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3281832/kazakhstan-sees-more-close-coordination-china-platforms-un-sco">Chinese-Kazakh</a> relations will be boosted in the next year as Kazakhstan is set to host the second China-Central Asia summit. This past year China overtook Russia as Kazakhstan&#8217;s largest trading partner, with exports reaching $41 billion.</p><p>Kazakhstan is viewed as a focal point in the Belt and Road Initiative and Middle Corridor, which aim to connect China to Europe. Initially, there were concerns about Russia&#8217;s view of Chinese involvement in Central Asia, a place which many analysts note is still viewed by Moscow as &#8220;Russia&#8217;s backyard.&#8221;</p><p>Despite China&#8217;s strong relationship with Kazakhstan and its position as Kazakhstan&#8217;s top trading partner, the Central Asian giant has still taken a balanced approach to trade, diversifying its economic partnerships in what Kuantyrov defines as a &#8220;complex international environment.&#8221;</p><h2><strong>Officially, It&#8217;s Turkestan</strong></h2><p>This month, T&#252;rkiye decided to officially change the name &#8220;Central Asia&#8221; to &#8220;<a href="https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/world/20241011/turkiye-replacing-term-central-asia-with-turkestan-in-new-history-curriculum">Turkestan</a>&#8221; in Turkish history books. The term, &#8220;Turkestan&#8221; was the name used for the land inhabited by Turkic people prior to the Russian Revolution. Turkestan refers to the land in which <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/the-power-of-names-turkeys-shift-from-central-asia-to-turkestan/">Turkic people</a> reside, primarily Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Western China. Turkic people also live in Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and other parts of the Caucasus and the Middle East. Some experts argue that this move is a move of Turkish soft power influence in the region, pushing to act as a counter-balance to some of the larger players in the region.</p><p>The <a href="https://www.turkicstates.org/en/turk-konseyi-hakkinda">Organization of Turkic States (OTS)</a> is the largest organization grouping the Turkic-speaking nations. The OTS recently announced the adoption of a Latin-based Turkic <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2024/09/turkic-states-revive-latin-based-alphabet-to-preserve-linguistic-heritage/">alphabet</a>, a vital step viewed to unifying Turkic speakers.</p><p>Some analysts argue that the name, &#8220;Central Asia,&#8221; diminished the Turkic identity of the region. Tajikistan on the other hand, the only non-Turkic country in Central Asia, is left at a crossroads. Is Turkestan the new regional name; then excluding Tajikistan? While T&#252;rkiye is the only country so far that has participated in any form of official renaming, it bears the question: will the name &#8220;Central Asia&#8221; continue to keep Tajikistan included or will the Tajiks be pushed towards their cultural kin in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan?</p><h2><strong>FMD Vaccines</strong></h2><p>Chinese company Yangling Jinhai Biotechnology is planning to build a plant in Kyrgyzstan to produce vaccines to treat <a href="https://timesca.com/chinese-company-to-build-fmd-vaccine-production-plant-in-kyrgyzstan/">foot-and-mouth disease</a> (FMD). FMD is a highly contagious disease that can significantly impact livestock production and trade. The production of the FMD vaccine is seen as critical, especially since livestock production is the primary source of income for a large portion of rural Kyrgyz populations.</p><h2><strong>No BRICS for Kazakhstan</strong></h2><p>The 16th annual BRICS summit was held in Kazan, Russia on October 22-24. Since its founding in 2006 until 2024, the alliance stuck to its name: only Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (joined in 2010) were members. However, in 2024, BRICS finally <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding">expanded</a>, seeing Egypt, the UAE, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia (delayed membership), and Iran join the block.</p><p>In further expansion plans for BRICS, Kazakhstan reportedly received an invitation on October 16, but has decided <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/why-kazakhstan-is-refraining-from-joining-brics/">against joining</a> for the time being. Kazakhstan has stressed the importance of a multi-vector foreign policy and may view joining BRICS as potentially straining a few of its relationships.</p><p>Kazakhstan hasn&#8217;t been the only country <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/brics-china-eurasia-dollar-summit-putin/33169958.html">hesitant</a> to join. Argentina officially declined its invitation and Saudi Arabia hasn&#8217;t officially joined despite accepting its invitation, and was not seen at the summit in Kazan.</p><h2><strong>World Uyghur Congress</strong></h2><p>On October 25-27, the 8th <a href="https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/press-release-world-uyghur-congress-to-hold-8th-general-assembly/">World Uyghur Congress</a> (WUC) was held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The event is held once every three years and aims to bring together the Uyghur diaspora across 25 countries and discuss the current and future challenges Uyghurs face in Xinjiang and across the globe. <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/wuc-uyghur-congress-harassment-sarajevo-xinjiang-china/33171721.html">Zumretay Arkin</a>, the director of global advocacy at WUC, said the event dealt with significant hacking attacks, physical threats against its members, and attempts to prevent the event from taking place. Some of the threats have come from the Chinese Embassy in Sarajevo.</p><h2><strong>New Kyrgyz Industrial Plants</strong></h2><p>On October 25, Chinese investors agreed to begin the construction of four <a href="https://timesca.com/chinese-investors-to-build-new-industrial-plants-and-residential-compound-in-kyrgyzstans-naryn/">production facilities</a> in Naryn, central Kyrgyzstan, including a car assembly plant and an LED manufacturing plant. A combined $140 million will be invested between the two plants, which is projected to create 1,200 jobs.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support our work.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p></p>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silk Road Monthly: September 2024]]></title><description><![CDATA[China Expands Strategic and Economic Ties with Central Asia Through Growing Infrastructure and Security Collaborations]]></description><link>https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-september-2024</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-september-2024</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrew Gundal]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 08 Oct 2024 14:02:45 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/b60419f0-3d73-46ab-b02e-e68467cf4738_1080x1080.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>Bedel Border Crossing </strong></h2><p>On September 3, China and Kyrgyzstan opened the third border <a href="https://akipress.com/news:793826:Bedel_checkpoint_inaugurated_on_border_between_Kyrgyzstan_and_China/">crossing</a> between the two countries. The Bedel border crossing is now the northernmost China-Kyrgyzstan crossing, <a href="https://timesca.com/new-checkpoint-opens-on-kyrgyzstans-border-with-china/">situated</a> in Issy-Kul region and Aksu prefecture. The border checkpoint was reportedly <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240904/da6a2881247c4389904db4115ec00ba0/c.html">agreed</a> upon last May during Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov&#8217;s state visit to China.</p><h2><strong>China-Central Asia Counterterrorism Meeting</strong></h2><p>On September 10, representatives from the Ministries of Internal Affairs from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan met in <a href="https://astanatimes.com/2024/09/china-central-asia-join-forces-to-counter-terrorism-combat-transnational-crime/">Lianyungang</a> in Jiangsu province. Talks were held to discuss regional cooperation in countering terrorism and transnational crime, primarily extremism, cybercrime, drug trafficking and human trafficking.</p><p>Chinese Minister of Public Security, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3278141/central-asia-china-touts-universal-security-forum-counter-terrorism-crime">Wang Xiaohong</a>, highlighted that &#8220;China is willing to enhance the capability for counterterrorism and transnational crime fighting, and build an efficient and pragmatic cooperation platform with Central Asian countries to achieve the vision of universal security.&#8221; Wang emphasized the importance of the forum to build security cooperation and build trust between China and Central Asian states.</p><p>This meeting came a year after the first China-Central Asia summit, and publicly introduced China-Central Asian <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3278141/central-asia-china-touts-universal-security-forum-counter-terrorism-crime">cooperation</a> to security and stability. Central Asia is a major region for the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has seen new railroad projects, increased trade, and greater cooperation with China.</p><h2><strong>Chinese PSC Presence in Central Asia</strong></h2><p>Odil Gafarov, a political science PhD student at Southern Illinois University, discussed the role of Chinese private security companies (<a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/videos/2024/09/boots-on-the-ground-what-chinese-private-security-contractors-do-in-central-asia?lang=en">PSCs</a>) in Central Asia. He explained the significance of the region for China&#8217;s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has seen over $70 billion of Chinese investments in the region.</p><p>However, Chinese interests in Central Asia go beyond just economics, covering security as well. The Chinese government remains very concerned over the security and stability of its western border in Xinjiang. China conducts joint military exercises and intelligence sharing with Central Asia.</p><p>The main objective of Chinese PSCs in Central Asia is to protect Chinese assets, both investments and personnel. Chinese PSCs&#8217; services include logistics, security training, armed/unarmed protection, intelligence gathering, and insurance services. Chinese PSCs have been introduced to accompany BRI projects as a result of attacks on Chinese workers, anti-Chinese protests, and disputes with locals. PSCs are required to abide by local laws and the rules set out by the Chinese government.</p><h2><strong>Nuclear Referendum in Kazakhstan</strong></h2><p>On October 6, Kazakhstan held a <a href="https://eurasianet.org/october-referendum-will-decide-future-of-nuclear-energy-in-kazakhstan">referendum</a> to decide whether to build a nuclear power plant to support its electric grid. The referendum <a href="https://timesca.com/kazakhstan-referendum-approves-first-nuclear-power-plant/">passed</a> with a sizable majority. Reminders of a nuclear past hold many voters hesitant, particularly, the memories of the <a href="https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/chernobyl-accident">Chernobyl</a> disaster and <a href="https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/semipalatinsk-test-site/">Semipalatinsk</a> nuclear testing site. Other voters are concerned of the environmental impact it could have, given that it will likely be built near Lake Balkhash and could impact its water supply.</p><p>Russia&#8217;s Rosatom was considered the favorite to be <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-nuclear-toqaev-russia-china/33102429.html">awarded</a> the project, while China&#8217;s National Nuclear Corporation, France&#8217;s EDF and South Korea&#8217;s Korea Hydro &amp; Nuclear Power were also being considered. The nuclear power plant will be the <a href="https://www.nucnet.org/news/country-signs-long-term-uranium-deal-with-china-11-1-2023">first</a> nuclear power station built in Kazakhstan.</p><p>Earlier this year, Kazakhstan&#8217;s Kazatomprom signed a long-term <a href="https://www.nucnet.org/news/country-signs-long-term-uranium-deal-with-china-11-1-2023">deal</a> with China&#8217;s National Uranium Co. Ltd to export uranium to China. Kazakhstan is the world&#8217;s largest uranium provider, producing over 40% of the world&#8217;s uranium.</p><h2><strong>Uzbek Battery Energy Storage System</strong></h2><p>The battery energy storage system (BESS) <a href="https://eurasianet.org/uzbekistan-making-progress-on-green-energy-power-plan">project</a> has been successfully completed in the Fergana Valley. The BESS facility has the capacity to produce 150 MW/300 MWh. Chinese Energy Overseas Investment Co. Ltd (CEEC), Huawei, and Central South China Electric Power Institute (CSDI) were awarded the $140 million contract to construct the BESS facility.</p><p>The facility is projected to produce 2.2 billion KWh of electricity annually. Uzbekistan has experienced numerous power outages in recent winters due to a surge in electricity demand. The new <a href="https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/ustanovlena-pervaya-sistema-khraneniya-energii-dlya-nakopitelnoy-elektrostantsii-v-ferganskoy-oblast/">plant</a> is expected to increase the stability and reliability of Uzbekistan&#8217;s power grid.</p><div class="captioned-button-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-september-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="CaptionedButtonToDOM"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! Feel free to share this post and contribute to the conversation on Asian affairs!</p></div><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-september-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Share&quot;}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.theasiacable.com/p/silk-road-monthly-september-2024?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&action=share"><span>Share</span></a></p></div><h2><strong>Skyhansa</strong></h2><p>The Kazakh-German consortium, <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/105900/">Skyhansa</a> signed off on a project to build a cargo-passenger airport in the Khorgos special economic zone (SEZ) at the German-Central Asia <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/central-asia-facing-5-assertive-presidents-germanys-scholz-gets-rebuffed-on-ukraine/">summit</a> on September 17 in Astana. The project will reportedly cost $500 million and is projected to create 300 jobs.</p><p>Khorgos (Khorgas in China) is a multinational city, situated on the China-Kazakh border. It is the largest <a href="https://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/khorgos.html">dry port</a> in the world, handling an annual freight volume of around 15 million tons. The <a href="https://timesca.com/kazakh-german-consortium-to-build-cargo-passenger-airport-in-khorgos-eastern-gate-sez/">airport</a> is projected to handle 500 passengers per hour, 250,000 annual tons of cargo, and 550,000 tons of fuel in its fuel storage facility.</p><h2><strong>Freedom Holdings</strong></h2><p>Freedom Holdings, a Kazakh conglomerate based in Almaty, is planning work with China International Capital Corp to help sell <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3278150/freedom-holdings-eyes-hong-kongs-dim-sum-bond-market-fund-kazakh-optic-fibre-project">dim sum bonds</a> on the <a href="https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2024-09-13/freedom-holding-corp-weighs-issuing-bonds-on-hong-kong-stock-exchange-to-finance-telecommunication-projects-in-kazakhstan/">Hong Kong</a> market. This move comes in an attempt to finance a &#8220;<a href="https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/could-eye-catching-results-from-kazakhstans-fintech-sector-signal-the-rise-of-a-central-asian-powerhouse/">hyper highway</a>&#8221; across Kazakhstan. <a href="https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/103471/">Freedom Telecom</a>, the recently created subsidiary of Freedom Holdings is planning to invest $236 million by 2027 to provide data centers and high-speed internet access across Kazakhstan.</p><p>The proposed data center will be located in Aktau, in western Kazakhstan on the coast of the Caspian Sea. Aktau is also the start of the <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3278150/freedom-holdings-eyes-hong-kongs-dim-sum-bond-market-fund-kazakh-optic-fibre-project">Trans Caspian Fibre Optic Cable</a>, which runs under the Caspian to the Azeri port city of Sumgayit. The &#8220;hyper highway&#8221; will reportedly <a href="https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3278150/freedom-holdings-eyes-hong-kongs-dim-sum-bond-market-fund-kazakh-optic-fibre-project">connect</a> Central Asia with the Middle East and Europe, while bypassing Russia.</p><h2><strong>Chinese Security Initiatives in Central Asia</strong></h2><p>Adina Masalbekova, a Bishkek-based China-Central Asia researcher, discussed China&#8217;s security leverage in Central Asia with <a href="https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/09/how-china-leveraging-security-cooperation-central-asia">USIP</a>. China offers three key initiatives to counter Western influence and hegemony: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI).</p><p>Through these platforms, China emphasizes noninterference, territorial sovereignty, and win-win cooperation. The SCO highlights the &#8220;three evils&#8221; of separatism, extremism, and terrorism as the threats to participating countries&#8217; security and sovereignty.</p><p>Chinese leverage, while yielding these platforms, has prevented any momentum of Xinjiang-related protests in Central Asia. Meanwhile, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have faced their own separatist concerns in Karakalpakstan and Gorno-Badakhshan. Kyrgyzstan has seen Chinese PSCs operating throughout the country, over concerns of information dissemination, protests, and anti-Chinese demonstrations or attacks. Many Central Asian countries have adopted Chinese technology in developing their own &#8220;safe&#8221; or &#8220;smart city&#8221; projects, leading to concerns over surveillance and privacy infringements.</p><h2><strong>Chinese Grant to Kyrgyz Ministry</strong></h2><p>On September 19, an agreement was signed to allocate a <a href="https://timesca.com/china-gives-200-million-yuan-grant-aid-to-kyrgyzstan/">grant</a> of over $28 million from the Chinese government to the Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy and Commerce. It is unclear which projects the grant will finance, but there are talks over the provision of agriculture equipment and machinery and the opening of an agricultural training center.</p><h2><strong>Chinese-Kyrgyz Trade Center</strong></h2><p>On September 21, a Chinese-Kyrgyz trade cooperation <a href="https://timesca.com/kyrgyz-chinese-trade-center-opened-in-xian/">center</a> opened in Xi&#8217;an. The center will hold exhibitions of Kyrgyz products, facilitate meetings between Kyrgyz and Chinese entrepreneurs, and provide information to the Chinese public about Kyrgyzstan.</p><p>A Kyrgyz trade <a href="https://www.akchabar.kg/en/news/v-siane-otkrilsya-torgovij-pavilon-kirgizskoj-respubliki-hfktbajqahegdyvy">pavilion</a> was also opened on September 21 in downtown Xi&#8217;an. The pavilion will sell Kyrgyz goods both offline and through Chinese applications such as WeChat, Pingduoduo, and Duoyin.&nbsp;</p><h2><strong>Solar Plant Construction</strong></h2><p>On September 23, China <a href="https://www.pv-magazine.com/2024/09/30/construction-begins-on-263-mw-solar-plant-in-uzbekistan/">Datang</a> began constructing a 263 MW construction plant in Uzbekistan&#8217;s Tashkent region. The project will require over 600 hectares of land and a $150 million investment. At the end of 2023, Uzbekistan had a solar power <a href="https://www.gracesolar.com/NewsInfo/12521.html">capacity</a> of 253 MW.</p><h2><strong>Kazakh Agro Production Project</strong></h2><p>Chinese state-owned CITIC Construction has agreed to invest over $1 billion to construct a deep grain processing <a href="https://timesca.com/chinese-company-to-build-sugar-substitutes-plant-in-kazakhstan/">plant</a> in Almaty region. Over 2,000 <a href="https://www.azernews.az/region/231765.html">jobs</a> are estimated to be created for this project.&nbsp;</p><p>The project will construct a production line with a capacity of 300,000 annual tons of wheat processing. The plant will produce maltose, fructose, crystalline fructose, allulose, crystalline dextrose, sodium gluconate, gluten by-products, and feed.</p><h2><strong>CKU Railway Company</strong></h2><p>On September 28, LLC China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company <a href="https://timesca.com/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-company-opened-in-bishkek/">opened</a> in Bishkek. The railroad project was agreed upon in June between representatives from the three countries. It will be the first railroad directly connecting Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with China.</p><p>The railroad will run through Kashgar, Torugart, Makmal, Jalal-Abad, and Andijon. It is projected that the project will cost around $8 billion, which is significantly higher than the initial cost projection of $4.7 billion.</p><h2><strong>Chinese Soft Power in Kazakhstan</strong></h2><p>Berikbol Dukeyev <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/09/kazakhstan-china-soft-power-adaptation?lang=en">discusses</a> the forms of Chinese soft power in Kazakhstan in response to anti-Chinese protests in the Central Asian state. As Kazakh public opinion has become more influential in shaping policymaking in the aftermath of the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/kazakhstan">2022 protests</a>, Dukeyev argues that China has stepped up efforts to improve its image in Kazakhstan through cultural, educational, and media initiatives.</p><p>Anti-Chinese sentiment is rooted in <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/rumors-of-secret-land-lease-to-china-causes-unease-in-kazakhstan/">fears</a> over Chinese land acquisition and expansion. Misinformation and concerns over Chinese investment have sparked protests in Kazakhstan. China has responded with cultural exchanges between the two states and co-productions of films highlighting the strength in partnership and historical ties between the two countries.</p><p>Kazakhstan enjoys visa-free access to China, with many students now studying in China. Skepticism still remains as China is attempting to build trust with the Kazakh people without overstepping.</p><p>This is not dissimilar to previous soft-power initiatives in Central Asia. Chinese soft power initiatives in <a href="https://osce-academy.net/upload/file/ChReport_eng.pdf">Kyrgyzstan</a> also grew after the proliferation of anti-Chinese protests. China has collaborated with Kyrgyz media outlets to publish PRC reprinted content, along with organizing training programs for Kyrgyz journalists and tailoring PRC media more for Kyrgyz audiences.</p><div><hr></div><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.theasiacable.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Thank you for reading The Asia Cable! 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